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CLASSICAL SUBJECTS AND MODERN SUBJECTIVITIES

Barbara Goff, *Guest Editor*

Introduction

BARBARA GOFF

The papers assembled here represent the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Reading in June 2004 and titled "Classical Subjects and Modern Subjectivities." The impetus behind the conference was to explore not the public dimension of classical reception, as in the discourses of architecture or politics, but the pressure of classical antiquity on more intimate dimensions of the modern (posteighteenth century) subject. Generations of Western subjects, not exclusively identified with an elite, have been conditioned by exposure to a classical education, which has ensured, among other things, that philosophical accounts of the correct trajectory for both individual and community have often been couched in terms of nostalgia for a classical past, and that modernity's most influential theorizing of desire is articulated in images drawn from classical antiquity. While it is neither possible nor persuasive to draw strict lines of demarcation between the "public" and the "private," as many of these papers demonstrate, it is hoped that the focus here on subjectivity will contribute to the developing range of ways in which scholars and students are currently thinking about reception of classics.[1]

Because it functions as a master trope for temporality, classics has had a privileged place in many accounts of subjectivity, and Edith Hall's keynote paper discusses how frequently and variously the discourse of classics feeds into the contemporary return of the subject. Although the subject was consigned to nonexistence by the critical developments of the 1960s, chiefly structuralism and deconstruction, there is now room for the reemergence, Hall concludes, of a subject that was earlier marginalized as belonging to the female, the slave, the working-class person, or other denigrated category. These marginalized subjects, as Hall shows, have often engaged in a self-fashioning that is classically informed. Relations to classical antiquity, however, are also unavoidably mediated by the subjectivities of others—writers, readers, and increasingly translators—who constitute much of the process of reception that Hall examines. Her essay concludes with discussion of the fragment, in classics and

elsewhere, and of the various resonances of "displacement" and "survival" as they refer both to subjects and to texts.

Dirk Held's paper considers the role of ancient Greece at what is arguably the inception of the modern subject, in the late eighteenth century. It transpires that the subject was not transcendent in its early days, later to be destabilized by contemporary critical theory, because the subject of the late eighteenth century is characterized by a radical disjunction between interior and exterior that renders it estranged from nature and from itself. Drawing on the writings of Kant, Nietzsche, and especially Schelling and Hölderlin, Held shows that ancient Greece offered an idealized version of wholeness, equilibrium, and oneness with nature, which might not be apprehended on a rational level but was present to the creative imagination. After Winkelmann, and especially in the poetics of Hölderlin, art was the sphere in which the idealized past might be re-created and might provide a blueprint for a bearable future.

Held's account resonates with that of Hall in that antiquity is avowedly an object of desire, but the values of temporality, and of unity or fragmentation, are differently rendered. Isabelle Torrance's paper also deals with the late eighteenth century, but much more specifically, foregrounding Goethe's version of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris.* The simplicity and directness of ancient Greece, as modeled by Iphigenia, provide a refuge from revolutionary upheaval, but since the subjectivity invoked in this play is that of a female, the situation is complicated. Since Goethe's play also represents an attempt to mediate between Christian and pagan notions of personal morality, moreover, the figure of Iphigenia and her gender identity are not themselves simple or direct at all. However, it appears that Goethe's relative familiarity with the ancient Greek languages means that his access to antiquity can be represented as less mediated than some.

The relationship between Horace and certain members of a nineteenth-century British male elite can definitely be represented as untroubled. Familiar through a traditional classical education, Horace's poems, in a series of translations, adaptations, and parodies, form, as Stephen Harrison's paper shows, an element of shared cultural capital that helps to bond this elite and protect it from outsiders. Unlike the challenging gender identity of Iphigenia, the ostensible class identity of the Horatian voice offers reassurance that past and present are unproblematically the same. Where the situation becomes more complex is that Horace, like Iphigenia, must serve to unite Christian and pagan versions of morality; and the class situation of the historical poet, as well as the numerous par-

odies produced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggest that the boundaries patrolled by the elite must be somewhat permeable.

The final essay collected here takes us from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth. Focusing on Freud's study of Jensen's novel *Gradiva* and on Derrida's subsequent study of Freud, Ika Willis offers a theorizing of the processes of reception that is informed by psychoanalysis and deconstruction. The complex relations between desire in the present and desire for the past are explored in the metaphors of telecommunication, which are shown to be appropriate for the study of reception because they paradoxically enable direct communication by the mediation of detour and distance.

The papers presented here, then, do not cohere around a period or a topic, but their varying concerns for the subject and its relations to classical antiquity do coalesce into a meditation on one persistent trope. The relationship to classical antiquity constructed by many of the texts considered here is one of desire—a desire for antiquity—that repeatedly converts historical distance into a dream of untroubled immediacy. This seamless move from past to present can then be pressed into service to provide a refuge from the social and political upheavals characteristic of modernity. To analyze the desire of historical subjects, represented in texts, is only a step away from acknowledging the complex pathways of our own desire for antiquity, and in this respect the papers gathered here can claim to address some of the main issues that power contemporary interest in reception.

Notes

[1] Not all the speakers could be represented here. My thanks to Alastair Blanshard and Alexandra Lianeri for their contributions to the conference. Special thanks to my co-organizer, Maria Wyke, and to the relevant office staff of the Department of Classics at the University of Reading, namely Susan Melia, Agostina Hawkins, Delphine Scott, and Rhiannedd Smith. At a later stage Rebecca Lane provided invaluable editorial assistance.

Subjects, Selves, and Survivors

EDITH HALL

The Subject of Time

Classicists can legitimately argue that their right to be stakeholders in the new economies of the academy is based on the philosophical idea, first fully developed in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit* [1927]), that a key constitutive element of subjectivity is *temporality.* With the slightest degree of modification, the notion of temporality in subjectivity intensely illuminates the reasons why ancient Greek and Roman texts and artifacts have proved so culturally long-lived and versatile. In his interpretation of Heidegger, Albert Shalom (1993) emphasizes that subjectivity in the known universe only arose after a long time when there was no subjectivity at all; in each one of us, subjectivity only arose at some unknown point after our father's spermatozoon fertilized our mother's egg. Temporality, which currently remains entirely beyond our control either as individuals or as a species, thus constitutes the very source of our subjectivity (Shalom 1993, 189). There are, of course, one or two other philosophical concepts that can certainly stake nearly equivalent claims to importance in the makeup of the self, especially spatiality and corporeality. There has also been a great deal of recent literature produced by psychologists on what they call the "self."[1] They often assume that the dominant explanatory metaphor for the sense of a continuous self, which unites our diverse constituent "selves," is no longer the linear story or plotline, but something more like a computer that processes information, a central processing unit (CPU) (Knowles and Sibicky 1990). Yet even the scholars who have produced these studies would undoubtedly agree that the CPU needs loci by which to sort that information, and that the dominant loci by which we, as subjects, experience the world are always primarily temporal. From this point of view, the ancient world from which we trace our origins, and against the backdrop of which we constitute our identity, has always represented—and will probably always represent—a key locus by which we experience temporality.

It is in black American thought that the arguments from temporality have been developed more than in any other arena, a reaction to the appalling fact that slaves were until so very recently not only denied a collective history, but even individual dates of birth. Here there is much to be learned from the remarkable black American Frederick Douglass, born into slavery in Maryland during the second decade of the nineteenth century, who became obsessed with discovering his date of birth. This need continued to nag at him throughout his life; he called it "a serious trouble" even as a free man in his sixties (Gates 1987, 98–102). Henry Louis Gates has written that

> We mark a human being's existence by his or her birth and death dates, engraved in granite on every tombstone. Our idea of the self . . . is as inextricably interwoven with our ideas of time as it is with uses of language. In antebellum America, it was the deprivation of time in the life of the slave that first signaled his or her status as a piece of property. Slavery's time was delineated by memory and memory alone. (Gates 1987, 100)

To a classicist, therefore, it is distressing to find Phillis Wheatley, a late eighteenth-century Boston slave, and the first African ever to publish a book of poems in English, express her reflections on memory, race, and the lacunose nature of her own cultural inheritance in a poem that is classically infused. In *On Recollection* (an abstract she names by abbreviating *Mnemosyne* to *Mneme*), Wheatley muses on the way that this female personification of Recollection enables her new "vent'rous *Afric*" poet to range "in due order" the "acts of long departed years," and to paint "the actions done / By ev'ry tribe beneath the rolling sun" (Wheatley 2001, 34–5). Wheatley could have had little access to any data about the long departed acts of her own ancestors beneath the sun that shone on the continent from which she came. But she was, in fact, fortunate in the (relative) richness of the information about her personal beginnings: she did at least know that she was born somewhere in West Africa at some time near 1753.

The notion of linear temporality turns Greek and Roman authors into the stemmatic ancestors of the contemporary subject, since the classical past is so often imaginatively constituted as the moment at which the consciousness represented by our own (and our species') "light bulb" was initially switched on. Most moral philosophers tend to the view that the notion of the subject is, in all disciplines, undergoing a massive project of

reconstitution, a process in which the contribution of classics, of Western culture's foundational texts, will become virtually inevitable. It is difficult to foresee anybody, at least as yet, abandoning the notorious stemma that Foucault constructed in *Technologies of the Self* (1988) where he traced the constitution of the self-through-writing, via Stoic self-examination, directly to Marcus Aurelius in his *Meditations*, followed by Augustine's *Confessions*.[2] For whenever there has been a revolution in the idea of subjectivity, the texts of ancient Greece and Rome have historically come into play, either as constituting the genealogical origins of the contingently constituted sense of subjectivity, or (to put it slightly differently) as tracing the etiology of Western humanity's textuality. For René Descartes in his *Meditations*, it was the reformulation of the master egos Paul, Augustine, and subsequently Thomas Aquinas.[3] For Heidegger, it was Karl Reinhardt's 1933 reading of Sophocles and certain aspects of early Greek philosophy (Halliburton 1988, 265), especially its pagan basis, so different from the Judeo-Christian tradition that Heidegger was concerned to problematize.[4] However, for Hannah Arendt's (1978) study of the will in *Willing*, Epictetus became the first Greek to treat will in a way that *did* offer any serious potential for real assimilation by the monotheistic Judeo-Christian tradition.[5] This principle can even work negatively. For one prominent (white) campaigner against slavery in the nineteenth century, the loss of the contemporary records of black resistance and cultural achievements, the destruction of the "record of the true relation which blacks now bear to this Republic," would represent a profounder grief to future scholars even than the loss of the great library of Alexandria.[6] For Gates, moreover, in an interesting shift from authority as derived from stemmatic descent to authority as derived from evolutionary parallel, an argument of this type emerged to refute the hoary old criticism of black literature that had argued that it must be inferior precisely because it originated in oral genres and media. As Gates (1987, 37) points out, this criticism was rendered obsolete and entirely redundant by nothing other than the Homeric researches of Milman Parry and Albert Lord.

Contemporary psychologists agree that it is the interpersonal situations undergone by an individual that generate the sense of self, but that these are significantly supplemented and informed by cultural materials that allow one vicariously to experience roles, identities, and emotions generated by personal interactions. Such cultural materials include all kinds of discourse, texts, drama, art, and now films and television (Smith-Lovin 2002, 131; Hall 2006, 20–6). Ancient texts and artifacts

that are still studied and enjoyed today, as well as contemporary novels, films, television programs, and dramas set in antiquity, will therefore be potential sources of the sense of self;[7] on the argument that temporality is a core component of subjectivity, they will offer, specifically, sources connected with the originating locus. A survey of the personal accounts of the books that informed or altered the subjectivity of the proletarian heroes studied by Jonathan Rose in *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (2001) indicates the striking recurrence of certain key ancient authors, read in translation, often because they were the recommended reading matter on lists compiled by workplace reading groups, Mutual Improvement Societies, and Worker's Educational Associations. At the top of such lists there long stood the figures of Homer (often read in Pope's translation), and Marcus Aurelius. Will Crooks (1852–1921), future Labour MP, grew up in extreme poverty in East London, but bought a two-penny secondhand translation of the *Iliad*, and was dazzled: "What a revelation it was to me! . . . I was transported from the East End to an enchanted land."[8]

Two poems by late eighteenth-century women, one on each side of the Atlantic, provide illuminating examples. One is Anne Yearsley's poem *Addressed to Ignorance, Occasioned by a Gentleman's Desiring the Author Never to Assume a Knowledge of the Ancients*, in which the humble milkmaid-turned poet, from Bristol, reveals the extent to which her own self-definition has been shaped by her reading of canonical authors. But her relationship to them is formulated in a paradoxical and complicated way. She both reveres them and yet radically questions their right to receive the reverence long bestowed upon them by elite, and male, society. She painstakingly shows off her knowledge of ancient figures (Achilles, Ulysses, Socrates, Diogenes, Hesiod, and Vergil), while insouciantly arguing that if Pythagoras's theory of reincarnation is to be believed, these august figures may all be engaged in lowly occupations now, while she may have been, in previous incarnations, a much more high-status individual.[9]

Yearsley campaigned against the slave trade on which her native Bristol's fortune was founded, and it was a slave, Wheatley, who wrote the other poem to be discussed here, about a decade earlier. In *To Maecenas* (1773) this black poet, whose writing and publishing activity was wholly unprecedented, tried on a series of identities she had encountered in her reading of classical authors, in a transparent quest to identify or formulate a poetic persona adequate to self-description. She first adopts the voice of Horace, a freedman's son, in order to address her patron

(ironically, her "Maecenas" was almost certainly another woman, Selina Hastings, Countess of Huntingdon and a prominent Methodist patron of black Britons); she then asserts her inability to rise to Homeric or Vergilian heights, but assumes the persona of Patroclus begging to borrow Achilles' armor in the *Iliad* (16.21–45) (Wheatley 2001, 9–10). As a black woman, she is as unskilled but as well intentioned in relation to the history of white male poets as Patroclus was as a warrior in relation to Achilles. In this image her perceived artistic inferiority and her actual low social status seem to be combined, in a manner not dissimilar to her self-abnegating characterization as "the last and meanest of the rhyming train" in her well-crafted and moving Ovidian poem, *Niobe in Distress* (Wheatley 2001, 53–9). Finally, and unsurprisingly, she identifies a true ancestor in the African dramatic poet Terence, but asks the Muses why she can find no other: "Why this partial grace / To one alone of *Afric*'s sable race?"[10] By half a century later, however, American blacks were beginning to frame some of the arguments from Mediterranean history and literature that have recently been attributed, rather, to a late twentieth-century white Jewish intellectual, Martin Bernal, in *Black Athena* (vol. 1, 1987). For, a century and a half earlier, in 1837, the New York newspaper *Colored American* included an editorial vehemently arguing that blacks could aspire to the achievements of the ancient Egyptians and Carthaginians, to the literary skill demonstrated in Hanno's *Periplous,* and to the brilliance of Terence's drama.[11]

With hindsight it seems obvious that Lévi-Strauss and the other dominantly white male abolitionists of the idea of the individual subject, who operated in the 1950s–1980s (see below), could afford the luxury of abolishing it because it was already theirs. To the classical scholars among them, the attractive ancient Greek and Latin texts were perhaps more transparently susceptible than Hanno or Terence to anthropological structuralism: Odyssean colonization fantasies, Hesiodic myth, or Herodotean ethnography (see Vernant 1970; Vidal-Naquet 1981; Hartog 1980). Another subject-free way of analyzing the classics was offered by the sort of deconstructive approach that abolished the possibility of semantic stability, of ever locating a single meaning in any ancient text (e.g., Goldhill's [1984] deconstruction of the *Oresteia*). Another was to treat, for example, tragic theater as an ideological corpus with virtually no relationship to the individual dramatists who produced it; this approach denied the relevance of the author's personal views to the dialectical expression of the beliefs that underpinned their society (Hall 1989). More subtle methodologies might cope with the traditional litera-

ture of the subject (e.g., Roman love elegy) by effectively removing the spotlight from the subject and reading the poetry in a way that dissolved its *object* into a textual construction (see e.g., Veyne 1983; Wyke 1987). Yet for the *post*poststructuralist world, if that is indeed what we now inhabit,[12] the most generative ancient Greek or Latin texts are those that help form almost any subjectivities *other* than the white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied Christian (or arguably Judeo-Christian) subject of established Western philosophy and political theory. The subject attempting to define itself may use the *Odyssey* of Derek Walcott's diasporic black *Omeros*, the *Agamemnon* of the endlessly recuperated Clytemnestra of twentieth-century feminism (on which see the recent study of Komar [2003]), or the *Philoctetes* acted by Ron Vawter, a prominent campaigner for gay rights, as he was dying of AIDS in 1994 (Hall 2004a, 11–2). Equally, it might rediscover obscure ancient authors such as Julia Balbilla or Eudocia Augusta (Balmer 1996).

Readers and Others

In order for these alternative subjectivities to emerge, some previously ignored historical subjects swimming in the textual stream that flows into ours needed, first, to be excavated. This procedure might be described as self-conscious and constructively critical atavism. Fiona Macintosh and I have tried to practice this type of cultural atavism in our protracted research into the meanings found in Greek tragedy by British scholars, translators, and dramatists since the Restoration (Hall and Macintosh 2005). An outstanding cultural ancestor of all scholars of ancient Greek literature is Gilbert Murray, whose historically specific reading of *Trojan Women* at the dawn of the twentieth century, in accordance with his own personal opposition towards the British role in the Boer war, has at least implicitly informed every subsequent discussion and performance of that tragedy. At a time when he was inveighing against British imperialism in southern Africa, Murray subjectively reacted to the ancient play as an outcry against Athenian imperialism. This interpretation has not only affected but actually been adopted by the majority of the play's readers (Hall and Macintosh 2005, ch. 17).

An even more telling example to be discovered in the history of classical scholarship must be Basil Gildersleeve's highly individual reaction to Pindar. Gildersleeve was intensely loyal to a nostalgic vision of the Old South, a vision forged before and during his service in the Confederate cavalry during the American Civil War, an experience that marked him

indelibly. Yet most classical scholars have known him solely as an exceptionally important figure in the history of research into Pindar. There is not a late nineteenth- or twentieth-century commentary or scholarly article on the epinician genre that is not at some level still informed by Gildersleeve's brilliant and lucid commentary on the Olympian and Pythian odes (1885). Yet it is inevitable that our understanding of Gildersleeve's own subjective responses to this Theban encomiast of the aristocracy must be immeasurably deepened by excavating the inside of the Confederate scholar's head (see Schein 1986; Hopkins 1986; and DuBois 2003, 13–8). He had personally identified himself with Pindar, and above all with the anodyne, beautiful, aristocratic, traditional, idealized, elegant world conjured in Pindaric epinicia. That idealized ancient world, existing entirely in the elite imagination, exhibits a capacity for erasing all the pain entailed by its underlying mode of production, namely slavery (P. W. Rose 1992, 141–84). This is painfully similar to the artificial prettiness and fundamental denial of the truth demonstrated throughout the genre of the Confederate Romance, where the nineteenth-century southern plantation is a place of conjured delicate sentiment, magnolia blossoms, and moonbeams, a set of images that attempts to obscure or eradicate the reality of systemic slave exploitation, rape, and torture (Gates 1987, 50).

Gildersleeve certainly saw himself as protecting his compatriots from constitutional slavery to the North, rather than fighting for the personal right to be a slave owner. Yet he would have insisted on the right of the men who fought for the Confederacy to determine for themselves whether they should own slaves, who were either black Africans brought to America like Wheatley in the previous century, or their descendants. Wheatley, as we have seen, struggled to identify an authentic voice in which to articulate her own experience. Classical subjects—conceived as white, free, and male—proved of only marginal help in the constitution of her literary self: black, unfree, and female. We as classicists, who proportionately have a greater chance of being female than ever before, have also always had an ambivalent relationship with literary subjectivity. Feminist thinkers have long since seen that the notion of a unitary transcendental subjectivity must collapse in the face of the existence of two sexes (see, e.g., Johnson 1980). They have also argued that it is precisely because the female subject has been excluded from the institutionalized legal and political domains that she can be crucial to contemporary discussion of subjectivity (see, e.g., Miller 1988). The "objective" voice of the traditional scholar, from this viewpoint, can be seen as a sort of

expressive costume that female scholars can wear, but of which they and their readers must be aware if they are to participate in scholarly discourse: as a kind of compulsory intellectual transvestism, it needs to be acknowledged (Rabinowitz 2001, 191). The scientific and speciously objective subject traditionally articulated in formal classical scholarship has thus been challenged; scholars such as Judith Hallett (1997) and Nancy Rabinowitz (2001) have advocated the use of a more personal, intimate voice, which raises to consciousness rather than effaces what personal experiences and attitudes might be bringing to bear on scholars' interpretations and uses of classical artworks.

The Canadian classics scholar and poet Anne Carson opened her Martin Classical Lectures, *Economy of the Unlost (Reading Simonides of Keos with Paul Celan)* (1999b), by repudiating scholarly "objectivity" while, at the same time, apparently criticizing the intrusiveness of her own subjectivity: "There is too much self in my writing . . . my training and trainers opposed subjectivity, I have struggled since the beginning to drive my thought out into the landscape of science and fact where other people converse logically and exchange judgements—but I go blind out there" (1999b, vii). But another significant factor in classicists' particular relationship with the topic of subjectivity has been much less obviously ideological, and has more to do with contingently available types of evidence. It is the ambivalence that results from the usual lack of external biographical material, a problem treated with delicate humor in the Czech poet Miroslav Holub's poem *Homer*, in which the ancient epic poet strolls the seas between his seven alleged birthplaces, "unseen, unburied, unexcavated, casting no biographical shadow" (trans. Ewald Osers in Holub 1990). Yet it was precisely with such biographical information that, at least in the 1980s, our colleagues in departments of later literatures, many of whom had declared dead the very idea of authorship, were so happy to dispense. This tendency did, in fact, penetrate classics. When I was an impressionable postgraduate student in the mid-1980s, I remember vividly the cynical scoffing of some theoretical sophisticate at the idea that it just might be relevant to Aeschylus's emotional response to the Persian military that his brother had died as a result of a terrible wound inflicted at Marathon. Yet it is quite impossible to conceive of a situation, even at the very acme of the first-wave poststructuralist assault on the subject (on which see below), in which classicists would not have jumped on the discovery of, say, the private diary of Sappho or Praxiteles, the correspondence between Ovid and Julia, or evidence that Aeschylus's father had died tragically in the bath.

What has made this issue seem particularly pressing has been the case of the attempt to excavate the lives and experiences of the women who lived in Mediterranean antiquity. At exactly the same time as the French poststructuralists and their followers were announcing the death of the subject, female classicists, especially in the United States, were lamenting the necessary and depressing limitations on gynocritical readings of the Greek and Roman classics. One way out of this impasse lay in Don Fowler's insistence that in the case of ancient Greek and Latin texts the resistant writing practice celebrated by Cixous can also become an approach to *reading*; feminist readers and their sympathizers do have access to an alternative hermeneutic, which need not require simply endorsing male authorial control over women's voices in male texts (Fowler 1997, 10–1). Such alternative readings have been explored, for example, in the work that Fowler's student Efie Spentzou (2002) has conducted on Ovid's *Heroides.*

Despite the near impossibility of biographical criticism in relation to ancient authors, there remains, however, much under the heading "subjectivity" to make classicists feel a special sense of proprietorial smugness, even authority. The tradition of literature in ancient Greek or Latin seems not only to have invented a certain type of authorial presence and personality, but thereafter to have supplied a large number of the strong literary "I" voices that still resonate in the Western head: Sappho, Archilochus, Nossis, Cicero, Catullus, Horace, Ovid, and so on. The ancient Greeks, moreover, certainly invented the self-conscious *theorizing* of the I voice, above all in Plato's assault on the speciousness of *oratio recta* in the immeasurably influential treatment of mimesis in his *Republic*, followed by Aristotle's perceptive treatment of how assuming another persona can allow an author to express controversial views, as Archilochus (so Aristotle says) used the *êthos* of Charon the carpenter in order to denounce wealth and tyranny.[13] There have also been virtually invisible routes by which ancient texts have come to be involved in the constitution of more recent selfhood. An exceptionally important example is the implication of Marcus Aurelius's practical Roman Stoicism in the history of the North American self-help manual, above all through its impact on Dale Carnegie, author of the classic *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (1936). Carnegie explicitly recommends Aurelius's *Meditations* (actually entitled *Ta eis heauton* or *To Himself*), as a source of self-help, for example in *How to Stop Worrying and Start Living* (1948).[14] The ultimate philosophy of Carnegie, encapsulated in his famous saying that if life gives you a lemon, make lemonade, is nothing

but a twentieth-century equivalent of the famous Stoic doctrine that if life has made you a donkey, at least you still have the option of pulling the cart with dignity. Carnegie was a self-made American hero, brought up dirt-poor on a Missouri farm, and his writings have had a huge impact on millions of Americans; they are the foundation text not only of the American self-help manual and industry, but of moralizing daytime television shows, especially Oprah Winfrey's. I suspect it was through Carnegie that Aurelius was discovered by another boy who dragged himself up from poverty, William Clinton, who claims to reread the emperor's thoughts every year or two.[15]

The key subjectivities involved in Greek and Roman reception studies, therefore, include those of the authors who have adapted ancient texts and those of the readers and scholars who have studied and enjoyed them. The issue of temporality, the closely related notion of the etiology of the Western subject, and an atavistic interest in the subjectivity of previous "receivers" of classics are all part of the story. But there are of course other significant intermediating subjects, especially translators, for none of us now (nor for many centuries) has been brought up to speak Latin or ancient Greek as our mother tongue. Classical culture is *always* experienced in translation. The subjectivity of the translator has been inserted into the hermeneutic process for all of us, not just those of us (including myself) who, even after learning the languages, habitually use cribs: this is because ancient Greek and Latin are so "incontrovertibly dead," as Louis MacNeice so memorably put it in *Autumn Journey* (1979; originally published 1938, 125). There is always a translator, another language, and what Derrida calls the essentially new work created by translation;[16] Greek and Latin classics offer unusually and universally empty ideological vessels into which translators and their readers pour their own subjectivities. It was Plato who began the Western theorization of the I voice in literature, so it is perhaps appropriate that it is in connection with a Platonic scholar that the history of the Western theorization of the act of translation is usually thought to begin. Certainly the crucial interdependence of the act of translation and the act of interpretation was brilliantly expressed by Friedrich Schleiermacher in the introduction to the first volume of his translation of Plato, first published in 1817 (1855, 5–56).

The identity and virtual presence of the translator can have a powerful mediating impact on the way we read ancient poetry, as I recently experienced reading some of Catullus's more obscene, misogynist, and phallically obsessed poems in the company of their most recent female trans-

lator, a middle-aged Englishwoman of conventional appearance and East Sussex domicile, Josephine Balmer. The unexpected effect of inserting a female subjectivity between Catullus and the reader is to take the seediness out of a world dominated by notions of sexual degradation. Indeed, I have rarely before felt the importance of the translator as companion subject in the process of reading to such a degree (Hall 2004b), except, perhaps, when frustrated by the misrepresentation of ancient feminine grammatical gender by prefeminist male scholars.[17] The "transvestite" translator, adaptor, or appropriator of the ancient subject is more often these days a modern woman dressing herself in the words of an ancient man (even if the new reassembled poem by Sappho comparing her own ageing process to that which eventually withered the male Tithonus's beauty was first published in Martin West's [2005] supplemented text and translation). But transvestite translators and adaptors have indeed become one of the most striking aspects of contemporary reception. An excellent example of creative transvestism here is Marie Darrieussecq's *Pig Tales* (1997; French edition, *Truismes* [1996]), subtitled in English *A Novel of Lust and Transformation.* The female first-person narrator is a sex-industry worker who turns into a sow. She has a generalized historical relationship, as the subject of metamorphosis, with Ovid's sexploited heroines, but a more specific one with Lucius of Apuleius's *Metamorphoses*, a foundation text in the history of the Western novel (on which topic Darrieussecq used to lecture at the University of Lille). The relationship between Apuleius's ass-hero and Darrieussecq's pig-heroine has excited less critical attention than her more oblique references to individuals in Kafka and Orwell, but it is revealed in several features. These include the application of potions, the treatment of Christianity as a bizarre mystery cult, the vision of political dystopia, the physical sufferings undergone by the narrator, her experience of bestial sex from the animal's perspective, and even the Latin yelled at her by the religious fanatic in the lunatic asylum, "*vade retro, vade retro*" (Darrieussecq 1997, 85). What is interesting here is the female writer (an avowed feminist) making her point about male treatment of women's bodies by inscribing her own subjectivity on one of the paramount foundation texts (the most important of which will probably always be the *Odyssey*) of subjectivity in fiction.

Recent female translators and adaptors of ancient poetry have been particularly fascinated with the subject positions of the dying, especially the speeches or thoughts expressed in ancient literature by individuals about to die at the hands of more powerful individuals. Josephine

Balmer's *Fresh Meat: A Perversion of Iliad 22* (2004b, 41–2) rewrites the climax of the *Iliad* entirely from the dying Hector's viewpoint, taking her cue from his final speeches (22.337–43, 297–305, 250–9). Carson's (1999a) *Autobiography of Red* can be seen as an extended response to the fragment of Stesichorus's lost epic which describes a fight between Geryon and the mighty Heracles.[18] In the passage that follows, Geryon droops his neck in death at the hands of Heracles, and is likened to a poppy that spoils its beauty by suddenly shedding its petals.[19] When transformed by Carson in her poetic novel, this fragment provides the climax—an intense moment of orgasm in the mile-high club, as Heracles begins to masturbate the ecstatic red monster in a plane high over the Andes:

> He felt Herakles' hand move on his thigh and Geryon's
> head went back like a poppy in a breeze
> as Herakles' mouth came down on his
> and blackness sank through him. Herakles'
> hand was on his zipper. Geryon gave himself up
> to pleasure. . . . (Carson 1999a, 118–9)

Geryon's right to subjectivity triumphs over his millennia-long objectification as the creature who existed simply to be slain in Heracles' tenth labor. Geryon displaces Heracles from the center of his myth, and himself takes center stage, substituting for his own death an erotic triumph over the lover who once (in Carson's story) callously abandoned him.[20]

If Carson has shifted the experience of Geryon from the periphery to the center of the ancient myth of Heracles, the conceptual journey undertaken by several other important recent adaptors of antiquity has been equally centrifugal, or perhaps centripetal: authorial subjects who feel themselves somehow excluded from the center (whether by class, gender, race, or sexuality) have been making central what was once peripheral to ancient narratives. This tendency is, of course, not entirely new. Recent poetry engaging with Greek and Roman texts shows a widespread tendency to select subjectivities not quite central to ancient myths—as if asking a character played by the tritagonist in a drama, rather than by the protagonist, to develop his or her own perspective. One example is the focus on the nameless slave who saved the baby Oedipus in Gjertrud Schnackenberg's cycle *The Throne of Labdacus* (2001), a poem that, incidentally, explores at length the issue of the subjective experience of temporality. An extreme and telling example is

Balmer's *Philomela*, where the words articulated are those of an *actually mute* ancient subject, on the topic of her sister and the death of her sister's child. This poem was written as Balmer was trying to come to terms with the death of her beloved little niece (Balmer 2004b, 22). Similarly, Fiona Macintosh (2004) has argued that the displacement of the plays about Oedipus from the center of the stage of the 1980s and 1990s, in favor of those about Clytemnestra and Medea, directly reflects the challenge Melanie Klein's mother-centered psychoanalytical model has (at least since the 1960s) posed to her mentor Freud's obsession with the phallic father.

Although the post-Renaissance reception of the Homeric epics has been an almost exclusively male affair, George Steiner's (1996) collection *Homer in English* includes rather grudgingly, as if to compensate for the startling paucity of female authors in the collection, Jemima Makepiece Sturt's fascinating 1875 poem *Penelope's Musings.* This reflects in the voice of Penelope (who is aware that Odysseus has been unfaithful) that she knows he will leave her again, concluding, "I know I'll be alone at death" (Steiner 1996, 187). But Sturt's brilliantly original response to the *Odyssey*, which was never actually published, is dismissed in Steiner's perfunctory preface as an "amateurish lyric" (Steiner 1996, 187). Notwithstanding the important contributions of H.D. and other pioneering female writers and poets, it took until the late twentieth century for Sturt's approach to be fully appreciated and developed.[21] In their excellent study of two recent poem cycles by women based on the *Odyssey*, Sheila Murnaghan and Deborah Roberts (2002) show how both poets, Linda Pastan and Louise Glück, use Penelope as their access point to the ancient epic, thus dovetailing with contemporary classical Homeric scholarship, which has come close to displacing Odysseus as the central interest of the poem.

A similar tendency is discernible in prose fiction, the medium that has been most intimately associated with subjectivity and its theorization since as least as early as Georg Lukács's *The Theory of the Novel* (1920; originally published 1914). There is a noticeable recent vogue for novels that are in dialogue with Greek tragic (usually Euripidean) texts and share one striking tendency: they use strongly defined narrators or subjects textualized in free indirect discourse who are selected from characters originally marginal—or at least not central—to the ancient play (see Hall, Forthcoming b). Thus, in Haruki Murakami's Japanese bestseller *Norwegian Wood* (1987; English translation 2000), which engages extensively with Euripides' *Electra*, the narrator is the I voice of the Beatles'

song *Norwegian Wood* ("I once had a girl," etc.), who has intense love relationships with not one but two Electra figures. He is a sort of Pylades—an involved but fundamentally marginal observer. In Barry Unsworth's *The Songs of the Kings* (2002), whose ancient undertexts are many, but to which the most important is *Iphigenia in Aulis*, the dominant subject of the first half is the seer Calchas, and of the second Sisipyla, Iphigenia's favorite slave. It is by no means accidental that both these individuals confide to the reader that they have other, authentic, non-Greek names—Kalunas and Amandralettes, respectively—which have remained known almost exclusively to themselves. The same sort of principle often applies to recent historical fiction set in Greek and Roman antiquity: in Steven Pressfield's Thermopylae epic, *Gates of Fire* (1998), the narrator is not Leonidas nor Xerxes nor any famous person of equivalent status, but Xeones, an invented figure. He is the Acarnanian attendant of the Spartiate warrior Dienekes, and thus a man of low status in Sparta but, unlike the helots, at least notionally free.[22]

Other writers have even been challenging the conventional, Hegelian opposition of subject and object, which virtually defined consciousness as the incisive, masterful, knowing subject's experience of the passive, known object. Of enormous significance here is Robert Burns Stepto's study of black narrative, *From Behind the Veil* (1979). From studying the biographical accounts of nineteenth-century slaves, and the ways that they were paternalistically framed by white emancipationists, Stepto develops a critique of the whole notion of narrative control, a critique in which objects become subjects and subjects interact with other subjects. In classical reception, an important example is Elizabeth Cook's *Achilles* (2001), which experiments with the free indirect discourse of a whole series of figures involved in Achilles' myth, for example in her bravura account of the violent sexual encounter between Peleus and Thetis which produced Achilles in the first place; this sequence alternates, with appropriate violence, between their two perspectives (2001, 13–9). In Christa Wolf's *Medea* (1996), as if in homage to the dramatic form of the canonical text standing at the head of her stemma, the novelist uses an ambitious plan in which the subjectivity is passed like a football between Medea, Jason, Glauce, and three socially inferior narrators—a Colchian former pupil of Medea, and two of Creon's Corinthian astronomers. In William Golding's *The Double Tongue*, published posthumously in 1995, a central undertext is Euripides' *Ion*, and yet the narrator (this time in unmediated first-person narrative voice) is Arieka, a priestess of Apollo at Delphi, somehow displaced from her marginal role in the ancient play to

become the rape victim in Creusa's place. Carson insists that her *Autobiography of Red* is *A Novel in Verse* (its subtitle). This signals the importance of its treatment of subjectivity (traditionally a novelistic property), and indeed this emerges repeatedly in explicit discussions of the difference between subjects and objects in art and photography, and in frequent references to Heidegger (see Hall, Forthcoming b).

Classics in Pieces

Carson's Geryon has survived his marginality in Stesichorus's ancient narrative, his rejection by Heracles, his unusual skin color, his bodily idiosyncrasies, and his homosexuality. He has also, more literally, physically survived the fragmentation of his Stesichorean papyrus. In the wake of the great nineteenth- and twentieth-century papyrus discoveries, many have been fascinated with the tenuousness of the threads that brought ancient texts to us, the single most significant example here of course being Tony Harrison's *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus* (1990), in which the satyrs sprang through the ancient paper on which Sophocles' *Ichneutae* had lain hidden in an Egyptian rubbish dump for two millennia.[23] *Trackers*, however, a play about class struggle in the political and the aesthetic realms, was not notable for its interest in the individual subject. In her fascinating introduction to her collection of ancient women poets in translation, Balmer (1996, 9) draws attention to the link between *female* writing as survival of the subject, and the material survival of women's poetry from ancient papyri and the medieval tradition. Indeed, fragmentariness and fragmentation *ought* to have played a much bigger role than it seems to have done in contemporary subjectivity's relationship to classics; the relevant material mostly relates to Sappho and the even more exiguous fragments of other women poets, especially Corinna and Erinna. It is in response to authors such as these that we find Diane Rayor (1990, 17) observing that fragments can offer intriguing possibilities, echoing broken conversations, half-finished sentences, or trailing voices. Balmer has indeed responded creatively to the way that the papyrus of Erinna frays, is torn, at just the point where the text's reading is "tears" (*druptei*); this is reflected in both the colometry and printed form of Balmer's version, which trails across her pages (1996, 20, 59–60).

In cultural studies, the fragment has become a matter of enormous interest and a key trope in theorization of the postmodern.[24] Fragmentation is also a vital key to the current understanding of the notion of the

self in the discipline of social psychology. The postmodern images of subjectivity used by social psychologists entail metaphors portraying it as "inscribed upon the surface of the body, as spatialised, decentred, multiple, nomadic, created in episodic recognition-seeking practices of self-display in particular times and places" (Nikolas Rose 1996, 169). The most dominant images in this discipline have been influenced by Bakhtin's notion of the dialogic imagination. According to this view, the sense of self can only exist in dialogue, that is, in relation to some audience: people who are present or imagined, specific or generalized, actual or fantasized. The self is different depending entirely on which members of this audience are being addressed. The self is plural and relational.

Bakhtin's polyphonic self has, admittedly, begun to prove fruitful in the recent appreciation of a few ancient authors; one instance is supplied by interpretation of the poems of Catullus, many of which "depend upon a polyphonic self, intersected by the voices and truths of others, a self that is created in the interpersonal space where consciousness meets consciousness" (Batstone 2000, 117). Carson, at least in *Men in the Off Hours* (2000), not only uses whole poems by Catullus, in linguistically marked "transvestite" manner, but such arcane and truly fragmentary sources as papyrus scraps of Alcman. But Carson perhaps constitutes the exception that proves the rule. Contemporary literary subjectivities that are using classical intermediaries definitely buck the "fragmentation" trend (if it is indeed the trend that some cultural critics are insisting). For the reconstituted selves that have dominated this essay—temporal, critically atavistic, transvestite, centrifugal—have actually displayed striking, indeed often defiant *integrity.* Many come into being not in order to emphasize the fragmentariness of the contemporary subject through a fragmentary or epigrammatic, haiku-like mode of expression, but in order to assemble, reconstitute, indeed glue the fragments back again into identifiably substantial texts. This is undoubtedly the case with *Autobiography of Red*, and indeed with several recent theater works using ancient fragments, including Colin Teevan's *Alcmaeon in Corinth* (2004).[25]

Yet the survival and reconstitution of such fragmentary heroes as Carson's Geryon or Teevan's Alcmaeon not only render them symbolic spokespersons for every effaced subject in the Western tradition. Their presence perhaps also reminds us that the very topic of the Reading University conference that gave rise to this collection of essays, the topic of subjectivity—at the very least, as defined as *literary* subjectivity—only just survived by the skin of its teeth the lethal assault inflicted upon it by the linguistic turn in the academy of the 1960s. The very survival—or

rebirth, or renaissance, or resurrection—of the subject as a concept followed immediately upon a single, momentous discovery, which turns the argument inevitably back to the Holocaust (where we shall have reason to return): the posthumous public revelation that Paul de Man, chief advocate of the detachment of texts from their writers, had between 1940 and 1942 published several articles expressing anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi views in the collaborationist Belgian newspaper *Le Soir.* The public's attention was first drawn to this in an article published in the *New York Times.* The revelation alerted everyone to the *morality* of detaching writers from what they wrote, at a time when many critical theorists, not just in continental Europe but increasingly in the Anglo-Saxon academies of the United Kingdom and the United States, could justifiably claim to have dispensed altogether with the very idea of authorship (see Burke 1992, 1–2). De Man had always refused to accept that writers' own lives were relevant to the interpretation of their works. But in his later, deconstructive work he denied that writing could have *any* stable subject. For de Man, the biographical subject who produced the text was eliminated: "The author disappeared in the textual machine" (Burke 1992, 2).

French-language antiauthorialism culminated, during the late 1960s, in the poststructuralism of Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, who had soaked up, only to discard, the French existentialist obsession with the authorial subject. This very notion came to seem untenable after the advent in anthropology of Lévi-Straussian structural linguistics, above all with *La Pensée sauvage* (Lévi-Strauss 1962). As Seán Burke has put it in his brilliant defense of subjectivity:

> This 'Copernican revolution' set in motion by the foregrounding of linguistic structures threw down a direct challenge to the central and founding role of consciousness. . . . In what was to become the 'slogan of the decade' for the France of the 1960s, Lévi-Strauss could thus declare: 'the goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man, but to dissolve him.' (1992, 13)

It was not only in this intellectual context that the author was declared dead. The poststructuralist project killed off the subject in all the disciplines where it had previously provided the center: as the author of literature, the patient in psychoanalysis, the transcendental consciousness of philosophy, the civic subject of political theory, and so on. Roland Barthes concisely expressed the intellectual crisis of the times when he

declared that language had become "the destroyer of all subject" (1977, 8), and that the goal of literary work was "to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text" (1970, 4). In fiction the arch-apostle was Alaine Robbe-Grillet in *Jalousie* (1957), with its absence of any I voice, its creation of a vacuum at the center of the text that the reader is forced to occupy, and its obsessive objectification of insentient items perceived visually. In film it was the enigmas of the plotless, virtuosic camera work of *Last Year in Marienbad* (1961), directed by Alain Resnais from a screenplay also by Robbe-Grillet. Meaning was to be created by the reader, and certainly not by the author. In a parallel assault on the idea of the subject of art, in the 1960s it became the group rather than the soloist or single artist that was emphasized in the public arts.[26]

This particular era of intellectual assaults on the subject made fewer waves in classics and its reception than in some areas of culture. Yet there were a few exceptions, such as Fellini's film *Satyricon* (1969), which tried hard to abolish the subject. One novel that engaged very extensively with fifth- and fourth-century Greece, above all with Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, was Joseph Heller's *Picture This* (1989). Here the engagement is conducted to a considerable extent through an oblique narrator, through whom are inscribed the thoughts of the Aristotle portrayed by Rembrandt in a famous painting of 1653 as contemplating the bust of Homer. Throughout much of the novel Aristotle becomes a clear, sardonic observer guiding the reader's reactions. But finally the novel, which has explored at length the Platonic critique of artistic mimesis, destroys its own carefully construed philosopher subject (Aristotle) by pointing out that this linguistic construct is as unreal, as nonexisting, as the Aristotle painted by Rembrandt, or the sculpture of Homer in the painting (Heller 1989, 350–1). It is questionable whether such an obsession with the linguistic basis of literary subjectivity would be so attractive to publishers today, just fifteen years later, for the Western subject is in the process of experimental and exciting reconstruction after near annihilation. Indeed, it could be argued that the subject has not actually "survived" at all, but has needed to be so radically reformulated as to bear little resemblance to the Cartesian certain I or the transcendental and clearly defined Husserlian subject. That form of subjectivity has undoubtedly been killed off, but the role of remaking the subject—indeed, some argue, of remaking the subject of philosophy itself—has passed to those whose subjectivities have been historically marginalized from mainstream discourse (Bordo and Moussa 1993, 112).

Burke (1992) argues that the author will always and inevitably elude

any attempt to be controlled by theory; this is because the author, far from representing Cartesian certainty, "operates as a principle of uncertainty in the text, like the Heisenbergian scientist whose presence invariably disrupts the scientificity of the observation" (1992, 172). Burke is referring to Werner Heisenberg, the controversial inventor of quantum mechanics, who discovered the Uncertainty Principle. As I understand it, the Uncertainty Principle means that it is never possible to determine accurately both the position and the momentum of a particle. The better you know the position, the more you disrupt the momentum, and vice versa. The subject of an experiment or investigation inevitably changes something about the object, and to an uncontrollable degree.

This metaphorical elucidation of the inevitable role of the subject in literature is strongly reminiscent of the remarkable moment in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, when the author prefaces his most definitively scientific, Hippocratic passage (2.49–51), which analyzes the symptoms of the Athenian plague entirely in the third person, with a general description of the onset of the disease at Athens, and the unelaborated statement "I had the disease myself and saw others suffering from it" (2.48). The scientific description includes an account of the very great degree of agony that the plague inflicted, the small chance of survival it offered, along with the information that it caused lasting damage to extremities, even causing permanent blindness. Throughout this passage we are wondering exactly what happened to Thucydides himself, what was the precise effect of the plague on the physical body of the author we are reading, who must certainly have believed that he was likely to die. This is indeed an instance of the Heisenbergian principle at play in the author's relation to his text. Yet arguably even more fascinating is Joel Fineman's response to this passage. Fineman was a fine scholar of literature in English, famous for his work on "the subjectivity effect" in Shakespeare's sonnets. He died of a longstanding cancer in 1989. But while dying he had written some of his best work on subjectivity, partly as a result of paying great attention to Thucydides' experience of mortal illness (Fineman 1991, 73 and esp. 80 note 28).

Surviving the Fragment

The physical survival of the ancient texts, the reassembly from fragments of ancient subjects, modern identification with ancient survivors: these are only a few of the resonances of the term *survival* for classical reception studies today. It is impossible to discuss the trope of survival without ref-

erence to one writer, who is less conspicuous for her place in the roll call of classical reception than in the twentieth-century repositioning of the female subject in Western literature: Tillie Olsen. This American activist and mother was author of one of the most famous texts beginning with the first-person singular of all time, her short story "I stand here ironing" (Olsen 1980a, 11). And it was Olsen who observed in *Silences* (a seminal lament for the lost—or at least elusive—element of female subjectivity in the literary tradition), "We who write are survivors" (Olsen 1980b, 39). In David Malouf's delicate novel narrated by Ovid, *An Imaginary Life* (1978), the depressed poet, victim of prosecution by Augustus, is surviving (just) in his Tomis exile. He asks the reader a series of direct questions about his presence in posterity: "Is Latin still known to you? . . . Have you heard my name? Ovid? Am I still known? . . . Have I survived?' (Malouf 1978, 18–9). A perception of being a *survivor*—of damage scarcely accommodated, or threat to continuing existence hardly outlived—here slides almost imperceptibly into the idea of survival as simply managing to sustain communication from one millennium to another. And the fusion of these two meanings of the term *survival* is one of the defining characteristics of the millennial subject reacting to the Greek and Roman cultural canon.

The preparation of the volume *Dionysus since 69: Greek Tragedy at the Dawn of the Third Millennium* (Hall et al. 2004) entailed thinking about the reasons why Greek tragedy seems to have chimed so in tune with the psychological concerns of the late twentieth century. Besides the more obvious factors of its potential for directors concerned with the sex war, political conflict, and ritual theater, it occurred to us rather later in the day that most Greek tragic heroes do *not* die at the end of the plays: they are what we now call *survivors.* In the judgmental, Christian world of renaissance tragedy, most perpetrators (and indeed victims) of murder, rape, incest, and so on die before the end of their plays. But in Greek tragedy the bereaved women of Troy, the blinded, polluted Oedipus, the filicidal Agave and Heracles, and the disgraced and lonely Creon all stagger from the stage at the end of their dramas, leaving their audiences wondering how they can possibly cope with their psychological baggage. The introduction to *Dionysus since 69* suggested briefly that this is perhaps the most important of all ways in which Greek tragedy has resonated with the obsessions of an age that has itself only just survived the manmade horrors of the twentieth century. Oedipus, Hecuba, Medea, and Heracles are grown-up heroes for a modern age; rejecting suicide, they stay alive and must try to accommodate their guilt, their shame, their bereave-

ment, and their trauma (Hall 2004a, 45–6). When it comes to fiction deriving from Greek tragedy, the notion of survival has taken on darkest hues. In Wolf's *Medea* the exculpated heroine is allowed physically to survive the murder of her children at the hands of the Corinthians, but has little else to celebrate; the novel shows how her enemies' control of the production and circulation of information meant that they could set her up as a childkiller for all posterity. In Unsworth's *The Songs of the Kings*, the terrible story of Iphigenia, sent to her death by a weak and ambitious father, is upstaged by the story of Amandralettes, her slave, who in a last-minute twist survives the end of the novel. She was supposed to save her mistress by being sacrificed in her place, but ends up allowing herself to be persuaded out of this altruistic act, and escaping into an uncertain but guilt-laden future (Hall, Forthcoming a).

To *survive* originally meant simply to outlive someone else, and was the term used in wills and the laws of inheritance. It then came to designate individuals who had escaped alive from accidents or natural catastrophes. It was only at some point in the mid-twentieth century that the term *survivor* began to be applied to those who had suffered painful experiences or committed painful acts, and had managed not to die or commit suicide in the process. The noun *survivor* came to be applied, in an ontological sense, to anybody who had committed or suffered anything involving trauma, and by extension to the ontological status of virtually everyone. To paraphrase Shelley, in the third millennium "we are all Survivors." We are survivors of alcoholism (our own or other people's), survivors of parental abuse, survivors of disease or violence.[27] The extent to which the concept has been informing all our subjectivities is clear from the way it is used in late twentieth-century poetry to title poems even about ostensibly minor traumas: in Marie Ponsot's poem *Survival*, the term alludes to enduring pregnancy and chatting about Sappho while watching one's husband flirt with another woman (Ponsot 2002, 72).

Besides the descendants of slaves and the survivors of the Holocaust, a third group of key survivors for our era, at least in the West, has consisted of Vietnam veterans. In the cinema the impact of the anarchy and violence of the Vietnam War on the American soldiers who managed to survive it, however damaged they were physically or psychologically, has been acutely observed in films such as Michael Cimino's *The Deer Hunter* (1978), Hal Ashby's *Coming Home* (1978), and Ted Kotcheff's *First Blood* (1982) (Riley 2004, 138). The strand that connects such cultural heroes and antiheroes not only to the moral heroism of the Greek tragic survivor, but also to ancient discourse on war atrocity, has been tellingly doc-

umented in Larry Tritle's *From Melos to My Lai: War and Survival* (2000). Fascinatingly, most reviewers have argued that Tritle's subjectivity, massively informed by his own experience as a volunteer (not conscripted) soldier in Vietnam, has been detrimental to his scholarship.[28] Goldhill, for example, in a review published in *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* (2002/3), complained about the "blatant appropriation" of ancient texts to Tritle's subjective agenda; it seems to me, however, that *blatant* appropriation is far less dangerous intellectually than what is, in the world of scholarship at least, its ubiquitous *latent* equivalent (132). More general praise has been encountered by Jonathan Shay's two remarkable studies (1994, 2002) of the psychological experiences of American soldiers, and their mirroring in the Homeric experiences of Achilles' berserk rampaging and the violence and paranoia surrounding Odysseus's homecoming. Shay had not served in Vietnam, but his readings of Homeric epic are profoundly conditioned by his experiences as a psychiatrist in Boston treating traumatized veterans. Personal experience really does matter. The most insightful undergraduate essay I have ever read on the rhetorical protocols of the *Iliad* was by a trainee marine. Bernard Knox, the most perceptive and influential of all twentieth-century writers on Sophoclean protagonists and their heroic tempers, discovered his profound understanding of Sophocles' *Ajax* when serving as a trained killer.[29] He was a paratrooper in World War II, a member therefore of an elite and highly trained special fighting force. He told me in September 1995 that he met his own particular Ajax half a century before, not in a camp or on a battlefield, but in a London pub standoff concerning the order of precedence in which different types of soldier should be served: paratroopers always felt that they had the highest status, as the men who took the greatest risks, and that they should therefore be awarded the greatest privileges. This was very shortly before both Knox and his Ajax were dropped out of the sky into France.

Some scholars who have been considering our era's obsession with the idea of survival have suggested that the important point is not that we are all actually survivors, but that we are all diagnostically *posttraumatic.* In *Trauma and Survival in Contemporary Fiction* (2002), Laurie Vickroy suggests that the major collective trauma of the Vietnam War psychologically affected the discourses of Western society to a far greater extent than previous wars, because in the wake of the forces of personal liberation unleashed during the 1960s, its veterans were able to vocalize their trauma in ways that had been impossible for previous war-damaged generations. She also explores the way that transference of traumatic

responses operates across generations, since traumatized parents have been unable to prevent their treatment of their children becoming affected by their own depression, emotional constriction, survivor guilt, and isolation (Vickroy 2002, 17, 19). One of Vickroy's central texts, interestingly, is Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, inspired by the story of the mid-nineteenth-century slave Margaret Garner, but informed by the myth of another, quite different, childkilling mother—Euripides' Medea.

Kirby Farrell (1998) goes even further in *Post-Traumatic Culture: Injury and Interpretation in the Nineties*, where she argues that trauma is not only a clinical syndrome; in contemporary culture it is "a trope something like the Renaissance figure of the world as a stage: a strategic fiction that a complex, stressful society is using to account for a world that seems threateningly out of control" (2). Our obsession with the traumas reported and depicted in news, films, television, and fiction actually elicits, suggests Farrell, revised views of the world that can become the basis for communality. Solidarity can and historically often has emerged from the process of scapegoating other groups—female, black, Jewish, gay—but this alternative is thankfully no longer (at least in public discourse) legitimate. It can, therefore, be argued that the traumas we devour in newspapers and entertainment, however peaceful our own personal lives may be, constitute a collective fantasy that functions as "an organizing or focusing tool" for contemporary society; its members are certainly having to produce new mindsets as they adjust to the stream of new forms of electronic representation and modes of self-consciousness and self-expression (Farrell 1998, 19). A slightly different argument for which the recent movie *Gladiator* could be adduced as evidence sees our (or at least North American) society as suffering from near universal *pre-traumatic* anxiety about impending global anarchy, an anxiety in which the precedent of the barbarians who sacked Rome can in itself, by merely being present to the consciousness, "have a real traumatic impact" (Farrell 1998, 25).

Yet it was the Holocaust more than any other single phenomenon that put the seal on our new meaning of the term *survivor*, as exemplified by innumerable personal testimonies, such as Jack Eisner's *The Survivor of the Holocaust* (1980), and Moshè and Elie Garbarz's *Un Survivant* (1983).[30] The question of Jewish suicide in the face or wake of unbearable trauma, and whether the burden of the particular memory of the Holocaust can ever be accommodated, are issues discussed at some length by Hannah Arendt in "We Refugees" (1978); and even here the etiology of the articulated self is traceable back to a man usually termed as a classical author.

For when Jean-François Lyotard came to discuss Arendt's work on the Holocaust in "Le Survivant" (1988), he drew attention to one of the foundation narratives for Jewish suicide and for the combination of guilt and relief in the subject of survival: Josephus's account of what happened to the last Jews alive (including himself) in the caverns of Jotapata, when besieged by Nero's troops in 67 C.E. (Lyotard 1993, 155). They discussed whether they had the right to commit suicide: Josephus—the leader, the traitor, and the survivor—proposed that each should kill the other in turn. He came out last in the drawing of lots, negotiated his fate with the Romans, and wrote *The Jewish War.*[31] Those who write are indeed survivors.

The idea of *survival* has been resonant for those suffering other twentieth-century collective and political traumas and those writing poetry and drama about them,[32] as well as for individuals living with more personal afflictions.[33] And many poems about survival do indeed use ancient myth or literature. The experience-scarred psyche of the Homeric Odysseus certainly underlies the retrospective review of the unpleasant jobs and sexual encounters in Sterling A. Brown's African American dialect poem *Odyssey of Big Boy* (Brown 1980, 20–1) as much as Judith Kazantzis's description of the returned father at the fireside in *Aside: Telemachos:* "Huddled in his coat, / with his blue furred eyes / poking at the shrinking embers / year by year" (Kazantzis 1999, 64). And the guilt incurred by Odysseus in order to survive and arrive at that fireside is emphasized by Michael Longley in *The Butchers*, a shocking retelling of *Odyssey* 22 that emphasizes the brutality and totality of the Ithacan massacre, opening with the chilling line, "When he made sure that there were no survivors . . ."[34] Another harrowing example is the account of the experience of a rape survivor in *Persephone below, or What Keeps Her There* by Jennifer Bates (1998, 33–4), while her *Explanations: Eurydice to Orpheus* is a subversion of the Ovidian heroine's amatory epistle. Eurydice takes responsibility for turning Orpheus's eyes away and sending him back to the living world, explaining that this way she has at least managed to claim Hell as her own space (Bates 1998, 10–1). An underground room of her own.

The Posthuman Subject

There is a growing perception that the form taken by our subjectivity, like our technologies and society, is undergoing a process of drastic and indeed constantly accelerating renewal. It could be argued that this

awareness is indicated even by the very fact of organizing a conference on subjectivity, as Barbara Goff and Maria Wyke did in 2004 at Reading: we are interested in subjectivity because we feel aware of it as an issue, and we are aware of it as an issue because it is changing so fast. Indeed, one of the reasons why the classical Greeks may offer such an attractive parallel at the moment, according to Armand D'Angour, is not only that they were involved in a period of intense novelty and creativity, but that they were *aware of* it. They "might reasonably lay claim to having discovered innovation" since they wrote about innovation, and in Aristophanic comedy even produced the earliest known term for it, *kainotomia*.[35] Accelerated innovation leads psychologists today into thinking about the unexpected and extraordinary consequences for the establishment of identity produced by technology of the Internet and the new virtual community it has invented (Kashima and Foddy 2002, 199). It is very much to be hoped that this is the reason for the current interest in subjectivity, rather than the other possibility that has been suggested, namely that the very emphasis on self and identity as interesting topics may be a reflection of Euro-American individualism with less than edifying resonances in the contemporary political climate, when radical anthropologists and social psychologists are stressing the importance of examining less Western concepts such as relatedness (Smith 2002, 235–6).

Near the beginning of this essay it was observed in passing that one of the loci of the subject which have a claim nearly equivalent in importance to temporality is the locus of corporeality. Two of the texts that subsequently entered this discussion have involved female authors using the subjectivity of beings without strictly human corporeality. Darrieussecq's narrator is left at the end of her novel, shifting between her pig and her human body; Carson's winged Geryon was never somatically human in the first place. A third example is constituted by Christine Brooke-Rose's notorious postmodern experiment in fiction, *Amalgamemnon* (1984). Written entirely in future and conditional tenses, *Amalgamemnon* erases reality completely. But it is, as far as it is safe to infer, the ruminations of a female professor of classics in a time when the humanities have become irrelevant and her own subjectivity has been completely destabilized by the increasing technologization of the processes by which experience is recorded. The novel draws extensively on the discourses of computer science, but fragments of the woman's former identity and consciousness drift in and out; besides several allusions to Platonic and Herodotean material, there are signs of an older and importunate male suitor, perhaps the Amalgamemnon of the title.

Early on in the novel, all the future tenses and conditionals are focused on an imminent apocalypse:

> Soon the economic system will crumble, and political economists will fly in from all over the world and poke into its smoky entrails and utter soothing prognostications and we'll all go on as if.
>
> As if for instance I were someone else, Cassandra perhaps, walking dishevelled the battlements of Troy, uttering prophecies from time to time unheaded and unheeded, before being allotted as a slave to victorious Agamemnon. (Brooke-Rose 1984, 7)

Here Brooke-Rose quite brilliantly uses one of the foundation texts of Western humanism and its stable subject in order to open her assault upon them; the figure of Cassandra, known to speak in the future tense, undermines the possibility of a subject founded on a temporal locus.

The strength of the revival of the postcolonial and postpatriarchal subject, and its concomitant reconstitution of its relationship with classics, may in fact be evidence that society is already taking its first steps towards the preparation for the question now so avidly being discussed by futurologists, and in particular cyborgologists: who or what will constitute the posthuman and postsomatic subject? In *Cyborg Citizen* (2001), Chris Hables Gray reveals that an astonishing fifty to eighty percent of his North American students would, if it were possible, download their consciousness into a computer or robot in the interests of extending their lives (2001, 190). The cyborg is itself an invention of contemporary pop culture, a replacement vampire who inhabits the boundaries between life and death, male and female. There are political theorists who for some time have been advocating the idea of virtual citizenship, of membership of a new type of participatory democracy, conducted via the Internet, which links humans irrespective of any visible identifiers such as age, sex, or ethnicity, but yet bears a stronger resemblance to what went on the Pnyx Hill at Athens than to the representative procedures in the modern parliaments. But others are going way beyond the e-citizen to the notion of the postsomatic citizen, to the cyborg itself, who is seen to open a place in politics for the abolition of all boundaries related to ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, or physical (dis)ability (Gray 2001, 192).

What role ancient Greek and Roman culture will play in the constitution of the subjectivity of each member of the posthuman community is, of course, as yet an unanswerable question, and it may be a harebrained one. But it is suggestive to find a recent survey of the issues (Gray 2001),

written by someone with very little training or interest in intellectual history, engaging perforce with ideas received from Greek and Roman antiquity. Gray adduces Plato's realm of ideas to illustrate the potential of posthumanity, and refers the reader to the Greek root ("steer") of the *cyber*-verbal stem. He also explores at length the parallel notions of the vampire (which he is unaware is a late antique figure, the first truly vampiric figure in Western canon being the bride of Menippus in book 4 of Philostratus's *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*), and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, who would never have come into his imaginary being without the Greeks' imaginary Prometheus (Gray 2001, 191–9). The subjectivity of the posthuman, at least as currently prognosticated, thus seems likely to lose nothing of its inherent need to define itself in terms of the known temporal as well as corporeal loci of the distant past.[36]

Notes

[1] For a survey of this, see Baumeister 1998.

[2] For the Foucault essay, see Foucault 1988, 16–49, with the discussion of Humphries 1997. For some fascinating observations on the importance of considering Augustine in any discussion of "the personal voice" in classical literature and scholarship, see Martindale 1997, 84–90.

[3] See the essays by Caton, Taylor, Menn, Boyne, and esp. Atkins's discussion of Descartes' *Meditation* II in Atkins 2005, pt. 1.1.

[4] See Heidegger 1959, 107: "Our relation to everything that makes up being, truth, and appearance has long been so confused, so devoid of foundation and passion, that even in our manner of interpreting Greek poetry and making it our own we barely suspect the power wielded by this poetic discourse in Greek being-there."

[5] See Halliburton 1988, 261. For a wide-ranging survey of the sense of self and identity over different cultures, which nevertheless traces the twentieth-century Western version back to late antiquity, see the seminal article of Mauss 1985 (originally published in 1938).

[6] James McCune Smith, speaking in 1851, as quoted in Gates 1987, 132.

[7] For some individual classical scholars' accounts of the way that ancient texts have informed their self-definition and perspectives on the world, see Van Nortwick 1997, with the bibliography on p. 24; de Luce 1997.

[8] Jonathan Rose 2001, 4–5, quoting from Haw 1917, 22.

[9] Yearsley 1787, 93–9; see Waldron 1996, 155–7.

[10] Wheatley 2001, 9–10. The simple profundity of Wheatley's identification with Terence must surely remind us that our subjectivity, at the onset of the twenty-first century, must be aware of the competing tension between local-national, ethnic, and global identity. Those of us who are British may well find ourselves responding to the way that the Roman empire and the Roman past had to become accommodated to the subjectivity of (as Lateiner [2003, 433] has recently put it) "the educated Jew Josephus, the Gallic Tacitus, the Spanish Martial, the Syrian Lucian, and the African Apuleius."

[11] *The Colored American* for 6 May 1837, quoted in Gates 1987, 128.

[12] See, e.g., Scheie 1998, who uses the term "postpoststructuralist" in reference to the widespread phenomenon of what might equally be called the neoethical focus of postcolonial and postfeminist theory, as articulated in Judith Butler's understanding of the term *performative* in her classic 1990 article on the performance of gender: "The notion that identity results from a performative gesture, rather than being grounded in fixed and stable categories of the subject, offers a much desired theoretical direction for the efforts of writers, critics, and others who seek to change a repressive and patriarchal status quo and who, in our postpoststructuralist world, can neither triumphantly announce the dissolution of subjectivity nor fall back on essentialist or determinist accounts grounded in a purportedly truthful 'real'" (520).

[13] *Rhet*. 3.1418b30 = Archilochus, frag. 19 (West [*Iambi et elegi graeci*]). See also Herodotus 1.12.2; Ford 2002, 147.

[14] Carnegie (1990, 133–4) cites sentiments that approximate to several passages in the *Meditations* from "old Marcus Aurelius, one of the wisest men ever to rule the Roman Empire"; see also Carnegie 1990, 231.

[15] Clinton is said to have revealed that Marcus Aurelius's *Meditations* was his favorite book at an unnamed gathering described in Márquez 1999, 1.

[16] The interpretive contribution of both the translator and of the scholar establishing a correct edition of a particular text had already been fully appreciated by both Heidegger and Gadamer; see Benjamin 1988b, 2.

[17] A particularly irritating example among the hundreds that could be adduced occurs in Theocritus's "Adonia" idyll. The old Loeb translator J. M. Edmonds's rendering of *ha tas Argeias thugatêr* as "that Argive person's daughter" (15.97), in reference to the expert operatic *diva* performing the aria in Ptolemy's palace, obscures entirely the force of the point being made in this poem about the importance of matrilineal descent and status within female communities and rituals.

[18] Pap. Oxy. 2617, frag. 4, 9–17 = *SLG*, frag. 15, col. 1, 14–7.

[19] Pap. Oxy. 2617, frag. 5, 14–7.

[20] See further Hall, Forthcoming b. Carson's *Autobiography of Red* (1999a) is an exercise in intertextual construction of the subject unparalleled in its elaboration and complexity, as has been noticed by departments of English and comparative literature all over North America. It is now possible to download and plagiarize essays on this poem, the latter which has become a set book on numerous university literature syllabi; subjectivity is prominent among the available titles. See, e.g., the anonymous WowEssays.com essay "Subjective Reality in Anne Carson's *Autobiography of Red*," available at $12.95 per page.

[21] For a survey of the uses to which Penelope's consciousness has been put in some recent poetry by both women and men, see Clayton 2004, 92–122. On feminism and Penelope, see also Hall, Forthcoming c, ch. 9.

[22] There will be an essay on this novel, with a focus on the identity of the narrator, by Emma Bridges in Bridges et al., Forthcoming.

[23] The satyrs of Sophocles' *Ichneutae* first jumped through their papyrus in the theater at Delphi in 1988, and the National Theatre in London in 1989; *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus* is published as Harrison 1990 and in Harrison 2004.

[24] On postmodernity and fragmentation, see, e.g., Derrida 1987 and Bauman 1995. A course, "The Theory of the Fragment," is available in the English department at

Sussex University: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/english/898Q3.html> (September 30, 2006).

[25] For this dramatic experiment, I recently translated into English the remaining fragments and testimonia that do or may come from Euripides' *Alcmaeon in Corinth* (a tale of averted father-daughter incest). The new play based on them was performed in September 2004 at Live Theatre in Newcastle. The composing process included workshops where the actors had to improvise the scenes of the play round a handful of fragments and a basic plot line. This play was the third Euripidean tragedy performed posthumously in 405 B.C.E., coming between *Iphigenia in Aulis* and *Bacchae*. Reconstructing it, however creatively, certainly made it possible to think about how these three plays, grouped together and performed by the same actors and chorus members, will originally have interacted; see further Teevan 2004, 9–15.

[26] This phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s has retrospectively been stressed in the editorial preface to a collection of excerpts from the influential *Performing Arts Journal* and *Performance Art* magazine (all of which were published between 1976 and 1998, during the period when the subject began to return). The editor Bonnie Marranca summarizes the shifts in focus over those ensuing two decades. The conversations "turned from space to text and narrative to fragment, from the modernist heritage to postmodernism . . . from group to solo . . . from the situation of the object to subject positions" (Marranca 1999, xi).

[27] See, e.g., Ruden 1997, ch. 1 (addiction survival) and Waites 1993, 1 (incest and abuse survivors).

[28] See Lee 2001: "The very personal perspective which Tritle employs makes *From Melos to My Lai* in some ways less compelling as an investigation of ancient Greek warfare and society. Perhaps most significantly, by insisting on exact and consistent cross-cultural matches between Greece and the United States, Tritle tends to read more than is warranted into the ancient evidence. There are as well points where his analysis does not adequately address the divergences between ancient and modern experiences."

[29] For a full and fascinating account of Knox's war experiences, and a consideration of the impact they had on his interpretations of Sophocles in *The Heroic Temper*, see now Jones 2002.

[30] See also, e.g., "Survival," the title of ch. 11 of Simon 2002. Philip Levine's poem *The Survivor*, though not about the Holocaust as such, involves the experience of the poet's grandfather, forced to migrate to the United States: "Once upon a day in 1940 / a little man had to leave / his dinner and save his life / and go with his house / on his back, sleeping nowhere . . ." (see Gillan and Gillan 1994, 48–9).

[31] *BJ* 3.387–92, 432–42. The best discussion of the whole episode and its place in the construction of Josephus's autobiography and authorial persona is Rajak 2002, 166–73.

[32] *Survival* by the African American poet Primus St. John (originally in his collection *Skins on the Earth*, republished in St. John 1999, 47) unambivalently addresses the Afro-American subject's ancestry: "Where is my father? / Black got the man, / Deep inside, / All by himself." On the very different, political importance of the "Survival!" slogan during the struggle against South African apartheid, see the collaborative drama *Workshop '71, Survival* in Kavanagh 1981, 125–71 (esp. 170) and Sheckels 1996, 84.

[33] Donna Lane's *Survival* explores the experience of cancer and mastectomy to a lesbian hoping to embark on an affair (Blackman and Healey 1994, 72). Jennifer Bates's

poem *The Survivor* concerns a woman who kills the man who has battered her for years (Bates 1998, 2). The topics of Carol Staudacher's *Survivor* are old age, its psychological delusions, and the comfort of religious faith (Sumrall and Vecchione 1997, 233). James Merrill's *A Survival* meditates on emerging from sleep after dreaming about a dead father (Merrill 2001, 109).

[34] Longley 1991, 52. For a discussion of Longley's highly individual response to the *Odyssey*, see now Hardwick 2004, 357–61.

[35] D'Angour 2000, summarizing the argument developed in detail in D'Angour 1998.

[36] This essay has benefited greatly from the reactions and suggestions of Fiona Macintosh, who kindly read the typescript, and of several people at the conference, especially Barbara Goff, Maria Wyke, Phiroze Vasunia, and Catharine Edwards. I am very grateful to all of them.

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Hellenism, Romanticism, and Subjectivity

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I

In his essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," published two years after his *Birth of Tragedy,* and with the Greeks still clearly in mind, Friedrich Nietzsche called attention to what he considered

> the most characteristic quality of modern man: the remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior—an antithesis unknown to the peoples of earlier times. Knowledge, consumed . . . counter to one's needs, now no longer acts as an agent for transforming the outside world but remains concealed within a chaotic inner world which modern man describes . . . as his uniquely characteristic subjectivity. It is then said that one possesses content and only form is lacking; but such an antithesis is quite improper when applied to living things. This is precisely why our modern culture is not a living thing: it is incomprehensible without that antithesis. (1874, 78)

Nietzsche is correct to observe that radical subjectivity is a distinctly modern phenomenon that has no role in ancient Greece. It is somewhat surprising, then, to find German thinkers of the Early Romantic period using the prism of Hellenism to help articulate a modern sense of subjectivity. In this paper I will examine two such figures, the philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). They were close friends during their student years at Tübingen, with one another as well as with the philosopher Hegel who was their contemporary. The relationship of Hellenism to subjectivity in the works of Schelling and Hölderlin cannot be fully understood without some awareness of how Kant, with his self-proclaimed Copernican conceptual revolution, brought subjectivity to the inescapable attention of modernity. In the following section, therefore, I provide a brief but necessary account of the emergence of subjectivity as an issue: brief in the

hope that its contents will not strain the reader's patience; necessary to appreciate the context of Schelling's and Hölderlin's work.

II

Subjectivity and the self have been a fixation of Western thought since Descartes. This fixation results from the fact that the means by which we interpret and interact with the world have come to be constituted by reflection on our own thinking (Bowie 1990, 1). One recent writer has gone so far as to claim that philosophers justly summarize the whole history of modern philosophy as variations on a single theme: the metaphysics of the subject (Carr 1999, 4). The metaphysics in question is that of a self-conscious subject and unitary "I" that serves as the foundation of the ideology of the modern self. Its reach extends beyond philosophers; like ideologies generally, it is experienced as transparent, natural, even self-evident. Charles Taylor in the preface to his well-known book *Sources of the Self* says modern identity is characterized by a sense of inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in nature (1989, ix). Inwardness, interiority, and individuality are widely recognized as components of modern self-consciousness. They require an epistemological supposition that the unitary first-person viewpoint is in some way authoritative and fundamental to all knowledge as Christopher Gill (1996, 127) expressed it in his examination of the differing assumptions about persons in ancient and modern thought. The modern perspective on the person is bound to the belief that moral life can be grounded only in an individual stance (Gill 1996, 11). In this respect, it is far removed from the eudaemonistic suppositions underlying ancient ethics. The modern point of view originated with Kant who under the rubric of autonomy declared that the criterion for moral authenticity was an agent's self-legislation through the exercise of free will. In *Critique of Judgment* he argued that this freedom is the ontological ground of moral law, and that moral law is an epistemological condition for awareness of our freedom (Mohr 1995, 37). Yet Kant does not hesitate to warn elsewhere that "Only the descent into the hell of self-knowledge can pave the way to godliness" (Kant 1991, 236).

Nietzsche's reference above to the uniquely characteristic subjectivity of modernity shows the effect of Kant's deep inquiries into consciousness and self-consciousness, an effect at work still today. Cartesian concern over the *existence* of self-consciousness had changed to concern over understanding the relationship between the thinking subject and her thought. A critical problem in grasping this relationship is determining

what connects the sequence of the subjects the I thinks (Bowie 1990, 16). Something has to unify the subject or we could not have the serial experiences of "I think." (Kant somewhat cumbersomely calls this the transcendental unity of apperception.) And while Kant speaks frequently of the subject, the self, and the I (Carr 1999, 38), there is much disagreement about what he means by self-consciousness. Is it, for example, conceptual awareness (and thus propositional, that I am), or some inchoate feeling of self (Carr 1999, 39)? Kant distinguishes the transcendental unity of self (objective unity of subject-object) from its subjective unity. He writes about the latter in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> The *subjective* unity of consciousness . . . is a *determination* of *inner sense* (B139). . . . [In this self-consciousness] I . . . as *thinking* subject know myself as an object that is *thought,* in so far as I am given to myself . . . yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself. (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B155; cited in Carr 1999, 42)

This is not the occasion to elaborate further on Kant's challenging ideas beyond remembering that he sets out two senses of self-consciousness, one in which the I is conscious of itself as an object with specific mental properties, and another in which the I is consciousness of the self *as* a thinking self (Carr 1999, 43). This can be distinguished as the sense of the self of which I am conscious and the consciousness of self (Carr 1999, 52).

Following in the wake of Kant came the intellectual movement known as German idealism, based on the belief that the mind's own ideas comprised the only unmediated knowledge available to it. This is the mind's knowledge of its own consciousness: in brief, *subjectivism.* Coupled with this was an insistence that all knowledge is a function of a transcendental or universal mind, a triumph of the subject but expanded to cosmic dimensions (Beiser 2002, 1–2). One final classification is absolute idealism whose adherents derived the transcendental subject from its place within nature (Beiser 2002, 4). Overall, German idealism in all its forms was systematic and holistic. In good Hegelian fashion, it engendered its own antithesis in the antisystematic countermovement known as early romanticism.

Holding this in mind, listen again to Nietzsche, declaring in *Daybreak:*

> How simple the people of Greece appeared *in their own conception of themselves!* How greatly we surpass them in our knowledge of man! But how labyrinthine do our souls appear to us in comparison with theirs!

> If we desired and dared an architecture corresponding to the nature of *our* soul (we are too cowardly for it!)—our model would have to be the labyrinth! (Nietzsche 1982, 104; Nietzsche's emphasis)

III

Turning to the intersection of Hellenism and subjectivity, we should note at the start the powerful appeal Greek antiquity held for Hegel, Hölderlin, Schelling, and their contemporaries. Rather than Nietzsche's labyrinth, this appeal was based on a valuation of classical Greece described in a recent account as embodying

> a mode of life in which the highest in man, his aspiration to form and expression and clarity was at one with his nature and all of nature. It was an era of unity and harmony within man, in which thought and feeling, morality and sensibility were one, in which the form which man stamped on his life whether moral, political, or spiritual flowed from his own natural being, and was not imposed on it by the force of raw will. [Here could be found] unity with self and communion with nature. (Taylor 1975, 26; see also Martin 1996, 123)

The image of a unified and harmonious Hellas derives of course largely from J. J. Winckelmann, whose influential 1755 treatise *Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture* famously identified noble simplicity and quiet grandeur (*edle Einfalt und stille Größe*) as the distinctive quality of Greek art. The unity and harmony claimed for Greece served as antidote both to the revolutionary turmoil of the time (Held 2004, 413) and to a growing sense of dislocation and estrangement felt by subjects living in conditions of modernity that began to emerge during the Enlightenment. By 1814 Benjamin Constant would write:

> Individuals, lost in an isolation from nature, strangers to the place of their birth, without contact with the past, living only in the rapid present, and thrown down like atoms on an immense and leveled plain, are detached from a fatherland that they see nowhere. (Quoted in Vidler 1992, 4)

From Rousseau onwards, writers gave voice to the dissonance and disorientation felt by modern subjects. The ancient Greeks in contrast were made out to be a people free from disarticulations of subject and object,

self and society. This formulation of Hellenism is principally associated with Germany but it affected the French as well, who regularly identified Greece as the precursor of rationalist and progressive elements of the Enlightenment (Held 1998, 21). Thus the architectural theorist A. C. Quatremère de Quincy, born in 1755, envied the equilibrium enjoyed by the Greeks, the "rapport exact des facultés morales avec les facultés physiques dans l'individu" (Pommier 1991, 67) and even Madame de Staël in her 1807 novel *Corinne* observed "l'unité d'existence . . . des anciennes" (Staël 1876, 243).

Dissonance and conflict moved to the center of modern experience, and humans would no longer be metaphysically at home in the world (Neiman 2002, 80). The resources for addressing the sundering of subjects from themselves, society, and nature were not readily available in Kant's metaphysics. One work, however, did lay the groundwork for a response, namely Kant's *Critique of Judgment,* which provided a foundation for aesthetics as an autonomous discipline. This enabled Schelling and Hölderlin to produce important theoretical works on art (Ameriks 2000, 7) which are pertinent to the connection between Greece and subjectivity.

History had undercut idealism's rational systematization. The elusiveness of idealism's subjective-objective unity, rooted in cognitive reflexivity, was exacerbated by the high level of abstraction at which the issues were discussed. Kierkegaard, for example, complained in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* about the abstractness of idealism's demonstration of the identity of subject and object (Bowie 1993, 4). This elusiveness seemed grounded in an irreconcilable disparity between the ancient Greeks, who according to Schiller wrote naive poetry free of self-awareness, and moderns fueled by anxieties of subjectivity who resorted to the sentimental poetry of feeling. This disparity led Hölderlin in 1795 to say that the best contemporary humans could ever achieve regarding the unity of subjective and objective would be an endless striving (Larmore 2000, 149).

In his early works, Schelling continued the idealist endeavor to articulate the unity of the subject, of the I, to find out how "the last foundation of the harmony of subjective and objective can become objective *to the I itself*" (*System of Transcendental Idealism* I/3; cited in Bowie 1990, 194). Yet by the end of that work he realized philosophy could not fulfill this task. Schelling therefore followed the lead of Hölderlin in resorting to what he termed "the general ocean of poetry" (Bowie 1990, 101). In the closing pages of *System of Transcendental Idealism*, a work deemed by one modern

critic (Hörstmann cited in Ameriks 2000, 128) to be a history of self-consciousness, Schelling claims it is

> self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its original identity with the conscious. (Schelling 1978, 231)

If the conscious and unconscious parts of the self were to be reconciled, the power of art, not the rational procedures of philosophy, would be required. Schelling, looking to Greek mythology, designated it the highest archetype of the poetic world (Schelling 1989, 36) and concluded that when art functions as mythology had functioned in early cultures it could bring our conscious reflection into harmony with nature. Only through art can the individual avoid estrangement of the subjective from the objective, of the self from the reality of nature. Tragedy was the highest manifestation of art according to Schelling, who grounds his claim by arguing in *Philosophy of Art* that the hero

> represents . . . the unconditioned and absolute itself in his person. . . . The genuinely tragic sublime depends . . . on two conditions, namely that the moral person capitulate to the forces of nature and simultaneously be victorious through his *inner character*. (Schelling 1989, 89; Schelling's emphasis)

Schelling gives the hero an interiority of character quite foreign to what is found in actual Greek tragedies (see Burns 1990, 26; Held 1990). In the early *Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1796), Schelling described Oedipus as the heroic figure of an equilibrium between the power or superior strength of the objective world and the self-affirmation of the I in its absolute freedom (*Selbstmacht*) (Courtine 2000, 60). The irreconcilability on rational grounds of deterministic nature and human freedom can, in Schelling's opinion, be unified artistically in tragedy. The self-affirmation required depends on what Schelling called inner character.

In *Philosophy of Art* Schelling states that modern art had lost unity of form and content. Greek art in contrast, particularly sculpture (Bowie 1990, 106), which retained the special status given it by Winckelmann, possessed such unity. A similar unity is found in mythology because cultures based in myth lack both the radical separation of subject and

object, and the separation of images from what reason abstracts from reality. Such separation, as Andrew Bowie (1990, 104) says, is part of the loss of home characteristic of modernity.

At the end of *System of Transcendental Idealism,* Schelling expressed hope for a new mythology that would address the problem of the separation of subjective intuition from its reflection (Bowie 1990, 105). Schelling also states in *Philosophy of Art* that Greek mythology is the highest archetype of the poetic world (Schelling 1989, 36), and believes that the essence of the Greek gods is their pure limitation and undivided absoluteness. From a modern perspective, this is a paradox since they unite universal and particular in themselves. The difficulties Schelling faced in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* in talking about the attempt of the I to intuit itself were overcome in Greek myth by the use of concrete and self-sufficient stories of the gods. No gap exists between image and what is represented, thereby allowing direct intuition of what philosophy could not express (Bowie 1990, 104). Schelling boldly claims that "as regards . . . the totality of conceptions in Greek mythology, one can show indeed that all the possibilities within the realm of ideas as constructed by philosophy are completely exhausted [*erschöpft*] in Greek mythology" (Schelling 1989, 41). He sets the example of Minerva as the archetype of wisdom and strength in unity from whom feminine tenderness has been eliminated, since the contrasting qualities together would reduce her to nullity. Were Venus to have Minerva's cold wisdom her influence would not be as destructive as it was during the Trojan War. It is the missing characteristics of these and other Greek gods, says Schelling, that give them their charm and allow them to be woven together in their various relationships. He writes: "The mystery of Life is the synthesis of the absolute with limitation. . . . The absolute in and for itself offers no multiplicity whatever, and to that extent it is for the understanding, an absolute, bottomless emptiness" (Schelling 1989, 36).

Schelling's *Philosophy of Art* presents the argument that Greek mythology uses concrete terms to present universal subjects. In this way Greek myth is linked to an absolute identity that lacks division between sensible and intelligible. There is no separation of our subjective intuition from cognitive reflection as demanded by modern science (Bowie 1990, 105). Philosophical reflection is obviated by the unity of subject and object expressed in mythology.

Lurking beneath particularity and limitation (which we can call determinateness) is a mysterious ontology that Schelling thought had been conquered by the Greeks. Under the proposition "The determining law

of all gods is pure limitation on the one hand, and undivided absoluteness on the other," Schelling writes in *Philosophy of Art* (presented in the geometric manner of Spinoza):

> As a consequence of the principle we have presented one can see further that the complete assembly of the gods can first appear only after the purely formless, dark, frightful element has been driven out. This region of darkness and formlessness includes everything that directly recalls eternity, the initial ground of existence. It has often been said that it is the [determinate] ideas that first disclose the absolute; only within them do we find a positive, simultaneously limited and unlimited intuition of the absolute. (Schelling 1989, 37)

Liberation was created by the gods' differentiation. Schelling writes in *Philosophie der Mythologie* that liberation

> gave the Hellenes their first poets, and conversely, the epoch which gave them poets brought with it the first fully developed history of the gods. Poetry did not come first, not real poetry at least, and poetry did not actually produce the explicit history of the gods; neither one precludes the other; both are the common and simultaneous culmination of an earlier state, a state of development and silence. . . . The crisis through which the world and the gods develop is not outside the poet; it takes place in the poets themselves, it *makes* their poems . . . it is not their persons . . . it is the crisis of the mythological consciousness [which] in entering into them makes the history of the gods. (Schelling 1966, 1:18; trans. Cassirer)

In this way the subjective mind of the poet draws on the absolute reality of the universe. Schelling believed the gods in the Homeric poems were juxtaposed with nature, and that infinite and finite slumbered under a common cloak. This is the reason he says that there were no ethical concepts in mythology that might concern the gods; morality is a plague only for mortals (Schelling 1989, 55). Focus on the infinite (such as ethical universals) was a post-Homeric feature. Schelling continues:

> This is not to say that earlier in Greece there were not already customs and religious acts that were more immediately concerned with the infinite. As mystery religions they distanced themselves almost immediately from the universally valid nature of mythology. It would not be

> difficult to prove that all mystical elements . . .—concepts that are related directly to the infinite—. . . were originally alien to Hellenic culture, and that Greek culture similarly was able to assimilate these elements later only in philosophy. (Schelling 1989, 55)

Through philosophy the Minervan owl took flight, and with that flight the unity and immediacy of Greek experience were lost. In Schelling's view, moderns were able to view the universe only as history, as a moral realm whose gods are gods of history. These gods could not become true gods who were alive, autonomous, and poetic.

The origins of poetry lay in the repression of chaos and disorder. Homer could not create his poetic world before mystery and the occult were overcome (Vidler 1992, 26):

> The Homeric age could not conceive a pure poetic mythology [*Göttergeschichte*] until the real religious principle had been concealed in the interior [*im Innern*], thereby granting the mind complete outward freedom. (Schelling 1966, 2: 649)

The interior that Schelling attributes to the beginning of Greek and European literature marks the initial disjunction from the exterior. This disjunction can be traversed only via Nietzsche's labyrinthine path.

IV

Friedrich Hölderlin, like Schelling, was enthralled with the vision of Greece. The main character in his novel *Hyperion* asks:

> Who can abide it, whom does not the terrifying splendor of Antiquity lay low, as a hurricane lays low young woods, as it seizes him as it did me, when he lacks as I do, the element in which he might gain a strengthening sense of himself [*Selbstgefühl*]? (Hölderlin 1965, 32; modified translation)

Echoing Goethe, Hyperion wants what modern man always wants, namely external correlatives of his inner aspirations (Constantine 1988, 96). Hyperion sought to unify the outer world with the bit of divinity he perceived within himself. Hölderlin was attuned to rising dissonances within the self as we see in his early essay "Judgment and Being" ("*Seyn, Urtheil*"):

> *Being*—expresses the connection between subject and object. Where subject and object are . . . united in such a manner that no separation can be performed without violating the essence of what is to be separated, there and nowhere else can be spoken of *Being proper*. . . .Yet this Being must not be confused with identity. . . . How can I say I! without self-consciousness [*Selbstbewusstein*]? Yet how is self-consciousness possible? In opposing myself to myself, separating myself from myself, yet in recognizing myself as the same in the opposed regardless of this separation. Yet to what extent as the same? I can, I must ask in this manner; for in another respect it [the I] is opposed to itself. (Hölderlin 1998, 37–8; Hölderlin's emphases)

An intuitive apprehension of Being is possible but it cannot be articulated propositionally. It must be approached instead indirectly through metaphor and art which became Hölderlin's means of disclosing Being. In becoming conscious of the world we are intuitively aware of a preconscious unity of Being that holds out a dream of closing the ruptures created by ordinary consciousness. The apprehension of beauty gives a measure of what that unity might be like (Pinkard 2002, 142). This is expressed in Hölderlin's great poem *Brod und Wein* (*Bread and Wine*), when the gods appear among men.

A description of night falling on a city after a day of work opens the poem. Night moves the world, including the hopeful souls of mortals. It subsists *in freiestem Geist* (most free in spirit) and will bring mortals a wine-cup more full, a life more intense and daring, Holy remembrance too. At night, jubilant madness (*frohlokkender Wahnsinn*) suddenly takes possession of the singers. Off to the Isthmus, then! . . . Off to Olympian regions . . . up to the heights of Cithaeron. For it is to these places that the approaching god points (Hölderlin 2004, 321).

The salute "*Seliges Griechenland!*" opens section 4: "Happy land of the Greeks," which Hölderlin calls the house of all heavenly beings. "Father Aether!" the singers cry. The sound resounds, and the heavenly ones enter. Their Day reaches men who shower the god with gifts (Hölderlin 2004, 323):

> This, while they can, the Heavenly bear with; but then they appear in
> Truth, in person, and now men grow accustomed to joy,
> And to Day, and the sight of godhead revealed, and their faces—
> One and All long ago, once and for all, they were named—
> Who with free self-content had deeply suffused silent bosoms,
> From the first and alone satisfied every desire.

> Such is man; when the wealth is there, and no less than a god in
> Person tends him with gifts, blind he remains unaware [*kennet und sieht er es nicht*].
>
> (Hölderlin 2004, 323–5)

People built temples and cities. "Only, where are they?" the poet asks. Thebes and Athens wither, the theaters are silent. Yet the Wine-god will reconcile Day and Night, proclaims the final stanza. The wreath of ivy he wears conveys a trace of the vanished gods to those below without gods, a diminished form of an outer correlative.

In this poem as in others, Hölderlin evokes an ultimate, holy ground where mind and the world are unified (Larmore 2000, 152). In the group, *Pindar Fragments and Commentary,* Hölderlin speaks of the loss of immediacy. Following a five-line verse translation of Pindar, frag. 151 (Bowra)—

> The law
> King of all, both mortals and
> Immortals; which for that very reason
> Compellingly guides
> The justest justice with a sovereign hand—

Hölderlin comments that the immediate (*das Unmittelbare*) is as impossible for mortals as for immortals—impossible for the immortals since the god must differentiate several worlds. Humans as cognizant beings must also differentiate several worlds because only through differentiation is knowledge (*Erkenntniß*) possible to them (Hölderlin 2004, 713). Immediacy therefore is denied to humans and god alike.

With the unity of Being thus disrupted, subjectivity comes into play. Freedom is made possible by the subject's distinction from the object, though at the cost of the dissonances that arise when the self, unable to enjoy identity with itself, is pulled in different directions.

The dislocations of human life are expressed in the final stanza of *Hyperions Schiksaalslied*:

> But we are fated
> To find no foothold, no rest,
> And suffering mortals
> Dwindle and fall
> Headlong from one
> Hour to the next

Hurled like water
From ledge to ledge
Downward for years to the vague abyss.
(Hölderlin 2004, 120)

When juxtaposed to the ideal of Greece, our depraved subjective condition is initially seen as hopelessness. The early poem *Griechenland* displays this hopelessness, though in a manner criticized as drawn from the pure zone of abstract ideals and lacking the tension of human life (Constantine 1988, 27):

I long to cross into the far country
To be with Alcaeus and Anacreon,
I wish I were sleeping in the unroomy grave
Among the holy dead of Marathon.
Oh let these be the last of the tears I've shed
For my beloved Greece, oh let
Me hear the clashing shears of the Fates:
My heart belongs already to the dead.

Beginning around 1800, Hölderlin's comprehensive poetic mythology successfully integrates images and ideas. Its basic premise is that while the present is a dark time in which we must struggle to survive, there has been a golden past, associated with Greece, and Hölderlin holds out hope for golden times in the future as well (Constantine 1988, 162–3). The figure of Diotima, celebrated in Hölderlin's verse and his novel *Hyperion*, embodies the lost ideal of personal life. Greece becomes an intensely visual and definitive evocation of an ideal and many of his poems create an imaginative flight to this land, but the poet invites us not only to look back to an ideal but forward to recovering it (Constantine 1988, 164).

In the long poem *Der Archepelagus* (*The Archipelago*), Hölderlin notes at one point that the Delphic oracle is silent, but the light above asks, what do you think of me? The Aether lies above the mountains and rules, in order that a loving people may be humanly joyful, and one spirit (*Ein Geist*) may be shared by all. But Hölderlin warns of the fractured spirit of humankind *without* the divine; dissonances drown out unity. Each person labors alone and hears only himself. Mortals greedily toil without gain (*fruchtlos*). This alienation will continue until men become aware of their soul again, until the blessing breath of love blows again as it once did with Hellas's children. The god will then reappear in the golden clouds.

The poet sings:

> Then, O then, you joys of Athens, you deeds done at Sparta,
> You delicious springtime in Grecian lands! When our autumn
> Comes, when you all, grown mature, you genii known in the ancient
> World return. . . .
>
> (Hölderlin 2004, 289)

In his evocation of the Greeks, Hölderlin was aware of his estrangement from them, and he sought in his translations of Sophocles to present the plays in a lively way that would appeal to modern audiences. He did so, he says, by accentuating the oriental strain of the tragedies. What he claimed to have achieved was to have written against eccentric enthusiasm and that he had achieved, by doing so, Greek simplicity (Constantine 1988, 293). The phrase used here, *griechische Einfalt,* resonates with Winckelmann's well-known phrase *edle Einfalt und stille Größe,* referred to above.

Simplicity and unity of the self, of the human subject, had been lost with the arrival of modernity. The articulation of what was missing from modern life often proceeded in a dialectical fashion by constructing a world in which unity and simplicity played a vital part. This world was ancient Greece. The German fascination with Greece begins with Winckelmann, who had found the essence of Hellenic beauty to be something *within* the great works of Greek art, something that could not be isolated. It was an invisible essence, and beauty lay beyond understanding (Held 2004, 422). By the time we reach Nietzsche, this Neoplatonic vision of Hellas had passed. Nietzsche found such invisible essences delusory, but he still looked to Greece for what it meant to be a human subject.

Let us close as we began, with a quote from Nietzsche, this time from *The Gay Science:*

> Oh those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those Greeks were superficial—out of profundity [*aus Tiefe*]. (Nietzsche 1974, 38)

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Religion and Gender in Goethe's *Iphigenie auf Tauris*

ISABELLE TORRANCE

The second half of the eighteenth century saw a new impetus in the relationship between Europeans and classical literature. There was a clear move away from what had become perceived as artificial forms of expression based on baroque notions of proper restraint. Preoccupations with history and prose inspired by classical models gave way to a renewed interest in the more emotional genres of art, philosophy, and poetry. The new emphasis was on gaining a deeper understanding of classical models, and this contributed to the success of classically inspired works from the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries. Highet (1985, 355) goes so far as to say that "most of the European writers of the epoch 1765–1825 knew much more about classical literature than their predecessors, and were more successful in capturing and reproducing its meaning." He remarks that Goethe, for example, "knew more Greek than Klopstock" (Highet 1985, 355). But, of course, the attempt at deeper understanding was nevertheless colored by contemporary subjectivities.

When the mostly self-taught cobbler's son J. J. Winckelmann began publishing on Greek art and literature in the mid-eighteenth century, he captured the imaginations of many influential Germans of the period, including Herder, Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, and Humboldt. The classical ideal of Greece was to prove an important inspiration for all these in their writings. Although clearly influenced by the work of men like the Earl of Shaftesbury in England, the publications of Winckelmann are commonly seen as marking the beginning of a new preoccupation with Greece in German thinkers at that time.[1] Winckelmann was primarily concerned with the visual arts, especially sculpture, and he propounded the association of Greece with nature, beauty, and freedom while the contemporary baroque world was shown as unnatural and corrupt. This subjective understanding of Greece is clear in Goethe's *Iphigenie.* The title character is cast as a pure and moral soul, who can claim that she is "as free as a man" (see below). It is noteworthy also that one of Goethe's sleights of hand in adapting the Euripidean original is to dispense with the statue of

Artemis, which Orestes must retrieve from the land in order to be rid of the Furies. In Goethe, Apollo gives the ambiguous oracle to rescue "the sister," which Goethe's "Orest" belatedly understands as meaning his own sister rather than Apollo's. Thus, the statue of Artemis in Euripides has become, in Goethe, the statuesque Iphigenie, a living, breathing, classical ideal of a statue.[2] In a similar vein, the slogan quoted by E. M. Butler in the context of Goethe as disciple of Rousseau "Back to nature; back to the noble savage!" (Butler 1935, 97) admirably suits Goethe's product *Iphigenie*, in which the "savage" king Thoas is described as "noble" in Iphigenie's prologue speech and is persuaded during the course of the play to abandon violence.

In truth, the *Iphigenie* really marks the first completion of one of Goethe's forays into the adaptation of Greek literature, and one of the earliest classically inspired pieces from the German Renaissance.[3] Goethe's engagement with Greek literature would become more and more apparent throughout his career. Before publishing the *Iphigenie* in prose form in 1779 (the verse form was published in 1787), he had already begun work on his *Prometheus*, though this was not published until 1830. Goethe found inspiration in mythical figures, particularly those from epic: Elpenor, Nausicaa, Achilles, Pandora, and Helen.[4] Indeed, Goethe was fascinated by the ambiguous figure of Helen and the combination of her beauty with her propensity to disappear, evident in Euripides' *Helen*, a play whose plot structure is very similar indeed to his *Iphigenia in Tauris.* Helen will appear in Goethe's *Faust II.* Although the hero manages to conjure up Helen and marries her, she disappears, leaving him holding her empty veil.[5]

In 1818, in his essay *Antik und Modern*, Goethe wrote "Jeder sei auf seiner Art eine Grieche! Aber sei's!" (Everyone should be a Greek in his own way! But he should be a Greek nonetheless!).[6] This statement highlights the conscious subjectivity of Goethe's interpretation of Greece, as well as his simultaneous desire to immerse himself in the classical world as much as possible. In fact, although Goethe's first love was Greek literature, and the bias of the German Enlightenment was strongly philhellenic, Goethe did also find inspiration in the Roman world. He traveled to Italy and his *Roman Elegies* were published in 1795. These were written in classical meters, a practice that had become popular through earlier German writers, most notably Klopstock. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, under the new academic pursuit of *Altertumswissenschaft* pioneered and developed by scholars like Wolf, Humboldt, and Wilamowitz, German philhellenism would become obsessed with philology

and textual criticism (see Pfeiffer 1976, 173–90). The transportation of tangible antiquities back from the ancient lands to Germany would also play a major role in Germany's relationship with ancient Greece.[7] But when German philhellenism was born in the mid- to late eighteenth century, the preoccupation was with understanding the *Geist* or essence of classical art and poetry, appreciating its beauty, and taking inspiration from its great art and literature.

Goethe was not the first, nor the only one, to rework the Iphigenia legend during this period. In fact, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, it became an extremely popular subject for exploration on the stage. Generally speaking, the Aulis legend held sway in the seventeenth century, with influential versions produced by Jean de Rotrou in 1640 and Jean Racine in 1674.[8] Racine had drawn up a plan for the first act of a version of *Iphigenia in Tauris* in 1677 but subsequently abandoned and never completed it (it was first published by his son Louis Racine in 1747: see Forestier 1999, 164–7). But at the turn of the century (1699), François Joseph de LaGrange-Chancel took inspiration from the play and wrote his own complete version, attempting to "overcome the difficulties" of the subject matter, which had thus far kept it from the stage.[9] In doing so, he refocused the main concern of the play away from the figure of Iphigenia, and onto the bond of friendship between Orestes and Pylades (reflected in the play's title *Oreste et Pilade*). After LaGrange-Chancel came a flurry of renewed interest in this "other" Iphigenia legend, and it was the eighteenth century that saw the glory days (unparalleled both before and since) of Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris* (hereafter, *IT*) with new versions inspired by the legend and the play's themes.

Dramatic versions of Euripides' play were produced by John Dennis (1700), Pier Jacopo Martello (1709), Johann Elias Schlegel (1737), Gian Rinaldo Carli (1744), Christoph Friedrich von Derschau (1747), Pick (1753), Claude Guimond de la Touche (parodied by Charles-Simon Favart in 1757), and Jean-Baptiste-Claude Vaubertrand (also in 1757), but none of these were as successful as Goethe's dramatic interpretation, which was first written in 1779 and completed in its final verse form in 1787 (Prudhoe 1966, xvi). Operatic versions of the *IT* myth abounded in eighteenth-century Europe: H. Desmarets and A. Campra (1704), D. Scarlatti (1713), G. M. Jomelli (1719), Orlandini (1719), J. A. Stranitzky (1725, parodying Minato's libretto for Schmelzer's 1678 ballet: see below, note 10), L. Vinci (1725), G. Reuter and A. Caldara (1728), A. M. Mazzoni (1756), T. Traetta (1758), G. Majo (1764), C. Monza (1766), N. Jomelli

(1771), C. W. Gluck (1779, parodied by C.-S. Favart in the same year, and by E. Morel de Chefdeville in 1785), and N. V. Puccini (1781).[10] This is not the place for a detailed study of all the eighteenth-century versions of the myth, but in examining Goethe's version, it will be necessary to take note of some significant innovations made by his predecessors.[11]

LaGrange-Chancel's emphasis on the sentimental friendship between Orestes and Pylades was to prove a popular theme in subsequent versions, including Schlegel's drama, Stranitzky's opera, and von Derschau's play. LaGrange-Chancel had presented an unsympathetic Iphigenia, as did von Derschau later. But John Dennis, reacting to LaGrange-Chancel, made an attempt to ennoble Iphigenia. An emphasis on the humanity of Iphigenia was introduced by Guimond de la Touche, but Majo's Iphigenia is bent on revenge in spite of her apparent humane traits; Schlegel's version refers to the issue of gender in a conscious manner, endowing Iphigenia with a particular womanly pride.[12] Although one could claim that Goethe's play had been influenced by all of these versions and more—whether in terms of rejecting certain aspects (like Majo's Iphigenia and her ideas of revenge), or by incorporating particular features such as Iphigenia's humanity and a focus on gender—critics are generally in agreement that Goethe's version represented something new.[13] Gliksohn (1985, 221) sums this up particularly well:

> L'originalité de Goethe tenait à un double dépassement: il renonçait, d'une part, à l'ostentation pathétique; d'autre part, il donnait une portée singulière à des références mythologiques notablement plus riches que celles où les dramaturges français ne cherchaient que l'image convenue de la vertu antique.
>
> Goethe's originality was twofold in its progression [from his predecessors]: on the one hand, it renounced the ostentation of pathos; on the other, it gave a special place to mythological references, which were notably richer than those in which French dramatists had sought only the conventional image of antiquity's virtue.

Goethe's familiarity with a wide range of ancient literature and his ability to read classical Greek suggest that, whatever inspiration he took from his contemporary predecessors, he also examined the original Euripidean play particularly closely.[14] In fact, as Apelt (1960) has argued, there is no need to assume that Goethe's humanist Iphigenie was necessarily inspired by Guimond de la Touche.[15] We note that Iphigenia's decision

not to kill the king because he is their host is a feature in Euripides, as is the concept of the humanity of the gods.[16] In the Euripidean play, Iphigenia questions Artemis's bloodlust and rejects the notion that the gods could be so brutal (380–91). She is wrong, but the issue is raised nonetheless.[17] Similarly, the one reference that defines Iphigenie as a "woman" in Schlegel—where she claims that as a woman she will defeat Thoas through her deception—seems unconvincing as an inspiration for Goethe's preoccupation with womanhood, which is much more easily seen as reflecting the powerful thematization of gender in Euripides.[18]

Goethe's play represents a fundamental type of hypertextual derivation from the original. It is an "imitation" of Euripides' play,[19] but also involves "transvalorization," that is, a substitution of values that reflect contemporary society (Genette 1982, 393–404). This will be evident in terms of gender portrayal, which is strongly influenced by Christian moral values in Goethe. It may strike the reader as strange or surprising that I have chosen the term *Christian* to describe the moral values in Goethe's play. Goethe had been denounced at the time as "immoral, irreligious and pagan" by both Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany (Williams 1998, 281). His religious/philosophical views are generally encapsulated in the doctrine of humanism influenced by Enlightenment ideals, and this doctrine is an evident theme in his *Iphigenie* (see, e.g., Peacock 1959, 73–80; Liewerscheidt 1997; Rasch 1979). Goethe further admitted that his primary model for classical humanism was ancient Greek society, which attempted "to deify man rather than to humanize the deity."[20] He disagreed with many aspects of established religion and read the Bible with a critical mind. But he did *read* the Bible, and this was the "main focus of his religious awareness." Furthermore, "he learned to read [the Bible] not only in Luther's translation but also in its original languages" so that it was "the main source of his moral education."[21] These complexities of Goethe's religious and philosophical beliefs make his *Iphigenie* an intriguing study as the adaptation of an original classical drama, in which the humans are repeatedly shown to be more moral than the gods,[22] but transposed into the context of his own and eighteenth-century moral beliefs. This paper does not seek to argue against the well-established humanist analysis of Goethe's *Iphigenie.* Rather, it seeks to show that, whether conscious or not, subjectivities formed by Christian ideals and biblical images are unmistakable in this play,[23] that the primary vehicle for exploration of ethical ideas is inextricably linked to an investigation of gender, and that both issues of religion and gender are directly and primarily inspired by the Euripidean tragedy.

In terms of genre, Goethe's play is not a tragedy in the modern sense, but it does contain the death-averted scenario of the original, which Aristotle so admired.[24] The issues of religion and gender are interdependent in both plays, but are markedly influenced by contemporary discourse in each case.[25] Namely, the way in which gender issues are explored and developed in Euripides' *IT* is only possible because of the religious context. Iphigenia is defined by her position as priestess in Artemis's cult of human sacrifice. Before the recognition, Iphigenia is associated with the slaughter of males and the sword, the man's weapon.[26] She controls all the stage action. She commands the local Taurians, who bow to her religious authority. By contrast, her male counterpart Orestes is cowardly at the opening of the play, and his heroism is heavily marred by his polluted status. He fights valiantly, but his madness leads him to slaughter a herd of cattle, which he believes to be the Furies (281–300), and he is then subdued by a group of herdsmen armed with stones (331–3). It is in the final third of the play that we find several platitudes regarding the inferiority and, indeed, expendability of women, with the male presented as more highly valued in society (e.g., 1005–6, 1298). Yet events of the play, and the portrayal of the characters, refute such platitudes.[27]

In an exceptional way, Euripides at once inverts traditional gender roles, yet simultaneously validates them. Iphigenia is associated with the sword, and is the figure in authority, but only through her female position as priestess in the cult. Orestes fights like an Iliadic hero, but his heroism fails because of his delusions. At the end of the play, traditional gender roles are positively reaffirmed. As the Greeks are attempting to escape, Iphigenia (having left the enclave of the religious temple) is afraid of wetting her foot, and Orestes hoists her onto his shoulder and places her safely on the ship (1380–3). Thus, male physical dominance is restored in no uncertain terms. Gender roles are validated in equal measures here because it is revealed that the siblings need each other: Orestes needs Iphigenia's female planning and priestly authority, and Iphigenia, having abandoned her religious office, ultimately needs his physical strength.

Similarly, in Goethe's play the exploration of gender issues is conducted through religious context and, similarly, insulting platitudes about women are ultimately refuted by events in the play. As in Euripides, and unlike other eighteenth-century versions, Iphigenie is the only female character in Goethe's drama, and she is even more isolated in her womanhood because Goethe has no chorus. It is evident from the opening scene of the *Iphigenie* that gender relations and their ideal are an issue with which the drama will be concerned. In her prologue speech,

Goethe's Iphigenie laments her present fate in Tauris,[28] and reveals how deeply she misses home. She explains in some detail the sorrows of womanhood (23–34):

Allein
Der Frauen Zustand ist beklagenswert.
Zu Haus und in dem Krieg herrscht der Mann,
Und in der Fremde weiß er sich zu helfen.
Ihn freuet der Besitz; ihn krönt der Sieg!
Ein ehrenvoller Tod ist ihm bereit.
Wie eng-gebunden ist des Weibes Glück!
Schon einem rauhen Gatten zu gehorchen
Ist Pflicht und Trost; wie elend, wenn sie gar
Ein feindlich Schicksal in die Ferne treibt!
So hält mich Thoas hier, ein edler Mann,
In ernsten, heil'gen Sklavenbanden fest.

The plight of women alone is worth lamenting. At home and in war, man is master, and in a foreign land, he knows how to help himself. Possession delights him, victory crowns him! An honorable death is prepared for him. But how tightly bound is woman's fortune! Even obeying a harsh husband is duty and consolation; how wretched it is when hostile fate drives her to distant lands! Thus Thoas holds me fast here, a noble man, in earnest, as slave in holy bondage.

This opening passage reveals several key points for the theme of gender relations in the play. The first concept, which is sure to strike a modern audience most sharply, is the fact adduced that even obeying a harsh husband is consolation for a woman, much more so than being driven to a distant land. Such a conception of a woman's role in society is firmly in keeping with Goethe's own views on the position of women, and those of the educated German élite of the eighteenth century. Goethe remained convinced of women's status as subordinate to men. Women should be gentle and loving consorts for their husbands, care for their children, and uphold moral standards in the family home.[29] Women who stepped out of this private sphere were doomed to destroy both themselves and those around them, as happens to the character Adelheid in Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen.*[30] This conception of the female role reflected the contemporary economic situation of the late eighteenth century in which women had moved "increasingly to the fringes of eco-

nomic and political activity," and were "defined primarily as . . . wife and mother, whose work within the family would make possible, and safeguard, her husband's success outside the home" (Frevert 1989, 19). This gave way to a new kind of femininity, where the ideal woman was responsible for the private sphere of human values, as opposed to the previously idealized "Hausmutter" who labored incessantly on the farm (Frevert 1989, 19).

In spite of giving Iphigenie lines that consolidate male domination over women, by the end of the play Goethe's Iphigenie is revealed as the most powerful character. She seems helpless, but is shown to have a certain divine power that is revealed as the play progresses. Furthermore, man helping himself by the sword, as Iphigenie suggests here, will ultimately be revealed as the wrong course of action. In the final act, Orest and Thoas are prepared to fight to the death to resolve the issue of departure from Tauris, but Iphigenie forbids them and shows them the better way of entreaty and mercy. Thus, Iphigenie's divine, but also female, morals are validated while the masculine way of brute force is questioned. Goethe, then, glorifies womanhood, albeit in an idealized form.[31] As Gliksohn (1985, 218) puts it, in contrast to previous versions of the play, "Le dénigrement du sexe feminin, dont l'histoire de la légende portait la trace, trouvait chez Goethe un éclatant démenti" (The denigration of the female sex, which was imprinted in the legend's history, found in Goethe a glaring refutation).

The characterization of Goethe's Iphigenie as the late eighteenth-century ideal of "woman" (as prescribed by men) is executed in part by continuous reference to her purity and holiness. The Christian connections discussed below are not meant to suggest that the audience is not also bound to think, within the religious framework of the play, of the goddess Artemis-Diana, whom Iphigenie serves. Rather, I wish to draw particular attention to the presence of a Christian subjectivity, which has not previously been emphasized, within the complex symbiosis in the play of polytheism, Christianity, and humanism.

Iphigenie is addressed by the king's servant Arkas[32] as "O heil'ge Jungfrau" (O holy virgin, 65), which sets her apart from more ordinary women of society, and suggests an affinity and even conflation with the Virgin Mary who is defined by this very phrase. This is reinforced by numerous instances of Iphigenie being called "heil'ge" (holy) as the drama unfolds.[33] This terminology contributes to Iphigenia's portrayal as a divine healing force: "heilig" (holy) and "heilen" (to heal) are cognates in German. Iphigenie's healing powers are emphasized from the outset

by Arkas who asks her (138–9): "Das nennst du unnütz, wenn von deinem Wesen / Auf Tausende herab ein Balsam träufelt?" (Do you call it useless that from your being balm trickles upon thousands?). Arkas is referring to Iphigenie's persuasion of the king, Thoas, to end the custom of human sacrifice. For a Christian audience, however, this image conjures up associations with sainthood and holiness, and the concept of being healed by a holy being. Jesus is the primary figure with powers of healing in the New Testament, followed by his disciples who also are given the gift of healing (Luke 9:1–2). Iphigenie will heal Orest by her touch (cf. Orest's address to his sister in the final scene: "Von dir berührt, / War ich geheilt" [I was touched by you, and was healed, 2119–20]), just as Jesus and His believers healed the sick by touch.[34] Furthermore, Orest tells us that while Iphigenie held him in her arms, evil grasped him for the last time and then fled "wie eine Schlange zu der Höhle" (like a serpent to its lair, 2124). Although the Furies, who have traditionally hounded Orestes in myth because of his matricide, are often represented in antiquity as snakes personified, the particular image of a single snake as the personification of abstract "evil" ("Das Übel," 2121) is an emphatically biblical image.[35]

Goethe may have been partly inspired by the virgin prophetess Theonoe in Euripides' *Helen* for his characterization of Iphigenie. Theonoe has divine knowledge, as implied by her name, and acts against her brother's wishes for what she knows to be the greater good.[36] Similarly, Goethe's Iphigenie is divinely inspired, and acts against Pylades' advice for what she believes to be divine will and the greater good.[37] But for a Christian audience, Iphigenie is presented as a powerful conflation of both male and female divine functions: she will heal (and therefore save), and she will also engender a new way of life in a metaphorical sense within the dramatic context of the play. Iphigenie is a rationalized Virgin Mary figure. She will not bear a child without a man, a biblical concept to which Goethe much objected,[38] but she will be chaste (as in the Euripidean original; cf. *IT* 798–9) and the best of human beings, though a human being nonetheless.

When we are introduced to the situation in Tauris, we are told that, instead of human sacrifices, Iphigenie now offers the gods "ein reines Herz und Weihrauch und Gebet" (a pure heart and incense and prayer, 774). The Christian elements of this new form of worship are obvious. The pure in heart are blessed and shall see God, according to Matthew 5:8. Similarly, offerings of incense and prayer are both prescribed for Christian worship in the Bible.[39] Iphigenie's purity of heart and hand are

emphasized throughout the play, and particularly in connection to the salvation of the ancestral house. At 1699–702, Iphigenie, in a moment of despair, exclaims:

> So höfft' ich denn vergebens, hier verwahrt,
> Von meines Hauses Schicksal abgeschieden,
> Dereinst mit reiner Hand und reinem Herzen
> Die schwer befleckte Wohnung zu entsühnen!
>
> So I have hoped in vain that detained here, separated from the fate of my house, one day I could redeem our deeply tainted dwelling, with a pure hand and a pure heart!

Here, Goethe introduces the concept that being separate from one's community can be advantageous in terms of spirituality. Again, this can be seen as a reflection of Christian ideology, according to which separation from society, through leading the life of a monk, nun, or hermit, brings one closer to God.

Precisely the same image of Iphigenie's "pure hand and a pure heart" recurs in the final act and confirms the resolution of the play. At 1968–9, Iphigenie entreats Thoas: "Laß mich mit reinem Herzen, reiner Hand / Hinübergehen und unser Haus entsühnen" (Let me go across [to Greece] and redeem our house with a pure heart and a pure hand). This repeated image has a significant and extremely pertinent biblical counterpart. Psalm 24:3 asks: "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? Or who shall stand in His holy place?" The answer is given: "He that hath clean hands, and a pure heart; who has not lifted up his soul unto vanity nor sworn deceitfully." As Iphigenie also rejects deceit, she will achieve the redemption of her house. It is against this background of Christian moral values and a quasi-divine status that Iphigenie's definition as a woman is explored.

As in the Greek original, and indeed in ancient Greek literature in general, Goethe presents his female character, Iphigenie, using words as a weapon. So when she discusses rejecting Thoas's offer of marriage with Arkas, the latter advises her (163–7):

> Der Skythe setzt ins Reden keinen Vorzug,
> Am wenigsten der König. Er, der nur
> Gewohnt ist zu befehlen und zu tun,
> Kennt nicht die Kunst, von weitem ein Gespräch
> Nach seiner Absicht langsam fehl zu lenken.

> The Scythian man has no disposition for speeches, least of all the king. He is only used to giving orders and to action. He does not know the art of slowly and misleadingly steering the conversation from a broad concept towards one's goal.

This description highlights the inherent differences between male and female speech. It is a man who expresses this distinction, but Iphigenie will prove him right in act 1, scene 3, when she tries to reject Thoas's proposal of marriage by indirect means and at some length (that is, she reveals her ancestry in the hopes that he will be appalled and retract his offer). The man is in command; the woman is subordinate and must argue slowly and gently to achieve her ends. Iphigenie is subordinate to Thoas, but she is ultimately able to resist his proposition of marriage through her status as priestess.[40] Like Euripides, Goethe has exploited Iphigenie's position to explore gender relations in a way that is different from his other plays. Iphigenie has a divine purpose that enables her to resist Thoas without losing moral ground through any audience perception of an intolerable act of rebellion on her part.[41] Goethe further justifies Iphigenie's rejection of Thoas by implying a pseudo-father/daughter relationship between them, which strongly suggests that Thoas's proposal is highly inappropriate.[42]

In her confrontation with Thoas regarding the proposal of marriage, Iphigenie explains her desire to return home rather than marry Thoas. Thoas flies into a rage and rants insultingly about womankind (463–74):

> So kehr zurück! Tu, was dein Herz dich heißt,
> Und höre nicht die Stimme guten Rats
> Und der Vernunft. Sei ganz ein Weib und gib
> Dich hin dem Triebe, der dich zügellos
> Ergreift und dahin oder dorthin reißt.
> Wenn ihnen eine Lust im Busen brennt,
> Hält vom Verräter sie kein heilig Band,
> Der sie dem Vater oder dem Gemahl
> Aus lang bewährten, treuen Armen lockt;
> Und schweigt in ihrer Brust die rasche Glut,
> So dringt auf sie vergebens treu und mächtig
> Der Überredung goldne Zunge los.
>
> Go back then! Do what your heart calls you to do, and do not listen to the voice of good counsel and reason. Be just like a woman and abandon yourself to the desire that seizes you without restraint, and drags you

> this way and that. When passion burns in women's bosoms, no sacred bond restrains them from the traitor who entices them from the long since reliable and faithful arms of father and husband; and when the rapid heat is calmed in her breast then the golden tongue of persuasion pushes its own way through powerfully and with vain loyalty.

Ironically, these platitudes about women that Thoas blurts out are all proven to be mistaken in the case of Iphigenie. Indeed, all the male characters are shown to be mistaken in one way or another. Pylades is mistaken in his theology, as is Arkas who has a similar theological standpoint,[43] and Orest, in his madness, mistakenly believes Iphigenie to be unchaste. Iphigenie is pure in her desire and will not be enticed away through deceit. She does, however, possess the art of persuasion. But again, this is not an underhand means of achieving a treacherous end, as Thoas here implies. Rather, she will ultimately persuade through love and kindness and with honesty.

Interestingly, there is no other female figure to act as an evil counterpart to Iphigenie.[44] Thus, Goethe's play decisively glorifies woman, and the positive qualities of women, although some of its characters lament what they see as the age-old trademarks of the female sex. However, there is no reason to see Goethe as any kind of feminist. As in Euripides, it is Iphigenie's position as priestess that allows Goethe to explore the virtues of woman. Iphigenie is the best of human beings, imbued with a divine essence, who achieves this persona by her adherence to an ascetic and Christian way of life. Iphigenie is thus removed from "real" women, and develops more as an "ideal." This is also aided by the medium of ancient myth, which propels Iphigenie's character into an identifiably alien time frame and situation, for a contemporary audience, in spite of the clear contemporary preoccupations.

After Thoas's outburst, Iphigenie attempts to calm his rage, saying (475–7):

> Gedenk, o König, deines edeln Wortes!
> Willst du mein Zutraun so erwidern? Du
> Schienst vorbereitet, alles zu vernehmen.
>
> Remember, o king, your noble word! Do you wish to repay my trust in this way? You seemed prepared to hear everything.

To this Thoas replies, still furious (478–80):

Aufs Ungehoffte war ich nicht bereitet;
Doch sollt' ich's auch erwarten: wußt' ich nicht,
Daß ich mit einem Weibe handeln ging?

I was not prepared for hopelessness, but I should really have expected this: Did I not know that I was driving bargains with a woman?

We later find out that Thoas had promised to let Iphigenie go free if ever an opportunity presented itself for going back to Greece (1970–8). Yet when such an opportunity arises, he is quick to forget his promise. It is Thoas, not Iphigenie, whose bargains cannot be trusted. In any case, Iphigenie defends womankind in her response to Thoas this time, but simultaneously acknowledges woman's subordination to man (481–5):

Schilt nicht, o König, unser arm Geschlecht.
Nicht herrlich wie die euern, aber nicht
Unedel sind die Waffen eines Weibes.
Glaub es, darin bin ich dir vorzuziehn,
Daß ich dein Glück mehr als du selber kenne.

O king, do not scold our poor sex. It is not glorious like yours, but neither are a woman's weapons ignoble. Believe what I predict for you in this matter, that I know your fortune better than yourself.

Prudhoe translates these last two lines as follows: "Believe my intuition which can foresee / Your future with an eye more clear than yours" (1966, 17). This translation is high in poetic merit, and while it is not a very literal rendering of the German, it conveys the concept of "a woman's intuition" in no uncertain terms, a concept that the German hints at but does not state so explicitly.[45] Of course Iphigenie is doubly intuitive in this play, not only because she is a woman, but also because of her special relationship with the gods, which gives her divine insight.

Thoas, however, remains unconvinced by Iphigenie's predictions for his future and continues in the same vein as before. He now laments the fact that he has long withheld sacrifices from the goddess Artemis and blames Iphigenie (511–6):

Du hast mich . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . wie mit Zauberbanden

Gefesselt, daß ich meiner Pflicht vergaß.
Du hattest mir die Sinnen eingewiegt.

You captivated me . . . as if with magic bonds, so that I forgot my duty.
You lulled my senses to sleep.

Here we see a further development of the image of "woman" as projected onto Iphigenie by Thoas. He has called her deceptive, and persuasive. Now he attributes to her the powers of a femme fatale, like the archetypal Sirens in the *Odyssey*, whose music has the power to charm men and make them witless. Such power is associated, of course, with the characteristics of persuasion and deception, but also contains an erotic element.[46] Thoas's loneliness, and desire for a son to replace the one he has lost, have confused him into thinking of Iphigenie in erotic terms, which are entirely inappropriate to their suggested father-daughter relationship.[47]

Having had Thoas define Iphigenie through all the evil qualities of women, we are then shown the attitudes of Orest and Pylades to Iphigenie's gender. Orest sees it as their doom because he states: "Der wilde Sinn des Königs tötet uns; / Ein Weib wird uns nicht retten, wenn er zürnt" (The crazed senses of the king will be the death of us; a woman cannot save us if he is enraged, 784–5). Here, Orest interprets the man as more powerful than the woman through physical force. But his words simultaneously demonstrate that Thoas's accusation that Iphigenie has lulled his senses to sleep is fallacious. Using the same image of the senses ("Sinne," 516, cf. "Sinn," 784), Orest emphasizes that Thoas's senses are "crazed." But Orest's argument concerning the misfortune of Iphigenie being a woman is contradicted at some length by Pylades. He argues as follows (786–93):

Wohl uns, daß es ein Weib ist! denn ein Mann,
Der beste selbst, gewöhnet seinen Geist
An Grausamkeit und macht sich auch zuletzt
Aus dem, was er verabscheut, ein Gesetz,
Wird aus Gewohnheit hart und fast unkenntlich.
Allein ein Weib bleibt stet auf *einem* Sinn,
Den sie gefaßt. Du rechnest sicherer
Auf sie im Guten wie im Bösen.

It is to our advantage that she is a woman! Even a man, who is himself the best of men, even such a man's spirit becomes accustomed to cru-

> elty and he makes for himself a law of the things he detests, and becomes violent and barely recognizable as a result of habit. Only a woman remains constant in *one* disposition, to which she sticks. You can count on her more surely in good as in evil.

Pylades' speech ends the scene, so his version of womanhood seems to hold sway at this point. Furthermore, he will be proved right about a woman's virtue in the case of Iphigenie, which is ironic in the light of his own character's inclination towards deception.[48] But what does his analysis contribute to the development of gender relations? It certainly presents an ideal of womanhood, and accurately reflects Iphigenie's constant faith in the benevolence of divine power. Like Orest's analysis, it also holds the man to be more physically powerful and involved in cruelty than the woman, but it suggests that the woman's positive disposition will go against the man's, in order to help the victims, Orest and Pylades. Furthermore, it suggests that, contrary to the well-used phrase, it is *not* a woman's privilege, or even custom, to change her mind. Although Pylades' analysis seems confident and true to the characters of the drama, as with his theological reasoning, it will be shown to be mistaken to a certain degree. Iphigenie *will* remain resolute in her belief, but will ultimately be unwilling to go against the king and will undergo a significant crisis of conscience, during which she changes her mind several times.[49] In fact, during this very crisis, Pylades tries to persuade Iphigenie to perpetrate the plan of deception, but Iphigenie contradicts Pylades' analysis of gender when she says (1677–9):

> O trüg' ich doch ein männlich Herz in mir!
> Das, wenn es einen kühnen Vorsatz hegt,
> Vor jeder andern Stimme sich verschließt.
>
> Would that I bore a man's heart in me! This, once it harbors a bold intention, shuts itself off from every other voice.

Iphigenie's statement thus suggests that a *man* is more likely to hold the same disposition and be deaf to reason, once he has made his decision. But the two statements are perhaps less contradictory than they first appear. Iphigenie's analysis of "man" is that he will not be moved once he has decided upon an act of (masculine) *boldness.* This factor confirms Pylades' statement that a man becomes accustomed to cruelty (and boldness). Thus, the woman's disposition, which does not change, is clearly

meant to be benevolent. But to whom should Iphigenie be benevolent? For Pylades, it is quite clear that Iphigenie should be on his side, but the issue is more complicated for Iphigenie, who does not want to offend the king but also wishes to help Orest and Pylades escape and to return to Greece herself. In the end, Iphigenie manages to remain benevolent to both parties, and *does* emerge as retaining the same disposition throughout, and is thus portrayed in the light of an "ideal" woman.

What Iphigenie's statement concerning the solidity of man's resolve omits is the fact that a man is also subject to the power of a woman through her use of persuasion. This she refers to in no uncertain terms in her exchange with Thoas in act 5, scene 3. Thoas attempts to make Iphigenie agree to the sacrifice of the strangers by virtue of the fact that it is their "law" and her "sacred duty." Iphigenie responds (1856–64):

> Laß ab! Beschönige nicht die Gewalt,
> Die sich der Schwachheit eines Weibes freut.
> Ich bin so frei geboren als ein Mann.
> Stünd' Agamemnons Sohn gegenüber
> Und du verlangtest, was sich nicht gebührt:
> So hat auch *er* ein Schwert und einen Arm,
> Die Rechte seines Busens zu verteid'gen.
> Ich habe nichts als Worte, und es ziemt
> Dem edeln Mann, der Frauen Wort zu achten.

> Stop this! Do not gloss over the power that delights in a woman's weakness. I was born as free as a man. If Agamemnon's son stood here now, and you demanded what was not fitting: *He* would have a sword and an arm with which to defend the right within his breast. I have nothing but words, and it befits the noble man to heed a woman's word.

This is a densely packed expression of woman's position, which touches on many different aspects of a woman's role and nature, in comparison to a man's. Iphigenie claims she was born "as free as a man," a statement that perhaps echoes Christian freedom of choice rather than any real equivalent between the social freedom of a man and a woman. As far as we can trace Goethe's own views on freedom, Boyle (1992, 385) notes that he seems indebted to Spinoza's belief that "human freedom" was an "emendation of the intellect by which, as mere finite modes of divinity, we lost interest in our finite selves and concentrated instead on what was

truly divine about us." Certainly, Iphigenie seems to be in touch with her own divinity, while being a moral agent, a function often borne by women in ancient Greek tragedy.[50]

The contrast between a man and a woman as drawn by Iphigenie is a contrast well grounded in Greek tragedy. The man's weapon is the sword, while the woman's only recourse is through words. Some tragic females (e.g., Clytemnestra and Medea) prove that they can wield both kinds of power. It is suggested in Euripides' *IT* that Iphigenia likewise can, but later revealed that she does not.[51] Similarly, in Goethe's version, Orest in his fit of madness assumes that Iphigenie will kill him with a sword on arrival in Tauris, but he is mistaken. The image is particularly violent and disturbing (1248–54):

> Die liebevolle Schwester wird zur Tat
> Gezwungen. Weine nicht! Du hast nicht Schuld
> . . . . . .
> Ja, schwinge deinen Stahl, verschone nicht,
> Zerreiße diesen Busen und eröffne
> Den Strömen, die hier sieden, einen Weg!
>
> The sister, filled with love, is driven to the deed. Don't weep! You are not guilty. . . . Yes, brandish your steel, do not spare me, rip this chest apart and open up a path for the streams which seethe here!

Clearly, Orest's delusions are what cause him to imagine his own vicious slaughter at the hands of his sister, and the severity of his suffering is emphasized by the fact that he sees such a slaughter as a release from what "seethes" inside him. But Iphigenie has nothing to do with swords, and whatever powers or influence she has remain firmly within the woman's realm.

That Iphigenie threatens Thoas, in effect, with Orest and his sword is noteworthy, given the way in which the events of the play unfold. Precisely at the moment when Orest and Thoas are going to battle it out to the death with their swords,[52] Iphigenie intervenes and persuades them with words to cease from physical conflict. Ultimately, the woman's weapon is more powerful than the man's, and more beneficial. The triumph of Iphigenie's words is foreshadowed at a number of points during act 5, scene 3. After Iphigenie advises Thoas that the noble man should heed a woman's word (1856–64, quoted above), Thoas responds, "Ich acht es mehr als eines Bruders Schwert" (I heed it more than a brother's

sword, 1865). Several lines later, Iphigenie once more puts a woman's plea above the power of the sword. She asks Thoas: "Die schöne Bitte, den anmut'gen Zweig, / In einer Frauen Hand gewaltiger / Als Schwert und Waffe, stößest du zurück . . ." (Do you reject the gracious plea, the graceful olive branch, which in a woman's hands is more powerful than a sword or weapon?, 1880–2). Thoas still refuses to be persuaded into letting the Greeks go free. He can only be persuaded once Iphigenie is completely truthful. At this point, Iphigenie's words fail because she is being economical with the truth.[53] Iphigenie's ultimate decision to be truthful can be seen as an extension and development of the Euripidean original, where Iphigenia's deception of Thoas is actually based on the truth of the hideous pollution of Orestes.

The truth, which Goethe's Iphigenie finally embraces completely, comes at the end of a monologue, during which she once again addresses the inequalities between men and women. She asks what defines a great deed, whether it can be achieved only through violence and deceit, and whether it is only a man who can accomplish such deeds (1892–907). She continues at 1908–12:

> Muß ein zartes Weib
> Sich ihres angebornen Rechts entäußern,
> Wild gegen Wilde sein, wie Amazonen
> Das Recht des Schwerts euch rauben und mit Blute
> Die Unterdrückung rächen?
>
> Must gentle woman renounce her birthright, and become savage against savages, and rob men of their right to the sword, like Amazons, and avenge oppression with blood?

Iphigenie's speech and the outcome of the play imply that a woman *can* accomplish a tremendous deed, and can do so through a woman's medium of words. Her great deed in Christian terms is her decision to be truthful and to trust in divine power, and this deed achieves its resolution through her female power of persuasion. She persuades the men of the play to renounce violence in favor of conciliation. The comparison to Amazons as unfeminine women is pointed in that Iphigenie had originally been mistakenly identified as an Amazon by Orest and Pylades before revealing her identity as Greek (777). Indeed, this innovation by Goethe is apt in mythological terms for both geography and history, and once more demonstrates his familiarity with original Greek sources.

Herodotus (4.110–7) records how some Scythians set up camp and attempted to seduce a group of Amazons who had ventured into their land. They succeeded in the seduction, but the Amazons refused to return to the Scythians' homeland. They settled elsewhere in Scythia with their Scythian husbands, although Herodotus notes that the Amazons continued to kill their male enemies. In this context, we see how Iphigenie is the antithesis of an Amazon, both in being unable to kill a man, and in resisting the seduction of a Scythian. Yet at the same time, it is clear how Orest and Pylades might assume that Iphigenie is an Amazon, given the location and the previously practiced slaughter of men.

The notion of a man's heroic deeds is further developed by Iphigenie in the final scene of the play (2069–77):

> Der rasche Kampf verewigt einen Mann:
> Er falle gleich, so preiset ihn das Lied.
> Allein die Tränen, die unendlichen
> Der überbliebnen, der verlaßnen Frau,
> Zählt keine Nachwelt, und der Dichter schweigt
> Von tausend durchgeweinten Tag- und Nächten,
> Wo eine stille Seele den verlornen,
> Rasch abgeschiednen Freund vergebens sich
> Zurückzurufen bangt und sich verzehrt.
>
> Rapid battle immortalizes man: Should he fall, then straightaway there is a song to praise him. Only the endless tears of his forsaken wife remain and are worth nothing in posterity, and the poet is silent about the thousand days and nights full of weeping, in which a silent soul anxiously calls in vain for a lost friend, so hastily taken away, to return, and is consumed with grief.

Again, this self-referential statement highlights the different functions of men and women, and also the grief that is caused by the male arena of physical battle. The passage as a whole recalls Homer, with the immortalization of battle in the *Iliad*, but also the grief that it causes, a motif also prominent in the *Odyssey.* Interestingly, for both Goethe and Homer, Iphigenie is wrong to say that the poet does not record the grief of those who suffer as a result of battle. Goethe's play is itself immortalizing Iphigenie's situation. She is not a forsaken wife, but she *has* been deprived of her kin and been pining for home for a significant period of time. Much

Homeric material deals with female mourning for husbands and sons claimed in battle. But of course, in Homer, weeping is not restricted to women. Odysseus famously weeps in his distress at the songs of Demodocus in *Odyssey* 8.521–34. By recalling Homer but simultaneously creating a contrast, Goethe's Iphigenie highlights contemporary subjectivities. In eighteenth-century Germany, women did not have the very public function of lament that they had in antiquity. Women had become more introverted. Their focus was the family and the home, and public displays of distress were not acceptable.[54] This is reflected in the image used by Iphigenie of a "silent soul . . . consumed with grief."

The development of gender relations in Goethe's *Iphigenie*, which reinforces traditional gender roles, although it reflects contemporary values, is nonetheless very similar indeed to exploration of gender in the Euripidean original. In Euripides, Iphigenia is thought up to a certain point to sacrifice using the sword, but is ultimately revealed as a powerful persuader, and her femininity is firmly reestablished at the end of *IT.* Similarly, Orestes in *IT* goes through a phase where he seems weak and ineffectual, but ultimately shows himself to be brave and physically strong, thus further reinforcing traditional gender roles. Both dramatists exploit Iphigenie's position as priestess as a means through which to express her authority as a woman.[55] There are some apparent differences, but these are not as stark as they first appear. In Goethe's version, it is clear from the outset that Iphigenie has never sacrificed anyone, and Orest's vision of Iphigenie actually killing him is part of his delusion. But in Euripides, although sacrifices have taken place, they have only been consecrated, not actually executed, by Iphigenia, and it is clear that she dislikes the practice and is under divine compulsion to fulfill her role as the priestess of Artemis. It is also paramount that Goethe's Iphigenie does not deceive Thoas; this is not part of her power of persuasion, unlike the Euripidean Iphigenia.[56] But this can be explained in terms of the value systems of their respective cultures. Deception is, in Christian terms, presumptively immoral, but in Euripides there is a different value system constructed around terms that indicate reciprocal friendship. In Euripides, Iphigenia will not kill the king because he is her *xenos* (host: *IT* 1021). Because of divine constraints on the community that demand human sacrifice, and divine constraints on Orestes that demand his theft of the statue from the temple, the only means of escape open to Iphigenia is through deception. Thus in Euripides, as in Goethe, Iphigenia rejects the solution that is morally abhorrent, and finds an alternative within the value code of the author's day.[57]

Goethe also exploits the motif of *xenia* or "Gastrecht" as Iphigenie calls it (2153), with Thoas to become a *xenos* to her and Orest, that is, they will enter into a bond of reciprocal guest-friendship on leaving Tauris. But the moment at which Iphigenie decides not to betray Thoas—in the sense that she will not even lie to him, let alone be party to his death, although her brother's life is in danger—has been seen as a move away from the Greek tragedy towards a humanist ideal, which is free from religious constraints.[58] Certainly, as I have noted, the ethical and moral subjectivities of the Greek tragedy are not the same as Goethe's. But the humanist, the Christian, and autonomous human thought are not mutually exclusive. Through the prism of a polytheistic setting, "the divine" in Goethe's play is at once humanist and Christian, and Iphigenie's autonomous thought is the product of her divinely inspired morals. As Hegel remarked not long after the play's production, the concern of the gods here proves itself the same as the individual's own inner concern.[59] We see this not only in terms of Iphigenie's understanding that Artemis does not require human sacrifice, but also in the solution to Apollo's oracle, when, at the end of the play, Orest realizes that the "Schwester" (sister) he is supposed to rescue is his own and not Apollo's.

While Goethe delineates clear gender roles, he suggests that the female way, which is also the Christian way, of peace and good will is superior and more effective than the man's weapon of force. Thus, gender and religion are inextricably intertwined until the end. This is different from the outcome of *IT*, where gender roles are validated in equal measures. But again, this happens only *after* Iphigenia has effectively left her priestly office. In Goethe she does not leave before the end of the play, and thus retains her authority.

The subjective gender prescriptions of his time facilitated Goethe's portrait of an Iphigenie who acts in a morally upright way with regard to the private sphere of the household. This reflects a society in which the man was expected to carry the burden of political action and, this being so, the ideal of truth is perhaps more suitably expressed through a female figure (cf. Preußer 2002, 28). It remains true, however, that Goethe's positive characterization of Iphigenie does not reflect any contemporary notion that a woman could be superior to a man. She is an idealized and deified version of the positive power that can be exerted on man.

Goethe skillfully blends the ancient with the modern, particularly through his injection of Christian moral values,[60] a system of values that allows Goethe's drama a genuinely positive outcome in contrast to the darker resolution of Euripides' *IT*.[61] Goethe develops gender relations by

reaffirming traditional functions of male and female, yet simultaneously highlights female strengths rather than male dominance over the female. In this he very much reflects Euripides, although his Iphigenie's strength lies in her New Testament beliefs. In terms of gender on the eighteenth-century German stage, Colvin (1999, 283) has noted that "within a masculinist Christian system, the feminine and the non-Christian [were] perceived as threatening; they [were] therefore classified on the side of chaos, whereby the orderly process of their categorization is one means of containing their potential threat." By exploiting the figure of Iphigenia in the Taurian legend, Goethe, at the end of the eighteenth century, was able to invert this prevalent norm, associating males (both Greek and barbarian)[62] with chaos and investing his pagan priestess with the subjectivity of Christian morals which creates a powerfully positive, yet simultaneously unthreatening, female force.[63]

Notes

[1] See, e.g., Pfeiffer 1976, 167–73; Highet 1985, 369; Marchand 1996, 7.

[2] Cf. Marchand 1996, 5: "The iconic power of Greek statuary for the generation of the 1790s should not be underestimated."

[3] Cf. Highet 1985, 369: "The German Renaissance was 200 years late." The Reformation that Germany experienced in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not have the cultural, artistic, and literary dimension of what we understand by the Renaissance in other European countries during this period. See further Highet 1985, 367ff.

[4] For a clear chronological list of works by German authors of this period inspired by classical themes, including those by Goethe, see Rehm 1969, 383–91.

[5] On the figure of Helen in Faust, see further Highet 1985, 386ff.

[6] Compare Shelley in his preface to *Hellas*: "We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their roots in Greece."

[7] On this see Trevelyan 1934, 39–43; Marchand 1996, passim.

[8] *Iphigenia in Tauris* was not completely absent from the seventeenth century. For example, in 1666 Joost Van den Vondel wrote a Dutch translation of the play, and in 1678 J. H. Schmelzer wrote a ballet entitled *Tempio di Diana in Taurica.* Nevertheless, it is evident that the Aulis legend dominated this century, not only through the influential productions of Rotrou and Racine, but also through the large number of works inspired by the theme, e.g., Bertrand's 1605 *Tragédie de Pryam Roy de Troye*, Coster's 1617 *Iphigenia*, Camus' 1625 novel *L'Iphigène*, Tronsarelli's musical drama *Ifigenia* of 1631, Scammacca's 1645 *Ifigenia in Aulide*, various translations of Euripides (e.g., Perrault's French translation of 1678 and Barnes's Latin translation of 1694) and Racine (e.g., Dutch translations by Arendsz in 1676 and Dullaert in 1679), and even parodies of Racine's *Iphigénie* (by Regnard 1688–1708). For further details, see the "Chronologie" in Gliksohn 1985, 288–9.

[9] This is roughly what LaGrange-Chancel states in his preface to the play, quoted in Heitner 1964; cf. also the passage quoted in Phillippo 2003, 16 note 10.

[10] There is also U. Garzia's 1798 ballet and further operas in the early nineteenth century: J. G. Naumann and N. Zingarelli in 1801, V. Federici in 1804, and M. Carafa in 1817. Information about dramatic and operatic versions has been collated from Gliksohn 1985, 228–32 et passim; Heitner 1964, passim; and Matthiessen 2000, 364 note 3.

[11] It is noteworthy that the two versions that were most successful and have best withstood the test of time, Goethe's play and Gluck's opera, were both written in the same year (1779). Phillippo (2003) addresses the potential "inspiration-chain," examining how different versions of the *IT* take inspiration both from Euripides and from earlier versions, and highlights particular textual correspondences. She suggests (19) that Goethe may have been influenced by reports about Gluck's project in his choice of plot motifs, but concludes (21) that the main direct influence on Goethe was the Euripidean text itself.

[12] Cf. Heitner 1964, 296: "The emphasis laid on Iphigenia's womanliness [in Schlegel] remained unique until Goethe made this a major theme in his drama."

Note that the characters who appear in Goethe's drama will be called by their German equivalents, where different from anglicized versions: Iphigenie for Iphigenia, and Orest for Orestes. Artemis will also be called by her Roman equivalent Diana. All other figures will be called by their anglicized names.

[13] Cf., e.g., Heitner 1964, 308: "Goethe already in 1779 had written an Iphigenia drama superior in every way to anything before it. When he gave it poetic form in 1786, he made it a supreme work of German literature." Goethe's *Iphigenie* has also been called "his most successful theatre work" (Nicoll 1969, 417).

[14] Butler (1935, 94) states that "Goethe was not much of a Greek scholar in those days, and never a distinguished one," but while he may not have had advanced philological understanding of the language, Goethe's Greek was perfectly adequate for understanding the literature. On Goethe reading Greek, see Trevelyan 1981, 24; on his use of different tragic myths and *sententiae*, see Trevelyan 1981, 96–103, and Boyd 1942, 9–14. Within the *Iphigenie* there are clear indications of Goethe's familiarity with the imagery of Greek tragedy. For example, there are direct references to Euripides' *Medea* and *Heracles* in Orest's words to Iphigenie at 1176–9: "Wie von Kreusas Brautkleid zündet sich / Ein unauslöschlich Feuer von mir fort. / Laß mich! Wie Herkules will ich Unwürd'ger / Den Tod voll Schmach, in mich verschlossen, sterben" (As from Creusa's wedding dress, an unquenchable fire consumes me. Let me be! Like Heracles, I wish to die a death which is undignified and full of shame, sealed in isolation). Cf. also 1078–81, where Orest exclaims to Iphigenie (who is still unaware of his identity): "Ein lügenhaft Gewebe knüpf' ein Fremder. / Dem Fremden, sinnreich und der List gewohnt, / Zur Falle vor die Füße; zwischen uns / Sei Wahrheit!" (A stranger weaves a tissue of lies for the stranger, rich in meaning, as a snare to trap his feet, being accustomed to cunning; between us, let there be truth!). Net imagery is clearly evoked here in the German through the verb "knüpfen," which can mean "to make a net." This reflects the net imagery of the *Oresteia* (esp. *Cho.* 997–1004), but Goethe removes the imagery from its original *philos* on *philos* (friend on friend) context, by stressing that *strangers* lay traps for *strangers.* This marks a moral departure from the Greek myth, and contributes to Orest's presentation as deserving of purification.

[15] Apelt (1960, 59) argues that, among other things with a friend like Herder, Goethe would not have much to learn from Guimond de la Touche in the matter of humanism.

[16] Both of these direct correspondences between Euripides and Goethe are noted by Phillippo 2003, 41and 44. On Goethe's exploitation of the motif of "Gastrecht," see below.

[17] Artemis will continue to demand human blood at the end of Euripides' play, albeit in a symbolic rather than actual death.

[18] The reference in Schlegel comes in act 4, scene 4. Iphigenie convinces Orest to abandon his idea of killing the king in favor of using deception instead. She says:

> Der König, der mich sonst also hülflos oft verlacht,
> Seh, daß ihn noch dies Weib zum Überwundnen macht!
> Ich hasse List und Trug, den man an Freunden übet
> Doch den gemeinen Feind, der Griechenland betrübet,
> Und durch Grausamkeit der Göttin unwerth ist;
> Wer diesen hintergeht; da lob ich Trug und List.

> The king, who has often ridiculed me as helpless on previous occasions, see, that this woman will finally make him vanquished! I hate trickery and deception when used against friends. But the common enemy who saddens Greece and who through his brutality is unworthy of the goddess; whoever deceives such an enemy—in this case I praise deception and trickery.

Goethe uses the term "Weib" (woman) and cognates twelve times in his play (see Schmidt 1970, 146), and "Frau" and cognates nine times (see Schmidt 1970, 118). Euripides has a similar count of twenty-two uses of the word *gunê* (woman) and cognates in his *IT*.

[19] The two fundamental types of hypertextuality—"transformation" and "imitation"—are discussed in Genette 1982, 447.

[20] Nisbet 2002, 221, taking information from Goethe's autobiography *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (*Poetry and Truth*).

[21] Nisbet 2002, 219, quoting once more from *Dichtung und Wahrheit.*

[22] The gods in the Euripidean play have prescribed matricide and sacrilegious theft and have demanded human sacrifice; see further Wolff 1992 and Goff 1999.

[23] Butler (1935, 103) also notes the paradox of Christianization in this play by a man "who at the period called himself decidedly not a Christian"; cf. Rehm 1969, 132ff. on the fusion of Christian and ancient Greek "holiness" in *Iphigenie.* We should also be aware here of audience response. Whatever Goethe's own philosophical views, he was writing for a predominantly Christian audience.

[24] Goethe termed his play a "Schauspiel," that is, a drama or, more specifically, a spectacle. But cf. Steiner 1961, 170: "No one who has seen [Goethe's] *Iphigenie* acted will forget how much anguish is gathered before the final twist of grace." This corresponds well to Aristotelian requirements of pity and fear. On the genre of Euripides *IT* and a defense of its status as an ancient tragedy, see Wright 2005.

[25] It is simply wrong to say with Stahl 1961, 21 that "the whole theme of man's relation to the gods . . . is not a real issue in Euripides." Wolf (1964, 20), in his analysis of Schlegel's *Orest und Pylades*, rightly acknowledges that the relationship between men and gods is also a central theme for Euripides.

[26] If others and I are correct in believing that lines 40–1 of Euripides' play are inter-

polated, the audience thinks until line 621 that Iphigenia slaughters the sacrificial victims herself; see Strohm 1949; Cropp 2000 ad loc.; Torrance 2004, 8 note 8.

[27] Iphigenia is the only female character in the play (though a feminine presence is ensured by the female Chorus), and she is portrayed as more commanding and more resourceful than any of the male characters. Even the local king Thoas bows to her religious authority (1202–3). But the importance of the female is also validated by Orestes' suggestion to Pylades at 695–8 that the Atreid line can continue through Electra, should Orestes die. See further Torrance 2004, ch. 5.2.

[28] Goethe seems to treat Tauris as an island. This is indicated in the title *Iphigenie auf Tauris* by the use of the preposition "auf," which in German denotes position "on" an island; cf. 1520–2 where Iphigenie compares Tauris to a deserted island. On the misuse of the word *Tauris* to indicate a place rather than a people, see Torrance 2004, vii.

[29] See Becker-Cantarino 2002, passim for evidence of Goethe's views on women.

[30] Noted by Becker-Cantarino 2002, 184. This is similar to Greek tragedy's exploration of the fate of the *oikos* in the absence of the male; cf. E. Hall 1997, 106.

[31] On Goethe's Iphigenie as an ideal of womanhood, see Preußer 2002, 26–30. On Goethe's interest in female heroines, see Rehm 1969, 125–7.

[32] Alan Sommerstein (personal communication) points out that Arkas is an Artemisian sort of name, as the name of the child of Zeus and Callisto whose story is recounted in Ovid, *Met.* 2.401–530, a story in which Artemis features prominently. Arkas is also the name that Racine chose for one of Agamemnon's servants in his *Iphigénie* (based on the Aulis myth).

[33] For information on the extent of the use of "heilig," "heilen," and cognates, see Schmidt's (1970) concordance.

[34] Cf., e.g., Mark 6:5, 16:18; Luke 13:13; Acts 9:17, 28:8; cf. Matthew 4:23, Luke 9:11, and Revelation 22:2 for healing more generally; cf. also note 42 below on the healing powers of touching Jesus' garment, and 2 Kings 13:21 where a man who touches the bones of Elisha is revived.

[35] Cf. e.g., Revelation 20:2: "that old serpent, which is the Devil and Satan"; Revelation 12:9; Genesis 3.

[36] For Theonoe's name, see Euripides, *Hel.* 13–4; Theonoe goes against her brother's wishes at *Hel.* 998–1029.

[37] Pylades is depicted as a deceptive, Odyssean-type character; cf. Orest who makes fun of Pylades and his plans by saying "Ich hör Ulyssen redden" (I hear Ulysses speaking, 762). It is noteworthy that Goethe spent some time "under the influence of Ulysses's personality," as Stanford (1963, 190) puts it. Goethe planned to write a play on the relationship between Odysseus and Nausicaa, but this was ultimately abandoned. He "admired Ulysses's freedom of action, his fixity of purpose, his iron endurance, his all-pervading alertness and intelligence" (Stanford 1963, 190). It was planned that this play would reveal the "inhumane . . . power of attraction in Ulysses' character" (1963, 191). This concept ties in well with the idea of the "humane" Iphigenie winning out over the Odyssean Pylades in Goethe's *Iphigenie* (cf. note 42 below).

[38] As Goethe explains in a letter to Johann Caspar Lavater dated 9 August 1782 (qtd. in Nisbet 2002, 220).

[39] Cf. esp. Psalm 141:2 for the correlation between prayer and incense, with verse 4: "Incline not my *heart* to any evil thing, to be occupied in deeds of wickedness with men

that work iniquity"; cf. also Luke 1:9–10 and Exodus 30:7–8 for biblical references to the use of incense.

[40] Many eighteenth-century versions include some kind of marriage proposal. Racine's draft has Thoas's son in love with Iphigenia; Thoas is interested in marrying Iphigenia in Stranitzky's opera; in LaGrange-Chancel and Majo a newly invented character Thomiris wants to marry Thoas (in the first case for political reasons, and in the second because she is in love with him).

[41] Stahl (1961, 20) calls Thoas's love for Iphigenie "a romantic episode inconceivable in the Greek play," but it may well have been inspired by *Helen* in which the Egyptian king Theoclymenus pesters Helen to become his wife; cf. Matthiessen 2000, 369, who acknowledges the motif from *Helen* but also explains that it had become popular in Goethe's time to insert a romantic element into classical dramas.

[42] For the suggestion of a father/daughter relationship between Iphigenie and Thoas, see 510–4 and 2154–7, and cf. 486–71. Kerry (2001, 42) comments that "metaphorical family relationships can . . . define distance as when Iphigenie views Thoas as a second father, thus distancing him as a potential suitor."

It is noteworthy that Iphigenie's real father Agamemnon is not demonized in Goethe's play. It is clear from the prologue speech that Iphigenie bears her father no ill will for her sacrifice, believing him to be a noble man, forced to bring her to Aulis under divine compulsion. This can be traced back to the moment in Euripides' *IT* where Iphigenia renounces anger against her father (992–3) to focus on her newfound preoccupation of restoring her ancestral house. In fact, if we read biblical images into some of Orest's statements, it is tempting to see a certain glorification of Agamemnon. Orest describes himself at 617–8 as "ein Ebenbild des Vaters" (the very image of the/my father). That the son should be the image of the father is clearly a biblical echo of the Father and the Son (cf., e.g., Genesis 5:3). Orest then laments his father's absence, and cries: "O wär' ich, seinen Saum ergreifend, ihm / Gefolgt!" (O would that I had seized his hem, and followed him!, 637–8). This image also aligns Agamemnon with God, or more specifically Jesus. The basic meaning of the image in dramatic terms is that Orest wishes he had followed his father into the Underworld and thus been relieved of his present torment. But the specific image of grabbing the hem recalls Matthew 9:20–22 and Luke 8:43–4. I quote the former: "And behold, a woman, which was diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, came behind [Jesus], and touched the hem of his garment: For she said within herself, If I may touch the hem of his garment I shall be whole. And the woman was whole from that hour." The afflicted woman has gained what Orest has not, but longs for—a cure from his torment. An identification between Agamemnon and Jesus in this image shows Agamemnon as a positive life force, while the fact that Orest is in the image of his father foreshadows the expiation of his crimes. Indeed, Orest's affliction is presented in Goethe as inherited sin from his forefather Tantalus, recalling the Old Testament God of Exodus 20:5–6 who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children of the third and fourth generation (see also Stahl 1961, 51). Lindenau (1956, 117–21) draws a parallel between the original sin of Adam for which he is thrown out of paradise, and Tantalus who is punished in Tartarus. But the parallel is not quite as neat as it might first appear. It is not the same to be cast into Tartarus (the equivalent of Hell), and to be put on earth, and Lindenau does acknowledge the difference in the fact that Adam's original sin affects all humanity, while the Tantalid curse is restricted to one family. This concept of vengeful gods reaches a climax in the "Parzenlied" (Song of the Fates) at the end of act 4 (on which see Boyd 1942, 119–24; Lindenau 1956, 150–1; Stahl 1961, 46–7). But the

ancestral curse will be broken by Iphigenie's love and purity and refusal to blemish her heart by lying, a symbol of the new system of justice which replaces the old in the Bible (cf. Trevelyan 1981, 102).

[43] Like Pylades, Arkas believes in the need for human action rather than faith in the gods alone. He presses Iphigenie to accept the king's proposal of marriage in act 4, scene 2. She says: "Ich hab es in der Götter Hand gelegt" (I have left it in the hands of the gods, 1462). To this Arkas responds: "Sie pflegen Menschen menschlich zu erretten" (They are wont to save humans by human agencies, 1463).

[44] Even Clytemnestra's curse on Orestes is described (1164) as "Mutterblutes Stimme" (the voice of a mother's blood) and Clytemnestra is not directly demonized. In Euripides, Orestes refers directly to Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon (at 552), and Helen is demonized for being a hateful creature to all Greeks (at 525).

[45] Cf. the role of women in Goethe's works to "intuitively sense oncoming disaster," noted in Becker-Cantarino 2002, 184. Rehm (1969, 123) discusses the influence of Spinoza's doctrine of "intuitive knowledge" on Goethe.

[46] Cf. Buxton 1982, 51: "No story illustrates the power of erotic *peitho*, and its opposition to *bia*, better than the encounter between Odysseus and the Sirens in the *Odyssey* . . . no human decision to resist can stand up to the Sirens' seductiveness."

[47] See note 42 above.

[48] Notably, he conceals his and Orest's identity from Iphigenie and invents a bogus intrafamilial killing, and then urges Iphigenie to deceive Thoas, once her identity has been discovered.

[49] During her crisis of conscience, Iphigenie makes a small number of misleading statements to both Arkas and Thoas before coming clean and revealing the truth. Some scholars have seen her purity as tainted because of this, but she is what Goethe termed "verteufelt human" (devilishly human) for all her Christian morals. On Iphigenie's conflict, see Stahl 1961, 39–52; on Iphigenie as "devilishly human," see Becker-Cantarino 2002, 185 and note 3.

[50] On women as moral agents in Greek tragedy, see Foley 2001, 107–299.

[51] See note 26 above.

[52] This episode also reflects Euripides' *Helen* 978–9, in which Menelaus threatens to fight Theoclymenus to death with his sword if Theonoe does not agree to let him escape with Helen.

[53] Liewerscheidt (1997, 226) believes that this detracts from Iphigenie's position of morality, but the dramatization of her decision, and the conflict she goes through, emphasize the difficulty of her situation and heighten the impact and the sense of great moral virtue of the final outcome in which she is completely truthful.

[54] Women do occasionally mourn privately in Greek literature, most notably Penelope in the *Odyssey*, who mourns in private for the presumed death of Odysseus. But a primary function of women in antiquity was public lament, especially in formal death rituals (see esp. Alexiou 1974; Holst-Warhaft 1992), and the majority of female figures in Greek literature, especially in Greek tragedy, are very vocal about their grief.

[55] I cannot agree with Boyle 1992, 465 that Goethe's Iphigenie represents "the powerless" who "continue to seek only an interior victory." Iphigenie is without a doubt the most powerful character in Goethe's drama, and the victory she achieves affects all the characters involved, not just her "interior" self. The irony is that she is powerful *in spite of* her subordinate status as a woman, which was also an integral feature of the Euripidean original.

[56] Lying is not perceived as negative in ancient Greek society in the same way as it is in Christianity. Greeks often valued deception positively (even when the deceiver was a woman, e.g., Penelope); see further Detienne and Vernant 1991 on cunning intelligence in Greek society, and Pratt 1993 on the art of lying in ancient Greek poetry. F. A. Hall (1914) clearly does not take such societal differences into account when he claims (382) that the Iphigenias of Euripides and Goethe "could scarcely be more dissimilar" because Goethe's Iphigenie refuses to lie.

[57] I cannot agree with Reed 1986, 60 who comments as follows: "Iphigenie . . . risks death for herself . . . rather than commit such an action which would make her impure. . . .There are no such scruples in the Greek original." But there *are* such scruples in the original, where Iphigenia similarly risks her life while refusing to break the law of *xenia* by killing the king who is her *xenos.*

[58] Strich (1910, 251) calls this the "rein menschliche Lösung eines von Göttern geschlungenen Knotens" (the purely human solution to a problem [lit. "knot"] posed by the gods). I am grateful to Heike Bartel for this reference.

[59] Hegel 1971, 324, written originally in 1818.

[60] See Matthiessen 2000, 364 on the success of Goethe's binding together of ancient paganism and modern Christianity.

[61] Euripides' play ends with instructions for Iphigenia and Orestes to found new cults, but no prescription is made for the restoration of the ancestral house, in contrast to other treatments of the myth, and the cults themselves are not as positive an outcome as they first appear; on the dark resolution of the *IT* and other Euripidean plays, see Wright 2005, passim.

[62] In the context of the Orient as threatening on the German stage in this period, and Greece as its opposite in the prevalent neoclassicist spirit, it is not insignificant that the contrast between Greek and barbarian is much more muted than one might expect. Thoas is introduced to us in Iphigenie's prologue speech as "ein edler Mann" (a noble man), a marked contrast to his general portrayal as a savage barbarian in eighteenth-century versions (see Matthiessen 2000, 370). Goethe may once more have been directly inspired by the original for his conflation of "Greek" and "barbarian"; on the conflation of Greek and barbarian in Euripides, see E. Hall 1989, 211–22; on the *IT, Helen,* and *Andromeda,* Wright 2005, 158–225.

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Horace and the Construction of the English Victorian Gentleman

STEPHEN HARRISON

The reading, criticism, and imitation of particular classical authors formed a natural part of self-construction for the elite classes in Victorian England, since the centrality of classics in the education of the period ensured that these texts were a key element in contemporary self-fashioning.[1] In this paper I look at the role in this self-fashioning of Horace, in some ways the most congenial of Latin authors for Victorian elite subjectivity. Unlike his fellow Augustan poet Vergil,[2] Horace remained popular among general as well as scholarly readers in Victorian England.[3] Although there are several reports by famous literary figures that they were put off Horace in youth by unimaginative school tuition,[4] the centrality of Horace to the curriculum of the newly influential elite English "public" (private) school[5] was clearly one root cause of this popularity. Fundamental here was the reception and construction of Horace as an honorary English gentleman who represented the values of the male and homosocial Victorian English elite: moderation, clubbability, leisured gentility, patriotism, and (even) religion.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives as one of its definitions of the term "gentleman" (s.h.v. 4, a) "a man of superior position in society, or having the habits of life indicative of this; often, one whose means enable him to live in easy circumstances without engaging in trade, a man of money and leisure." This is roughly how I will use the term here, adding some of the moral ideals and high culture to be found in, for example, the celebrated view of the Victorian gentleman given in J. H. Newman's *The Idea of a University* (first published 1852): "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life."[6] As we shall see, both aspects—leisured and genteel wealth, cultured behavior and manners—make Horace an especially attractive ancient author for the Victorian male elite.

The wide range of Horace's poems, even within the single genre of lyric, the *Odes* being in the Victorian period (as always) the most read of his works, meant that he could be appropriated and reprocessed by the

English elite for a wide range of purposes. But the key factor was the gentlemanly status conferred and implied by a knowledge of the poet-cultural capital, to use Pierre Bourdieu's term (Bourdieu 1984, 53–4). Clive Newcome in W. M. Thackeray's *The Newcomes* (1855) acquires enough classics at Grey Friars (based on the English "public" school Charterhouse) in the 1820s "to enable him to quote Horace respectably throughout life" (ch. 8), the mark of a gentleman and elite member. Horace, in fact, provides the route into the gentlemanly club, literally so in Ronald Knox's *Let Dons Delight* (1939), set in a senior common room in the University of Oxford in 1938 but reflecting established Victorian and Edwardian ideas:

> God knows why it should be so, but as a matter of observation it seems to me quite certain that the whole legend of the 'English Gentleman' has been built upon Latin and Greek. A meets B on the steps of his club and says: 'Well, old man, *eheu fugaces,* what?' and B says '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,*' and the crossing-sweeper falls on his knees in adoration of the two men who can talk as learnedly as that.[7]

This entertainingly absurd exchange of random Horatian tags, dimly recalled from elite education, takes place on the steps of a London gentleman's club, which constitutes the metropolitan analogue of the select Oxford college common room in which the framing conversation itself takes place. It shows both that Horace represented a natural talisman for the elite and (behind the evident irony) how little knowledge of the poet was actually required for such social acceptance.

Horace's elite status is also clear from the other side of the sociological tracks. Several characters in Victorian literature seeking intellectual self-improvement and consequent increase in social standing use Horace as a potential way to success. At one end of the Victorian period, Mr. O'Bleary, the ambitious young Irishman in "The Boarding House" in Dickens's *Sketches by Boz* (1836–7), reads Horace in the evenings, expressive of his desire to rise in the world of London to which he has moved from Dublin.[8] At the other, Jude Fawley in Thomas Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* (1895) studies his Horace on the road with his baker's cart in his quest to become a gentleman and scholar (part 1, ch. 5), and H. G. Wells's autobiographical George Lewisham in *Love and Mr. Lewisham* (1900) reads Horace's *Odes* as a set text for his external London matriculation (ch. 1), the route by which he too hopes to achieve gentlemanly respectability.

Just as Horace's *Odes* could be seen as mapping the leisured lifestyle of

the English male elite, so they could be presented as mirroring other aspects of its ideology. Lord Lytton's translation of the *Odes* and *Epodes,* published in 1869, argues that Horace's interest in moralizing aligned him with the gentlemanly clergy of the Victorian period, even including an implicit allusion to continental travel as a shared gentlemanly experience:

> And out of this rare combination of practical wisdom and poetical sentiment there grows that noblest part of his moral teaching which is distinct from schools and sects, and touches at times upon chords more spiritual than those who do not look below the surface would readily detect. Hence, in spite of his occasional sins, he has always found indulgent favour with the clergy of every Church. Among the dozen books which form the library of the village curé of France, Horace is sure to be one; and the greatest dignitaries of our own Church are among his most sedulous critics and his warmest panegyrists.[9]

Horace's collection in the *Odes* of over a hundred relatively short and diverse poems that often gave moral advice even achieved comparison with the Psalms of the Hebrew Bible in the writing of J. W. Mackail, brought up as a late Victorian gentleman:

> [B]oth volumes have been taken to the heart of the world, and have become part of ourselves. It is interesting to remark that both have this note of intimacy, that the Psalms and the *Odes,* or at least the most familiar among them, are habitually referred to, not by their titles (for they have none), nor by their number in the series, but simply by their opening words. We do not usually speak of the 95th or 114th, the 127th or 130th Psalms, if we wish to be understood, but of the *Venite,* the *In exitu Israel,* the *Nisi Dominus,* the *De Profundis.* And so with Horace one speaks familiarly of the *Integer vitae*, the *Aequam memento*, the *Eheu fugaces*, the *Otium divos*. This secular Psalter, like its religious analogue, has to be supplemented, enlarged, re-interpreted, possibly even cut, for actual use, for application to our own daily life. But both, in their enormously different ways, are central and fundamental; permanent lights on life and aids to living. (Mackail 1926, 148–9)

Horace, then, could be seen as proto-Christian, and his *Odes* as quasi-scriptural, an important affinity in Victorian England where the Christian religion still held a central place in elite society.

In this paper, I examine in some detail the self-definition and self-affir-

mation of the English nineteenth-century male elite through the prism of translating or imitating Horace. Members of the Victorian establishment could demonstrate their cultural capital by producing English renderings of its favorite Latin poet, and the practice of Horatian pastiche and intertextual allusion became extensive.

Theodore Martin, future knight, biographer of Queen Victoria's consort Prince Albert, and pillar of the Victorian establishment, attempted in his translation of the *Odes* and *Epodes* (1860) to provide mid-Victorian equivalents for the Horatian social context. Especially interesting here is his treatment of *Odes* 1.8, in which the poet addresses Lydia and accuses her of turning her lover Sybaris from manly pursuits on the Campus Martius to the softer games of love. The descriptions of leisure pursuits both outdoor and indoor in this poem clearly reflect for Martin the easeful lives of the Victorian elite, often divided between sports and socializing as in the country house weekend, and implies that little has changed in the intervening centuries, as his annotation to the poem shows: "The whole poem, besides its value as a picture still true in all its main features of 'Modern habits and manners, and of the amusements and lighter occupations of the higher classes of society in England,' is delightful for grace, sprightliness and Horatian shrewdness" (Martin 1860, 283). Martin was so taken by this idea that he appended to his translation of the poem a modern version, a fashion followed by other poets (see below), in which the contemporary links are clearly made. In its rendering of 1.8.3–12, in which the original asks why Sybaris is not engaging in Augustan-type exercises of riding, swimming, swordplay, javelin, and discus, the version refers to the Victorian gentlemanly sports of hunting, rowing, cricket, boxing, fencing, and general athletics:

> Before his eyes by love were seal'd,
> He headed every hunting field,
> In horsemanship could all eclipse,
> And was the very best of whips.
> With skulls he was a match for Clasper,
> His bat at cricket was a rasper,
> And ne'er was eye or hand so quick
> With gloves, or foil, or single-stick;
> A very stag to run or jump —
> In short, he was an utter trump.

This version's appeal to contemporary gentlemen is marked not just by the evocation of favorite activities but also by allusions to sporting heroes

of the time (Clasper)[10] and to technical sporting idiolects ("whip" in hunting)[11] and slang terms ("rasper"[12] and "trump"[13]), all reinforcing elite class solidarity for gentlemanly readers.

The common element of leisure shared by Horace and certain sections of the Victorian male elite could also be seen through the angle of retirement from the world. The mature Horace was commonly depicted—based on hints in poems such as *Odes* 1.5, with its allusion to an erotic past, and 3.14, which looks back to his Republican days—as someone who had taken leave of the great world after a tempestuous youth,[14] and so translating Horace's *Odes* could be a suitable occupation for those retired from public life. Lord Lytton's translation of 1869, already alluded to, was written at the end of a long (and sometimes sensational) literary and political career in which he had run through all possible forms of the English novel and served as secretary of state for the colonies.[15] Most famous perhaps in this field was Gladstone's translation of the *Odes* (1894), originally begun as a suitable diversion amid the stresses of his later political campaigns (Morley 1911, 3: 384) but eventually finished in retirement: the day after he resigned as prime minister for the last time (2 March 1894), Gladstone is recorded as working on his translation of Horace, which was then published within months by the workaholic octogenarian ex-premier (Morley 1911, 3: 386).

Most of the celebrated literary men of the Victorian era came from or aspired to membership of the social elite, and the evocation of Horace in their creative work was a signal both of their own elite status or ambitions and of a desire to be accepted by a gentlemanly readership. The common format of Horace's *Odes,* by which another person is addressed, often a real male Roman person, could create an effective cultural triangle in which the reader could participate in the knowledge of Horace shared between the poet and his addressee. Matthew Arnold could famously criticize Horace for not sharing Arnold's own Victorian virtues of industry, quasi-religious commitment, and a desire to improve the world in his 1857 essay *On the Modern Element in Literature,*[16] but a bare decade before we find him addressing a fellow male elite member in a poem that openly advertised itself as a "Horatian Echo" (1847). The poem begins with an injunction not to enquire about politics with detailed topical allusions (1–18):

Omit, omit, my simple friend,
Still to enquire how parties tend,
Or what we fix with foreign powers.
If France and we are really friends,

And what the Russian Czar intends,
Is no concern of ours.

Us not the daily quickening race
Of the invading populace
Shall draw to swell that shouldering herd.
Mourn will we not your closing hour,
Ye imbeciles in present power,
Doomed, pompous and absurd!

And let us bear, that they debate
Of all the engine-work of state,
Of commerce, laws and policy,
The secrets of the world's machine
And what the rights of man may mean,
With readier tongue than me.

As scholars have noted (e.g., Allott 1979, 59), these lines recall Horace's opening address to Quinctius in *Odes* 2.11.1–4, urging him to ignore what foreign peoples plot, even perhaps picking up Horace's verb of advice with a change of prefix (from *remittas* to "omit"):

Quid bellicosus Cantaber et Scythes,
Hirpine Quincti, cogitet Hadria
divisus obiecto, remittas quaerere . . .

Likewise, the central injunction to enjoy the good things in life and the final two stanzas on mortality make the most familiar of Horatian moves in the sympotic odes, from carpe diem to memento mori (e.g., *Odes* 1.4, 4.7), especially in the closing lines (31–6):

The day approaches when we must
Be crumbling bones and windy dust;
And scorn us as our mistress may,
Her beauty will no better be
Than the poor face she slights in thee,
When dawns that day, that day.

The recommendation of the quiet life that this poem carries is both typically Horatian and highly appropriate to the contemporary circum-

stances of the likely addressee, probably the aspiring Liberal politician John Blackett (Allott 1979, 58).

Tennyson's *To the Rev. F. D. Maurice* (1854) similarly and neatly inserts real current affairs into the recognizable frame of the Horatian invitation ode, again in an address to a fellow member of the elite who will recognize the allusions (1–16):

> Come, when no graver cares employ,
> Godfather, come and see your boy:
> Your presence will be sun in winter,
> Making the little one leap for joy.
>
> For, being of that honest few,
> Who give the Fiend himself his due,
> Should eighty-thousand college-councils
> Thunder 'Anathema', friend, at you:
>
> Should all our churchmen foam in spite
> At you, so careful of the right,
> Yet one lay-hearth would give you welcome
> (Take it and come) to the Isle of Wight . . .

As has been persuasively argued in a model treatment (Rudd 1991), this poem plainly picks up a series of elements from *Odes* 3.29, an invitation from the poet to Maecenas to come to the country. Note that Maurice is being invited to Tennyson's country home on the Isle of Wight, Farringford, and to forget the concerns of the city. Maurice had just been removed from his chair at King's College London for religious unorthodoxy, and the consolatory private address of a friend who had been in public trouble might also pick up *Odes* 4.9, apparently addressed to the Lollius who had suffered a major military setback in his German command a few years before (see Syme 1986, 402). Note too that Tennyson (unlike Arnold) uses Horace's characteristic format of the quatrain stanza.

Another (unrecognized) imitation of a Horatian ode by Tennyson can be found in the dedicatory poem (1883) attached to *Tiresias,* addressed to the poet and gentleman Edward Fitzgerald, his friend since their shared Cambridge days and author of the famous version of the Persian *Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyam,* who might naturally be expected to pick up on this Latin link (on Fitzgerald and Horace, see further below). In Horatian manner the ode begins by hailing the addressee, located like Maecenas in *Odes* 3.29 in a rural retreat (1–4):

Old Fitz, who from your suburb grange,
Where once I tarried for a while,
Glance at the wheeling Orb of change,
And greet it with a kindly smile . . .

In the manner of the Horatian ode, the literary works of the friend are complimented: "your golden Eastern lay" (32) and "your Omar" (37) (cf. *Odes* 2.1, to Pollio, alluding to his *Histories*). The poet is explicit about his age ("And I am nearing seventy-four, / While you have touch'd at seventy-five," 43–4), and the poem celebrates the friend's birthday (cf. *Odes* 4.11 on Maecenas's birthday). Tennyson's manuscripts and supervised editions during his lifetime give the poem in continuous form, but it is worth noting that it can be easily broken up into fourteen quatrains that would replicate the four-line stanzas of Horatian odes, clearly a feature of the poem to Maurice (above). Similarly, the quatrain stanzas of Tennyson's celebrated *In Memoriam* (1851), like the poem to Fitzgerald famously dedicated to another Cambridge friend, A. H. Hallam, clearly contain some allusions to Horatian odes that the dead Hallam might have appreciated.[17] Section 115 is plainly a spring ode that reflects similar Horatian meditations on the arrival of that season (cf. *Odes* 1.4, 4.7):[18]

Now fades the last long streak of snow
Now burgeons every maze of quick
About the flowering squares, and thick
By ashen roots the violets blow.

Now rings the woodland loud and long,
The distance takes a lovelier hue,
And drown'd in yonder living blue
The lark becomes a sightless song.

Now dance the lights on lawn and lea,
The flocks are whiter down the vale,
And milkier every milky sail
On winding stream or distant sea:

Where now the seamew pipes, or dives
In yonder greening gleam, and fly
The happy birds, that change their sky
To build and brood; that live their lives

From land to land: and in my breast
Spring wakens too; and my regret
Becomes an April violet,
And buds and blossoms like the rest.[19]

Fitzgerald made use of Horatian material in his magnificent *Rubáiyát* (1859, 1st ed.; 1889, 5th ed.), once again showing his gentlemanly Horatian education. Here again we find quatrain stanzas, overtly mirroring the meters of the Persian original that Fitzgerald claimed to have rendered, but often recalling the *Odes.* The narrating first person of the world-weary, aging epicurean Omar himself, mixing sympotic exhortation to seize the day with splendid moralizing and memento mori nihilism, provides multiple echoes of the Horace of the *Odes.* This is especially clear in the sympotic passages, e.g., stanza 11:

Here with a Loaf of Bread beneath the Bough,
A Flask of Wine, a Book of Verse — and Thou
Beside me singing in the Wilderness —
And Wilderness is paradise enow.

The simple sympotic setting and address to a single beloved as fellow-participant has more than one point of contact with the last poem of book 1 of the *Odes,* 1.38:

Persicos odi, puer, apparatus,
displicent nexae philyra coronae,
mitte sectari, rosa quo locorum
sera moretur.

Simplici myrto nihil adlabores
sedulus curo: neque te ministrum
dedecet myrtus neque me sub arta
vite bibentem.

It has also been noted that the famous words of stanza 51 look back to another Horatian ode (Turner 1989, 106):

The Moving Finger writes: and having writ,
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it.

The reference to "Piety" clearly picks up *Odes* 4.7.21–8, a similar address suggesting that no human qualities can help a man resist death:

cum semel occideris et de te splendida Minos
fecerit arbitria,
non, Torquate, genus, non te facundia, non te
restituet pietas;
infernis neque enim tenebris Diana pudicum
liberat Hippolytum,
nec Lethaea valet Theseus abrumpere caro
vincula Pirithoo.

These literary allusions formed a bond between writer and reader as fellow gentlemen able to detect the intertextual presence of Horace, but were generally earnest in tone. Less earnest uses of Horatian allusion were also known in the Victorian era. Especially entertaining is Thackeray's version of *Odes* 1.38, of which the Latin original has just been cited above, entitled *Ad Ministram*:

Dear Lucy, you know what my wish is, —
I hate all your Frenchified fuss:
Your silly entrées and made dishes
Were never intended for us.
No footman in lace and in ruffles
Need dangle behind my arm-chair;
And never mind seeking for truffles,
Although they be ever so rare.

But a plain leg of mutton, my Lucy,
I prithee get ready at three:
Have it smoking, and tender and juicy,
And what better meat can there be?
And when it has feasted the master,
'Twill amply suffice for the maid:
Meanwhile I will smoke my canaster,
And tipple my ale in the shade.

Here, as Norman Vance (1997, 181) has noted, Thackeray "humorously transforms Horace's preference for Roman simplicity instead of exotic Persian elaboration into a celebration of plain English fare." More inter-

estingly, Thackeray also transforms Horace's address to his male wine-pourer into one to a female attendant (note the title *Ad Ministram*). It is somewhat unclear whether Lucy is to be imagined as the speaker's wife serving her husband at home in a modest household (perhaps implied by "for us") or as a servant being given instructions by her bachelor master (possibly implied by the reference to "the maid").[20] The latter interpretation is especially intriguing: modern Latin scholars have suggested an erotic and pederastic tinge in Horace's address to the wine-pourer and suggestions for his coiffure (West 1995, 191–2), and Thackeray may have picked up this suggestion of sexual partnership in the original.[21] In any case, the addressee's gender is changed to reflect the realities of the life of the Victorian gentleman with whom Horace is otherwise easily identified, and to avoid possible implications of homosexuality.[22]

Thackeray's poem (first published in 1841)[23] was followed by Martin's translation of 1860 (see above), which gave rise to similar Horatian parodies set in Victorian gentlemanly social life. In his *To Q.H.F.,* published in 1873 and explicitly stimulated by Martin's translation (its subtitle is "Suggested by a Chapter in Sir Theodore Martin's 'Horace'"), Austin Dobson, who himself later published translations of Horace,[24] evokes the now familiar idea that modern London, a metropolis set at the heart of an empire, parallels Horace's Rome in the characters and foibles of its genteel population:

Ours is so advanced an age!
Sensation tales, a classic stage,
    Commodious villas!
We boast high art, an Albert Hall,
Australian meats, and men who call
    Their sires gorillas!
We have a thousand things, you see,
Not dreamt in your philosophy.

And yet, how strange! Our "world" to-day,
Tried in the scale, would scarce outweigh
    Your Roman cronies:
Walk in the Park — you'll seldom fail
To find a Sybaris on the rail
    By Lydia's ponies,
Or hap on Barrus, wigged and stayed,
Ogling some unsuspecting maid.

The great Gargilius, then, behold!
His "long-bow" hunting tales of old
    Are now but duller;
Fair Neobule too! Is not
One Hebrus here — from Aldershot?
    Aha, you colour!
Be wise. There old Canidia sits:
No doubt she's tearing you to bits.

Here "world" refers to the social world of the Victorian elite, and the social context is clearly that of the upper classes: "the Park" is plainly London's Hyde Park, resort of the rich for a constitutional ride or walk (though it also skillfully echoes Horace's similarly abbreviated use of *campus* for *campus Martius* at *Odes* 1.8.4, the poem from which the lovers Sybaris and Lydia are also taken), while Hebrus from Aldershot, a town of regimental headquarters, is clearly an army officer (his name and Neobule's passion come from *Odes* 3.12). Though other Horatian genres outside the *Odes* are alluded to here (Barrus is from the *Satires,* Gargilius from the *Epistles,* Canidia from the *Epodes*), we are clearly in the world of Horatian erotic lyric. The meter Dobson uses, though an eight-line rather than four-line stanza, plainly recalls the Sapphic stanza of the *Odes* by echoing the length and rhythm of its short last line in the short third and sixth line: "Commodious villas" is a good English stressed equivalent of that adonean line*, terruit urbem* (*Ode*s 1.2.4).

Much the same is C. S. Calverley's *Contentment—After the Manner of Horace,* published in 1872. In this poem Calverley, who was a considerable classical scholar and a master of meter in Latin, Greek, and English verse, and who had earlier published translations of a number of Horace's *Odes,*[25] matches Dobson in adopting a meter that recalls Horace's Sapphic stanza, this time in Horatian quatrains with a short last line again close to the adonean. The topic is Horatian, too: the man of contentment whom mishaps do not disturb is a comic version of the indifference of the Stoic sage to external disaster famously promoted in *Odes* 1.22 (*integer vitae scelerisque purus*) and 3.3 (*iustum et tenacem propositi virum*). The poem begins with a Horatian-type address to a friend and an imitation of the opening of *Odes* 1.1: in "Friends, there be they on whom mishap / Or never or so rarely comes," the construction of "there be they" is strongly Latinate and echoes *Odes* 1.1.3, *sunt quos.* It then ends with a celebration of the happy life of the carefree English gentleman as he takes a train, evoking the elite pleasure of travel:[26]

And when they travel, if they find
That they have left their pocket-compass
Or Murray or thick boots behind,
They raise no rumpus,

But plod serenely on without:
Knowing it's better to endure
The evil that beyond all doubt
You cannot cure.

When for that early train they're late,
They do not make their woes the text
Of sermons in the Times, but wait
On for the next;

And jump inside, and only grin
Should it appear that that dry wag,
The guard, omitted to put in
Their carpet-bag.

A final example is taken not from poetry but from the most widely read literary form of the Victorian period in the elite classes, the gentlemanly novel. In Thackeray's *Henry Esmond* (1852), his historical novel of the Stuart and early Georgian period in England, we find the embedded story of Tom Trett, who achieves contentment despite bankruptcy (book 3, ch. 4), which ends with the following flourish: "So it was that when Fortune shook her wings and left him, honest Tom cuddled himself up in his ragged virtue, and fell asleep." This clearly echoes the metaphor used by Horace at *Odes* 3.29.53–6, when he talks of wrapping himself in virtue if fortune changes and facing poverty with equanimity:

si celeris quatit [*sc.* Fortuna]
pennas, resigno quae dedit et mea
virtute me involvo probamque
pauperiem sine dote quaero.

As in his poem *Ad Ministram* (discussed above), Thackeray's reuse of Horace is clearly parodic: Horace's dignified statement of philosophical independence is altered in tone by the familiar language ("cuddled," "ragged") and the changed, bathetic ending. But the effect is not to make

fun of Horace: the allusion appeals to a shared knowledge and to an amused and affectionate perception that the earnest original has been significantly redirected to comic purposes.[27]

This rapid and superficial tour of English Victorian elite literature has given some strong indications of how deeply knowledge of Horace, acquired in the course of a gentlemanly education made newly rigorous and more widely available to the upper classes through the recently reformed "public" schools, was embedded in elite male writers and readers of the period, and how the poet could be used by them as a triangulation point in the reinforcement of shared elite status. Translations, subtle intertextual reworkings in major Victorian poets, and comic/parodic uses all point the same way, to Horace as a common currency for exchange, mutual recognition, and class-consciousness within a self-defining elite.[28]

Notes

[1] See esp. Stray 1998, which chronicles the move from classical learning as the mark of an elite amateur in the Victorian period to the professionalization of teaching and scholarship in the twentieth century.

[2] On the mixed reception of Vergil in the British culture of the Victorian period, see Vance 1997, 133–53; F. Turner 1993.

[3] For Horace in Victorian British culture, see Vance 1997, 175–93; Thayer 1916.

[4] E.g., Byron, *Childe Harold,* canto 4 (1818) LXXIV–LXXVII, esp. LXXV. 6–8: "I abhorr'd / Too much to conquer for the poet's sake, / The drill'd dull lesson, forced down word by word"; or Tennyson (see Tennyson 1899, 13).

[5] See Stray 1998; for a case study, Gaisser 1994.

[6] Cited from the 1873 edition (Newman 1873, 208–9). For more on the subject of the gentleman in Victorian England, see Brander 1975; Castronovo 1987.

[7] Knox 1939, 264. I owe this splendid quotation to an address to the Horatian Society given by Emily Gowers in London in July 2003 and published privately in 2004.

[8] This is one of the very few allusions to classical literature in Dickens, who wrote primarily for a nonelite readership.

[9] Lytton 1869, xvii. Note that indeed the most distinguished English Victorian edition of Horace (2 vols., 1874 and 1891) was produced by the Rev. E. C. Wickham, D.D., son-in-law of Gladstone and eventually Dean of Lincoln and a leading churchman.

[10] The Claspers, father and son, Henry (Harry) Clasper (1812–70) and John (Jack) Clasper (1836–1908), were both famed professional oarsmen (see *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* s.h.vv.); the son is likely to be meant here, given his especial fame in the 1850s.

[11] "Whip" here is short for "whipper-in," defined in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (s.h.v.) as "a huntsman's assistant who keeps the hounds from straying by driving them back with the whip. Also called shortly a *whip*."

[12] The *Oxford English Dictionary* (s.h.v.) defines "rasper" as a slang term meaning "a person or thing of sharp, harsh or unpleasant character; also, anything remarkable or extraordinary in its own way."

[13] *The Oxford English Dictionary* (s.h.v.) defines "trump" as a colloquial "term of hearty commendation: a person of surpassing excellence."

[14] Mackail 1897, 111: "Horace had passed meanwhile into later middle life. He had in great measure retired from society, and lived more and more in the quietness of his little estate among the Sabine hills." "Society" and "estate" look to the Victorian gentleman as much as to the Latin poet.

[15] See the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* s.h.v.

[16] Arnold 1970, 74: "Horace wants seriousness . . . the men of taste, the men of cultivation, the men of the world are enchanted with him; he has not a prejudice, not an illusion, not a blunder. True! yet the best men in the best ages have never been thoroughly satisfied with Horace. If human life were complete without faith, without enthusiasm, without energy, Horace . . . would be the perfect interpreter of human life: but it is not; to the best, to the most living sense of humanity, it is not; and because it is not, Horace is inadequate."

[17] For another example see Vance 1997, 178.

[18] The repeated "now" at the head of three consecutive stanzas clearly picks up the pattern *iam* (5) . . . *nunc* (9) . . . *nunc* (11) from *Odes* 1.4, with the first two standing at the head of stanzas.

[19] For further Tennysonian allusions to Horace, see Mustard 1904.

[20] An 1879 illustration of the poem by George Kilburne clearly shows a wife at table with her husband: Thackeray 1879, 183.

[21] For Thackeray's similar detection of a sexual frisson in a scene in the *Aeneid,* see Harrison 2000.

[22] Similarly, Martin (1860) in his translation renders *Ode*s 4.10 (a pederastic poem to the boy Ligurinus) with the title "To a Cruel Beauty," casting the boy as a girl (187).

[23] *Fraser's Magazine,* June 1841.

[24] Seven odes are translated in his collection *Old World Idylls* (1883).

[25] Fifteen odes are translated in his collection *Translations into English* (1866).

[26] The reference to "Murray" may be to a continental guidebook; cf. Cunningham 2000, 681, though the single carpetbag might suggest a country house weekend in England rather than a trip to Paris.

[27] For other Horatian allusions to Thackeray, see Nitchie 1918.

[28] I am most grateful to Barbara Goff for organizing the original conference in Reading and for facilitating the publication of this piece.

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"She Who Steps Along": *Gradiva,* Telecommunications, History

IKA WILLIS

> Gradiva was able to return the love which was making its way from the unconscious into consciousness, but the doctor cannot. Gradiva had herself been the object of the earlier, repressed love; her figure at once [*sofort*] offered the liberated current of love a desirable aim. To indicate the expedients and substitutes [*Auskunftsmitteln und Surrogaten*] of which the doctor therefore makes use to help him to approximate [*nähern*] with more or less success to the model [*Vorbilt*] of a cure by love which has been shown us by our author—all this would take us much too far away from the task before us.
>
> Sigmund Freud, *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva"*

> A receptionist must know how connections are tolerably made, determining which opening will establish communication between two parties or two things—in brief, she must understand how to manipulate the switchboard or she would lose her post.
>
> Avital Ronell, *The Telephone Book*

Introduction

As is clear from the terms in which the citation above is couched, Sigmund Freud's 1906 study, *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva,"* is in part concerned with directness, proximity, and distance. Although certain "expedients and substitutes" are an irreducible part of the doctor's method, his task is nonetheless to reduce the dimension of distance and detour as far as possible: he is to "approximate" a certain immediacy, modeled by Gradiva. To indicate the relation between mediation and immediacy, however, Freud writes, would "take us much too far away from the task before us." In this paper, I intend to follow up, not "the task before us," but rather the very detour that Freud cuts off—to proceed along the lines that he indicates but does not follow in the passage

cited, in order to end up "much too far away" from the immediate task. That is, I will not privilege immediacy and proximity over distance and detour; rather, I will examine the relation between the two, by analyzing the technical structures of mediation that enable (an approximation to) immediacy in *Gradiva.*

I do not specify here whether I mean Freud's 1906 study or Jensen's 1903 novel. Indeed, for reasons that will become clearer in the course of this analysis, I will consistently resist drawing a simple distinction between Jensen's *Gradiva* and Freud's reading of it; rather, I will consider Freud's Jensen's *Gradiva* (or Freud's *Jensen's "Gradiva"*) as its own entity, the text-in-its-reception. This is not to say, however, that Gradiva, the character in Jensen's novel as it is received by Freud, receives a determinable identity that the "original" Gradiva lacked, or that Freud's reading of *Gradiva* gives us more direct (or, for that matter, more mediated) access to a Gradiva who could be considered outside of the intertextual relation in which she is caught. In fact, I argue that, insofar as Gradiva can be said to have an "identity," this identity is constituted by the particularity of the relation between mediation and directness, between an original context (in Jensen's novel, say) and a reception (in Freud's study), in which she participates. By reframing the distinction between mediation and directness, the figure of Gradiva allows us instead to read the structures of mediation that *allow* direct communication between present and past texts. I will show this through a reading of Gradiva's footprint, which connects first-century C.E. Pompeii with (fictional) early twentieth-century Germany, just as a telephonic receptionist connects disparate parties across distances on a technical apparatus.

My task here, too, is a receptionist's task: establishing a "tolerable" connection between the two quotations with which I opened this paper. Although nothing in either text immediately authorizes me to place them in communication—Avital Ronell's text does not address *Gradiva*, for example—it should be clear that Ronell, like Freud, attends in the passage cited to distance, closeness, mediation, and immediacy; moreover, her attention to teletechnological figures suggests that distance and detour may be an irreducible dimension of connection or reception. Alternatively, a more direct path between the two citations can be traced if we detour through Jacques Derrida. Once again, Gradiva's footprint (now as it appears in *Archive Fever*, Derrida's 1996 book on Freud) is the locus of connection: Derrida's reading of Gradiva's footstep relates this indexical sign to the structure of distance and mediation that Ronell analyzes in *The Telephone Book.*

In approaching the question of the relation between mediation and directness—a central one for reception studies—through Freudian psychoanalysis and deconstructive theories of telecommunication,[1] I hope to avoid one of the risks inherent in the use of the term "reception," insofar as this term carries with it a trace of the sender/message/receiver model: this risk is the oversimple separation of these three terms on the circuit. Psychoanalysis, by introducing desire and lack into its account of the subject, troubles the idea of a self-identical, bounded "sender" or "receiver"; and deconstruction enables us to trace a "telephone exchange"—a circuit of sending-and-receiving—which precedes the determination of the points on this circuit into sender/message/receiver. Accordingly, I take up Ronell's figure of the "receptionist," who disturbs the simplicity of this model by drawing attention to the technical manipulations that determine the possible channels of mediation and connection between points on the circuit of transmission, in order to conclude this paper by arguing that Gradiva is a model not only for the analyst but also for the receptionist.[2]

Part One

In Jensen's 1903 novel *Gradiva*, the protagonist, Norbert Hanold, a young German archaeologist, is smitten by the figure of a woman on an ancient frieze. The desire this figure arouses in him is not academic, but sexual; and the singularity—the unsubstitutable, irreplaceable detail—which directs his love towards this woman and no other is the unusual placement of her foot. He names the woman "Gradiva," or "She Who Steps Along" (on the model of Mars Gradivus), and he weaves a reading of the frieze, interpreting it as a sculpture from life, modeled on a Greek woman living in Pompeii at the time of the volcanic eruption.

Hanold's reading is not legitimated by any academic protocol, yet neither is it entirely random, as it might appear. In fact, there are strict technical limitations on his reading of Gradiva: it is highly structured and determined by a set of substitutions, distortions, and transformations. It is for this very reason that Freud devotes a book-length study, *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva,"* to the novel: Freud was struck by the congruence between the novel's narrative and imagery and his own analysis of the mechanisms of repression, for it transpires that Hanold's attraction to Gradiva is the result and symptom of a repressed attraction to a real woman, who physically resembles the figure of the woman on the frieze.

This is played out in Jensen's novel as follows. As his desire for Gradiva becomes obsessive, Hanold persuades himself to travel to Pompeii, where he hopes to find "traces" of the woman who was the model for the figure on the frieze (these traces are literal: consonantly with his attraction to her gait, what he hopes to find is her footprint, preserved in the volcanic ash). Instead, he encounters a woman whom he (and the reader) at first takes for the ghost of Gradiva, since she looks exactly like the woman on the frieze. He has several ambiguous conversations with the woman before it eventually transpires that she is, in fact, a childhood friend of his, Zoe Bertgang, who actually lives on the same street as him in Germany. The novel ends conventionally and happily as the two acknowledge their love for each other and are romantically united.

In *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva,"* having summarized the main events of the novel's plot, Freud states that "the author has presented us with a perfectly correct psychiatric study" (Freud 1959, 43; as indicated by the passage cited as epigraph to this paper, Freud in fact considered *Gradiva* to be a "model" for the analytic cure) and goes on to "reproduce [the story/the case] with the technical terminology of our science" (Freud 1959, 44). This second, technical account of Jensen's *Gradiva* includes a detailed analysis of the psychic mechanisms that have determined Hanold's response to the "Gradiva" figure. For example, Freud writes:

> His phantasies about Gradiva . . . were echoes of his memories of his youthful love, derivatives of those memories, transformations and distortions of them, after they had failed to make their way into his consciousness in an unmodified form. . . . Behind the impression of the sculpture being 'from the life' and the phantasy of its subject being Greek lay his memory of the name Zoe, which means 'life' in Greek. (Freud 1959, 50–1)

Freud, then, traces the technical mechanisms of desire and repression which condition Hanold's reception of the classical artwork, and delineates a structure of tension between the mediation performed by repression ("derivatives . . . , transformations and distortions") and immediacy. He summarizes the narrative structure of the novel, accordingly, as follows:

> The story was set in the frame of Pompeii and dealt with a young archaeologist who had surrendered [*hingegeben*] his interest in life in

> exchange for [*gegen*] an interest in the remains of classical antiquity and was now brought back to real life by a roundabout path [*Umwege*] which was strange, but perfectly logical. (Freud 1959, 10)

Freud is punning here on the name of the real live woman who is the true object of Hanold's repressed sexual desire, Zoe ("life," in Greek). For Freud, both the narrative and Hanold's neurosis originate with the "exchange" or "surrender" of "real life" (Zoe) for archaeology: this exchange takes up a position in the set of "expedients and substitutes" that structure both the novel and the unconscious mechanisms of repression. Gradiva is both a substitute for and a symptom of Hanold's desire for Zoe: she both bars his access to Zoe (since he has *surrendered* his interest in life for an archaeological passion) and connects him to Zoe by a "roundabout path" (since Hanold's feelings about Gradiva are "echoes . . . derivatives . . . transformations and distortions"—that is, coded representations—of his feelings for Zoe). The movement of the novel, according to Freud's summary, is the surrender of Zoe for Gradiva, followed by the return from Gradiva to Zoe.

Yet it is also possible to read this the other way round, since what occurs at the end of the novel in fact seems to be the surrender of archaeology in exchange for "life," so that "real life" now appears to be merely a substitute for the "real" archaeological desire. The novel ends with two lovers walking through Pompeii together. Hanold asks Gradiva to go a little ahead of him. "She understands," Freud writes. That is, she receives Hanold's meaning and responds to Hanold's desire:

> And, pulling up her dress a little with her hand, Zoe Bertgang, Gradiva *rediviva*, walked past, held in his eyes, which seemed to gaze as in a dream; so, with her quietly tripping gait, she stepped through the sunlight over the stepping-stones to the other side of the street. (Cited in Freud 1959, 40)

At the end of the novel, then, Zoe is in fact standing in for Gradiva, rather than the other way round, as Freud's reading would have it: Hanold desires Zoe insofar as she is a substitute for a substitute. The novel appears to end by fulfilling not Hanold's desire for Zoe (which would return him to "real life"), but his antiquarian desire for Gradiva. Gradiva's name, as noted, derives from her gait. This gait is, in its specificity, inextricably associated with Pompeii: Hanold believes that the arching placement of her stepping foot, with only its toes and the ball of

the foot in contact with the ground, corresponds to the stepping-stones uncovered by archaeologists on the streets of Pompeii. Thus her gait fixes her in a particular spatial and temporal context, relating her not to Zoe but to Hanold's "interest in the remains of classical antiquity," to which Freud has *opposed* Hanold's desire for Zoe. If, as Freud's summary of the novel suggests, Hanold's archaeological desires are a detour away from and a barrier to the fulfillment of his sexual desires—if they are indeed in opposition to one another—then the novel seems to end with the victory of the archaeological over "real life." That is to say, where at first it seemed that the substitute, Gradiva, in fact delivered Hanold's desire to its true object, Zoe, now it is possible to reverse those positions: Hanold's desire, having gone irretrievably astray, is now directed straight at Gradiva, and Zoe can only be reincorporated into its circuit insofar as she agrees to occupy the position to which Hanold's desire was mistakenly delivered. It could be argued, then, that Hanold's acceptance of "real life," of the unmediated presence of Zoe, is itself a sacrifice, a substitute, or an expedient, allowing him to *approximate* (remember that the novel, in Freud's reading, is obsessed with *closeness*, proximity, detour, distance) the fulfillment of his archaeological desire.

I do not, in fact, wish to argue for the "real" priority of one desire over the other: rather, I seek to draw attention to a tension in Freud's study. On the one hand, Freud sees Hanold's desire for Gradiva as nothing but a *symptom*—a derivation, distortion, or transformation—of his desire for Zoe; but on the other, in his analysis of the first dream in the novel, Freud asserts the coexistence of *two* desires in Hanold's psyche: one for Gradiva, and one for Zoe.[3] Freud enumerates the desires that have constructed Hanold's dream as follows:

> The first was a wish, understandable in any archaeologist, to have been present as an eye-witness at the catastrophe in the year 79 AD. What sacrifice [*Opfer*] would an archaeologist think too great if this wish could be realized in any way other than in a dream? The other wish, the other constructor of the dream, was of an erotic nature: it might be crudely and also incompletely stated as a wish to be there when the girl he loved lay down to sleep. (Freud 1959, 93)

This passage echoes Freud's summary of the novel cited above, in which he writes that Hanold "had surrendered" his interest in real life in exchange for archaeological interests; here, however, he suggests that the fulfillment of archaeological desire might be worth such a sacrifice. More importantly, though, in the dream the desire relating to "real life"—the

desire "to be there when the girl he loved lay down to sleep"—is present *alongside* the archaeological desire, rather than in a relation of sacrifice, surrender, substitution, or symptom.

Freud's analysis of the dream does not fully explore the relation between Hanold's two desires, or, more importantly, the question of whether they are indeed two separate desires, as in the dream, or only one desire and its symptom, as in Freud's account of Hanold's "surrender" of his interest in Zoe/life in exchange for his interest in the remains of classical antiquity. The complexity of the relation between these two desires corresponds to the complexity of the relation between Zoe and Gradiva, and indeed the object(s) of Hanold's one or two desire(s) are Gradiva (the desire for immediate communication with the past) and Zoe Bertgang (the desire for sex in the present).

In the terms used in Freud's reading of the novel, the delusion "Gradiva" is sometimes differentiated from "Zoe," the "real" woman, and sometimes not;[4] Gradiva is *both* the site of the difference between Gradiva and Zoe, *and* the site of their identity. The name Zoe Bertgang, in its translatability, marks both the identity and the opposition between Zoe and Gradiva: she is *Zoe*, "life," a real woman rather than a frieze, a phantom, or a delusion, yet she is also named by the very word—*Gradiva, Bertgang*—that identified Hanold's invented woman in her specificity. Gradiva and Zoe Bertgang coincide in the gait, the stepping-along, which constitutes (t)he(i)r identity as the object of Hanold's desire; they are differentiated in their relation to "life."

This differentiation, however, relies on a determinable difference between life and death, and thus, in general, on the difference between presence and absence, and on a nonreversible, linear chronology. In *Gradiva*, and in conceptualizing reception in general, this difference and this chronology both do and do not hold. It is for this reason that I turn to *Gradiva*, and to Freud's reading of it in terms of the temporality of repression, in order to understand the temporal complexity of reception. For reception, like Hanold's subjectivity, is structured by a particular form of relation between mediation and immediacy, between detour and directness—between the immediacy of a reader's encounter with a text or artwork, and the chronological distance across which that text has been transmitted.

It is not accidental that in *Gradiva* the privileged metaphor for this temporality—the temporality of repression—is Pompeii.[5] Freud writes:

> [Hanold's] phantasy transported [Gradiva] to Pompeii . . . because no other or better analogy could be found in his science for his remarkable

> state, in which he became aware of his memories of his childhood friendship through obscure channels of information. . . . There was a perfect similarity between the burial of Pompeii—the disappearance of the past combined with its preservation—and repression. (Freud 1959, 51)

Pompeii represents both the "disappearance" of the past, the inexorably unidirectional movement of chronological time that bars access to the past, *and* its "preservation," that is, the presence of the past in the present. Like a repressed memory, the past is unable to make its way into present consciousness "in an unmodified form," yet it *acts* in the present by means of certain "obscure channels of information."

Moreover, archaeology promises the *material* existence of the past in the present. The archaeological site of Pompeii is, once again, the site of a certain relation between immediacy and mediation. Jensen writes that Hanold goes to Pompeii

> in order to see whether he could find any traces [*Spuren*] of [Gradiva]. And 'traces' literally; for with her peculiar gait she must have left behind an imprint of her toes in the ashes distinct from all the rest. (Cited in Freud 1959, 17)

That is, Gradiva's footprint will be an immediately legible mark of her identity, of her (past) *presence* at a certain point in space. Her footprint promises—to anticipate Derrida's reading in *Archive Fever*, which I will explore later in this paper—a certain indistinguishability between "imprint" and "impression." That is, the *sign* of Gradiva's presence, her having-been-there, is not modified, distorted, or transformed through conventional, aesthetic, or other technical structures of transmission: as an indexical sign, it is the material survival of the past, just as it was, in the present. This mark of Gradiva's having-been-there is, of course, the sign simultaneously of presence and absence, of the disappearance and the preservation of the past. By marking the absence of what was once there, the footprint represents the inaccessibility of the past, the *distance* between Gradiva and Hanold. But simultaneously, by telescoping (or, to anticipate, once more, the technical terminology that I will introduce later in this paper, telephoning across) that distance, bringing the past *into* the present, making Gradiva's footstep into a moment of the present, it destroys the unidirectional historical chronology that is maintained by the inaccessibility of the past, installing instead the more complex chronology, the "obscure channels," of repression.

This complexity is what, in *Gradiva*, calls to be read, not only by psychoanalysis, but also by reception studies. Reception is structured by the disappearance and preservation of the past. This central problematic of reception studies can thus be reframed in the terms used by those writers who deal with the paradoxical situation in which distance and detour are the condition of possibility of direct communication, that is, those writers who address the question of telecommunications technologies, in particular the telephone.[6] In the remainder of this paper, therefore, through a reading of Freud's and Derrida's readings of *Gradiva* in the light of this work on teletechnology, I attempt to account for the relation between disappearance/distance and preservation/proximity that structures reception.

Part Two

The complex temporality of repression is inscribed at the very point that most densely figures Hanold's one or two desire(s): Gradiva's footprint, the sign of the gait by which her identity is constituted and also, as I began to indicate above, the marker of the disappearance-and-preservation of the past.

My reading in this part of the paper follows Freud in a particular (deconstructive) way that itself aims to be a model of reception. I cite again the epigraph to this paper:

> Gradiva had herself been the object of the earlier, repressed love; her figure at once [*sofort*] offered the liberated current of love a desirable aim. To indicate the expedients and substitutes [*Auskunftsmitteln und Surrogaten*] of which the doctor therefore makes use to help him to approximate [*nähern*] with more or less success to the model [*Vorbilt*] of a cure by love which has been shown us by our author—all this would take us much too far away from the task before us. (Freud 1959, 90)

Here Freud characterizes Gradiva by immediacy (*sofort*) and directness. The fact that Gradiva is *both* the analyst *and* the object of Hanold's repressed desire means that the cure coincides with the analysis, in a manner not possible for the doctor who can only approximate (*nähern*), come as *near* as he can, to this model through substitutes and expedients. Elsewhere, however, Freud has said that Hanold is returned to life by "a roundabout path" (*Umwege,* literally "detours"): in this case the doubleness of Gradiva—here as symptom and as repressed object—is a *barrier* to

directness, since, as symptom of a repressed love, she is subject, as we have seen, to distortions and transformations.

Perhaps, then, it is the case that directness is only possible *through* detours. If that is the case, I am following Freud precisely by *not* following him: by pursuing the detour, the "expedients and substitutes," which he fears would take us "much too far away from the task before us," that is, by pursuing his insight into the irreducibility of detour, rather than by his more conventional privileging of an immediacy that effaces detour.

According to Freud's reading of Hanold's dream, both Gradiva and Zoe represent *presence*, immediacy, proximity: the two wishes that structure the dream are the wish "to have been present" (at the eruption in Pompeii) and the wish "to be there" (with Zoe). Hanold, like Freud, desires an immediacy that is granted to Hanold, although not to Freud. And the question of whose desire I am reading, when I read Freud's account of Hanold's desire, is another important question for reception: Gradiva, for Freud, is a figure for an impossible coincidence—she is both the analyst and the object of the analysand's desire—just as, for Hanold, she is the site where his desire to "be present" at Pompeii in the past impossibly coincides with his desire to "be there" with Zoe in the present.

But what *is* this immediacy, this co-presence, this "being there" that Hanold and Freud desire? For Hanold, just as much as for Freud, this idea of "presence" is highly mediated; it is predicated on a complex structure of mediation, distance, detour, exchange, surrender, expedient, and substitute—that is, repression—out of which the "directness" that resolves the novel appears to crystallize. Might this desire for presence really be the desire for a certain form of mediation?

There is a third dimension to Zoe/Gradiva to which I have so far paid little attention. As already cited several times, Freud writes that Hanold "had surrendered his interest in life in exchange for an interest in the remains of classical antiquity and was now brought back to real life by a roundabout path." As the analyst (whose analysis is, as Freud states, an inimitable model of directness), Gradiva is not only "real life" and "the remains of classical antiquity," but *also*, as befits the way her identity is constituted through her gait, the "roundabout path" that *connects* the two. That is, she participates in and figures the structure of mediation that enables and influences reception, the structure of relation between directness/presence and mediation/absence/temporal distance.

Hanold's desire for Gradiva participates in this Pompeian movement between presence/immediacy and mediation/absence. I have just said that it is Pompeii, as a specific archaeological site, which enables

Gradiva's footprint to be read in its singularity ("With her peculiar gait she must have left behind an imprint of her toes in the ashes"). Since, in fact, it is out of Gradiva's stepping that Pompeii appears in the novel in the first place, this is another reversible statement (Pompeii enables Gradiva's footprint to be read; Gradiva's footprint allows Pompeii to be deduced). Freud writes:

> [Hanold] convinced himself . . . that [Gradiva] must be transported to Pompeii, and that somewhere there she was stepping across the curious stepping stones which have been dug up and which made it possible to cross dry-foot from one side of the street to the other. (Freud 1959, 11)

The placement of her foot, that is to say, corresponds to the topography of the road surfaces recently discovered in Pompeii, and therefore fixes her in space (and in time, since Pompeii is frozen in 79 C.E. in Hanold's imagination—he is sure that Gradiva died in the eruption).[7] As discussed above, what Hanold loves about Gradiva is her gait; this constitutes her identity *as* Gradiva (She Who Steps Along), and fixes her in the particular temporal and spatial context of Pompeii in 79 C.E. Her identity, therefore, appears not to be detachable from this historical context, and it seems that the object of Hanold's desire is indeed inaccessible by its very nature.

Yet, we are told, the reason that Hanold finds Gradiva's gait so attractive in its specificity is because it has something "of today" about it (Freud 1959, 50). What makes her gait recognizable in its association with Pompeii, the long-gone past, is its contemporary quality. Again, Hanold's desire participates in the complex mediation/immediacy relation of repression or reception. What constitutes Gradiva's identity as the object of Hanold's desire is her function as an apparatus of *relation* between times. He can only desire Gradiva's gait in its disappeared pastness because of its preservation in the present. Moreover, since, as Freud (1959, 50–1; Freud's emphasis) says, "the ostensibly aesthetic judgement that the sculpture had something 'of today' about it took the place of his knowledge that a gait of that kind belonged to a girl . . . who stepped across the street *at the present time*," it is a desire within Hanold which *calls for an answer from* Gradiva, which then appears as if it had come spontaneously from Gradiva. Hanold's reading of Gradiva is determined not by her historical specificity, nor by Hanold's conscious invention, but by the call-and-response that structures the "obscure channels" connecting Gradiva and Zoe.

Understanding this structure of call-and-response allows us to reframe the relation between immediacy and mediation in *Gradiva*—the relation between Gradiva and Zoe. As we have seen, the directness of the relation between Hanold and Zoe is in fact enabled by *Umwege* (detours). Hanold and Zoe are connected in the relation of immediacy and directness that, for Freud, characterizes "real life" (as opposed to symptoms of repression, which are distorted and transformed), *by* detours. And it is this connection through detour that structures the novel itself, for in *Gradiva* the symptom that substitutes for the desire (Gradiva) actually *delivers* that desire to its original destination (Zoe). That is, the distinction that Freud attempts to make between immediacy and indirectness cannot, in fact, be saved, since each is predicated on the other.

This structure also involves us in the question of desire. Since psychoanalysis intervenes in the sovereign conception of the subject, desire and lack constitute and therefore *precede* the subject, rendering any stable distinction between inside and outside impossible. It is Hanold's desire that turns Gradiva and Zoe into prostheses of himself: Freud (1959, 88) writes that his "treatment consisted in giving him back from the outside the repressed memories which he could not set free from the inside." That is, it is his desire, his lack, which "calls" for fulfillment by Gradiva, so that, once again, what appears to come from the "outside" really originated in the "inside." Desire thus disturbs the distinction between sender and receiver, since Hanold seems to be "receiving" from the outside the very repressed memories that in fact "sent" the call for a response in the first place.

This, then, involves us more deeply in the question of *whose* desire we are reading. If the receiver receives his own desire, then is he really receiving anything? Desire circulates through these texts: as I have suggested above, it is not easy or possible to distinguish between Freud's desire and Hanold's desire—and what about Jensen's (and what about mine, and what about yours)? And what, for that matter, about Carl Jung's? For Jung originally drew Freud's attention to *Gradiva*:

> [Jung] recalled that in the work of fiction that had last caught his fancy there were several dreams which had, as it were, looked at him with familiar faces and invited him to attempt to apply to them the method of *The Interpretation of Dreams.* (Freud 1959, 9–10)

What repressed desires of his own might Jung have been recognizing in the "familiarity" of these faces? What might have been the "Zoe" to *his*

(reading of Jensen's) Gradiva? And what mechanisms of substitution account for the fact that it is *Freud* who answers the "invitation" that these dreams extended to Jung?[8]

As Jung, reading *Gradiva*, felt that it called to be read through the technical terminology of the *Trauerspiel,* so, in the light of this complex circuitry and exchange of desire(s), I hear a call from *Gradiva* to be read through the figure of teletechnology as it has been invoked and analyzed in particular by Derrida in *The Post Card* (1987) and Ronell in *The Telephone Book* (1989).[9] These analyses precisely connect[10] the question of the circulation of desire with the transformations that technologies of telecommunication perform on the conceptualizing of distinctions between presence/absence, proximity/distance, inside/outside—and between sender, message, and receiver. Hanold and Gradiva, as we will see, are involved in a telephonic or postal structure.

In *The Telephone Book*, Ronell analyzes the first moment in history when words (Alexander Graham Bell's "Come here, Watson, I want you") were successfully sent and received through a telephone. First she reads the sentence itself:

> The command attracts different registers of interpretive valency. . . . Come forth, manifest yourself, Wat-son, cut the lines that separate us but whose wound enables me to command your arrival, your destination and destiny. . . . 'I want you' suggests that desire is on the line. . . . I want that which I do not possess, I do not have you, I lack you, I miss you. . . . He calls out, he desires, he lacks, he calls for the complement or the supplement. (Ronell 1989, 228)

The first call on the telephone expresses desire for physical or material presence, the very desire(s) that structure(s) Hanold's first dream. Yet, as Ronell puts it, the "lines that separate us" (and which therefore, by separating, make that call for presence necessary) are precisely what "enables me to command your . . . destination." Gradiva functions according to this structure: she is both the symptom of a *repressed,* and therefore absent, object of desire, and the "roundabout path" that delivers that object "at once" (*sofort*) to Hanold, both the separation and the possibility of communication. Ronell's reference to the "supplement," invoking Derrida's mobilization of that term in *Of Grammatology*, also illuminates the structure of Hanold's desiring call to Gradiva: Hanold, like Bell, calls for "the complement or the supplement," that is, for that which will *complete* him and make up for the lack that he experiences ("I

want you/I lack you"). Hanold must be completed by something outside himself—but following the logic of the supplement, not *entirely* outside himself, otherwise it could not be something that he "lacked," for in that case it would be entirely other to him and thus not able to complete him.

Ronell goes on to explore the temporality of the telephonic call. She writes, regarding "the original words of what Watson calls the art of telephony":

> However, by the time this [original] sentence was produced, the telephone was itself old enough to come up with an intelligible sentence, old enough to rearrange Watson on the receiving line, for the telephone experimented with this couple, regularly changing its positions, making it difficult to determine who was the sender, who the recipient—who, in other words, was responsible for its birth. (Ronell 1989, 229)

The telephone is, paradoxically, older than its parents: it is "old enough to come up with" the sentence that marks the moment of its birth. The telephonic structure precedes, and "experiment[s] with," the positions of sender and receiver. That is, instead of there being a sender and a receiver who make use of an available technical structure in order to transmit with more or less success a determined message, the technical structure of the telephone *produces* the sender and the receiver. Similarly, it is that unique gait of Gradiva's which, as we have seen, is the point of connection and differentiation between Zoe in the present and Gradiva in the past, and which thus produces Zoe, Gradiva, and Hanold as positions on the circuit of Hanold's desire.

This technical structure allows us to reformulate one of the central problems of reception studies, namely how to theorize the reception of a text or an artwork in a specific historical moment without seeking the "truth" of the text either in the moment of its production or in the moment of its reception. It is clear that a receiver, however "active," does not read entirely at random nor create a text from scratch; but neither is she an entirely passive or inert surface of inscription for an already constituted text, "reading" a determined message from it as a computer "reads" data from a disk. Considering the text, its point of origin, and its point of reception as points on a telecommunicative circuit of desire enables us to avoid such oversimplifications, by submitting to examination the distinction between sender and receiver and the structures that connect and distinguish them, rather than taking these for granted.

In *The Post Card*, Derrida writes very beautifully and rigorously about the structure of the post as call-and-response and about the disturbances in the positions of sender and receiver that follow from such a rigorous thinking of the post. This passage comes in a series of meditations on a postcard reproducing a medieval picture showing Socrates ("S.") apparently writing at Plato's ("p.") dictation:[11]

> Example: if one morning Socrates had spoken for Plato, if to Plato his addressee he had addressed some message, it is also that p. would have had to be able to receive, to await, to desire, in a word to have *called* in a certain way what S. will have said to him; and therefore what S. . . . pretends to invent . . . p. has sent himself a post card (caption + picture), he has sent it back to himself from himself, or he has even 'sent' himself S. And we find ourselves . . . on the itinerary. . . .
>
> When he writes, when he sends, when he makes his *(a)way,* S is p, finally is no longer totally other than p. (finally I don't think so at all, S. will have been totally other, but if *only* he had been totally other, truly totally other, nothing would have happened between them, and we would not be at this pass . . .). (Derrida 1987, 30)

In order to be able to receive a message, Derrida suggests, an addressee must have called, and therefore in a certain way or to a certain extent *determined*, what he will receive. What is received from outside the receiver thus originates in part from inside the receiver, for if there were ever to be a relation of absolute alterity between sender and receiver, nothing could happen between them: no message could be sent or received.

Gradiva, too, is a postcard that Hanold sends himself. As Freud's reading of the novel makes explicit, it was Hanold's repressed attraction to Zoe that initiated his original strong erotic response to Gradiva, a response that then sent him to Pompeii, where he found, far from his own home and appearing at first to be Gradiva, Zoe, the woman who lived in the same street as he. Gradiva, then, who at first appeared to be the cause, is in fact the effect of Hanold's sexual attraction to Zoe; appearing to originate from outside Hanold, she turns out to be a coded message from his own unconscious. In other words, Gradiva, who appears to be the original of Zoe, is in fact produced in her legibility to Hanold *by* Zoe. That is, it is Zoe who determines the manner of Gradiva's reception in Hanold: Zoe (as that which Hanold desires, that is, as the lack within Hanold) is the apparatus of reception that determines Hanold's reading of Gradiva. Inside and outside become difficult

to distinguish here, as the "outside" becomes a point on the circuit of self-relation in the neurotic subject. Ronell, recalling Freud's statement that Hanold's "treatment consisted in giving him back from the outside the repressed memories which he could not set free from the inside," writes (1989, 85) of the telephone that it, like the unconscious, is "to be understood as that which is inside the subject but which can only be realized in a dimension of outside." This confuses the relation between sender, message, and receiver, since Hanold appeared to receive the message that he "called" (in the terms Derrida uses for Socrates and Plato) and therefore sent.

Gradiva, then, is, as Freud would have it, the structure of mediation that enables the relation between Hanold and Zoe. This structure, however, is far more complicated than one of instrumentality or representation, since it is Gradiva who connects and also distinguishes Hanold and Zoe. It is not only through Gradiva's mediation that Hanold is united with Zoe, but also through Gradiva's mediation that he is able to receive Zoe "from the outside" and thus to set free the repressed desire within himself. Gradiva, in other words, is the receptionist who puts through the call from Hanold to Zoe.

But there are no telephones in Jensen's novel. The technical structure that functions like a telephone is Gradiva's footprint; this is the site on which, as I have argued, Hanold's one or two desire(s) are connected and differentiated. Gradiva's *step*—her footprint as an archaeological object, as well as the way her gait contains its spatiotemporal context within itself, being legible only within the context of Pompeii—is the point at which the mediating structures of reception/repression are working hardest. Yet it is also the point at which they function in such a way as to efface themselves, just as the telephone, predicated on distance, effaces the distance that bars communication between a speaker and a receiver.

Hanold's desire, we can now see, is indeed a desire *for* a certain kind of mediation. His desire to be present is the desire (understandable, Freud says, in any archaeologist: I would say that this archaeological desire is the desire of the reception scholar) to be at the point where presence and absence are the same thing—where "real life" and the "remains of classical antiquity" coincide, where they are perfectly superimposed to the point of indifferentiation. Derrida eloquently describes this desire in *Archive Fever.* It is both Freud's desire and Hanold's desire:

> Freud . . . wants to exhume a more archaic *impression* . . . an imprint that is singular each time, an impression that is almost no longer an archive

> but almost confuses itself with the pressure of the footstep that leaves its still-living mark on a substrate, a surface, a place of origin. Where the step is still one with the subjectile. . . .
>
> Hanold . . . dreams . . . of reliving the singular pressure or impression which Gradiva's step, the step itself, the step of Gradiva herself, that very day, at that time, on that date, in what was inimitable about it, must have left in the ashes . . . of the pressure and its trace in the unique *instant* when they are not yet distinguished the one from the other. . . . The trace no longer distinguishes itself from its substrate. (Derrida 1996, 97–99)

Gradiva's footprint promises a moment when the past in its inimitable, singular uniqueness (the "imprint," the "pressure," the indexical sign or inscription in the "real") is indistinguishable from its record (the "impression," the "trace," the archival inscription). The desire that circulates between and beyond Gradiva, Hanold, Zoe, and Freud, this desire that is understandable in any archaeologist, the desire to "be there," is the desire for this indistinguishability, for this proximity, this coincidence between the past and its record. Hanold wants to be there "as an eye-witness at the catastrophe of 79 AD." This desire is slightly odder than it might seem, since it is precisely this moment—the catastrophe—that is preserved at least partially in the present. Why does Hanold not wish to be in a more inaccessible moment of the past?[12] What he desires is to be there at the moment when history and archive *coincide.* He desires their connection-through-distance, not their identity. He desires the particular structure of mediation that makes this coincidence possible. As Derrida (1996, 98) says, "Hanold suffers from archive fever (*mal d'archive*)": he is madly in love, not with presence, but with the archive.

If Gradiva's footstep promises a *coincidence* between the past and its archive, it is also the point at which these two are differentiated and at which their nonidentity is brought to light. The directness, the immediacy, the dimension of *sofort* that Freud identifies in Gradiva, is an effect of the indirectness, the nonidentity, between the past and its record. The possibility of the indivisibility of pressure and trace, trace and substrate, is opened by the "immanent divisibility" or "iterability" that haunts Gradiva's footstep from the very beginning. Derrida writes that the instant of Gradiva's footstep "presupposes . . . the archive." He goes on:

> The possibility of the archiving trace, this simple *possibility*, can only divide the uniqueness. Separating the impression from the imprint.

> Because this uniqueness . . . would have been possible . . . only insofar as its iterability, that is to say, its immanent divisibility, the possibility of its fission, haunted it from the origin. (1996, 100)

Gradiva's footstep, then—not only its legibility in times and places other than the instant of its formation, but even its uniqueness, its promise of fixity in space and time—is made possible by an archival apparatus that Derrida here names "iterability." The archive divides and haunts Gradiva's footstep; the uniqueness of the instant of the step is enabled only by the iterability that conditions its legibility.

Gradiva's footstep, as it appears in *Archive Fever*, brings to light the structure of iterability that precedes and enables its uniqueness. This means that the footstep cannot any longer be read as if its transmission were transparent and direct: its conditions of legibility become part of it as an object of reading. The desire(s) of Freud and of Hanold correspond(s) to this structure of reception.

Gradiva is the model, then, not for the analyst—or rather for a directness to which the analyst can only approximate—but for the receptionist. The position of the receptionist troubles the structure sender/message/receiver, by making visible the technical structures that enable a connection to be made between sender and receiver and that, at the same time, separate sender from receiver. The receptionist connects, yes; she fulfills the archaeological desire to "be there." But what she makes plain, in her irreducible attention to detour, distance, and technicity, is that that desire, by its very nature, can only be fulfilled by a roundabout path, the "roundabout path" that Freud has described as "strange, but perfectly logical," obeying the strange logic of the telephone or the postal system. Reception studies can learn a lot from turning its attention, not to the receiver, but to the receptionist.[13]

Notes

[1] The three major deconstructive texts I cite here—Derrida's *The Post Card* and *Archive Fever*, and Ronell's The *Telephone Book*—are all profoundly engaged with Freud; it is, however, outside the scope of this paper to trace the (important) debt that these theories of telecommunication owe to Freud's work.

[2] It could be argued that the psychoanalyst is herself nothing but a receptionist, making connections between the patient's conscious and unconscious minds. See, e.g., Ronell 1989, 99: "The orthodox view of the [psychoanalytic] session required the retreat of the analyst into the position of an ear that occasionally responds; in short, early psychoanalysis advanced an ear-mouth connection so that the unconscious might be hooked up and encouraged to speak. . . . The question . . . of unconscious transmissions is articu-

lated in psychoanalysis according to a telephonics, that is, according to a problematics of putting through calls from the unconscious, always subject to being cut off."

[3] The importance of this analysis is suggested by the title of Freud's study, *Delusions and Dreams*; one of its ambitions is to demonstrate that the dreams in the novel conform to the rules for the production and structuring of dream material laid down in the *Trauerspiel.* That is, what called for the reading Freud performs were the dreams in *Gradiva.* He writes, in a passage I will discuss in some more detail later in this paper, that Jung "recalled that in the work of fiction that had last caught his fancy there were several dreams which had, as it were, looked at him with familiar faces and invited him to attempt to apply to them the method of *The Interpretation of Dreams*" (Freud 1959, 9–10). Although I do not address the question here, it would be possible to write another paper on the way that Freud conceptualizes the relation between psychoanalysis and literature in this study. His reading of *Gradiva* is in part driven by the question, *How,* exactly—by what means, by what technical mechanisms—does *Gradiva* call for a psychoanalytic reading? How is this call put through?

[4] For example, in a discussion of the origin of various details in Hanold's delusion (1959, 51), Freud differentiates between the living, German Zoe Bertgang and the imaginary, Greek/Pompeian Gradiva: "The details about *Gradiva*'s father originated from Hanold's knowledge that *Zoe Bertgang* was the daughter of a respected teacher at the University" (my emphases). In general, Freud attempts to use "Gradiva" to refer to "the woman that Hanold fantasizes is Gradiva" and Zoe to refer to "the living woman, the agent of the speeches and actions interpreted by the delusional Hanold" or to the living Zoe Bertgang as she appears in the novel after Hanold is cured of his delusions. So, e.g., Freud 1959, 31, where he switches terms in consecutive sentences: "The 'bumping and thumping' whose dominance in their childhood was shown by *Zoe's* words? And think, again of how *Gradiva* asked the archaeologist whether it did not seem to him that they had shared a meal like this two thousand years before." Since, however, the distinction is not always possible, Freud sometimes uses "Zoe-Gradiva" (e.g., 1959, 29); but it is telling that, towards the end of the book, he "lapses" into using *Gradiva* only, even in contexts where it is clear that he must mean the living woman (e.g., 1959, 89, where Freud discusses "the similarity between Gradiva's procedure and the analytic method of psychotherapy").

[5] This is, of course, not the only text in which Freud invokes Pompeii, or archaeology in general, in order to metaphorize repression. See, e.g., the extended archaeological metaphor that introduces "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (Freud 1962, 192) and its discussion by Derrida in *Archive Fever* (1996, 93–4).

[6] The telephone removes speech from its position as the privileged index of spatial presence/proximity, just as archaeology displaces the footprint from its position as the index of temporal proximity. Elsewhere, in my Ph.D. dissertation "*Discors Machina*: Rome and the Teletechnology of History" (University of Leeds, 2004/5), I have discussed the impact of telephonic technologies on logocentric concepts of space, time, and subjectivity, and related this to Gradiva's stepping along as an alternative spatialization of historical time.

[7] "Pompeii" thus equivocates between Pompeii, the town "as it was" in 79 C.E., and Pompeii, the archaeological site existing in Jensen's and Freud's day.

[8] Gradiva, like the telephone, originates in a correspondence between two men; see below on the "birth" of the telephone in the exchange of words between Bell and

Watson. It would be possible to read the relationship between Freud and Jung in the light of Ronell's (1989) reading of this telephonic exchange of desire.

[9] How is this call put through? That is the question that this paper attempts to answer.

[10] Connect in such a way as to make that connection tolerable, like the receptionist in the second epigraph to this paper.

[11] The card labels Socrates "Socrates" and Plato "plato" (with a lower-case "p"). Since Derrida is concerned with transmission and reception in *The Post Card*, he adopts this notation, rather than "correcting" it, since to correct a typo is to assume that one knew what the writer meant *despite* the literal text in front of one. His use of the initials is to do with a move too complicated to summarize here; it is not relevant to my argument in any case.

[12] The answer to this question is, of course, partly because, by definition, he is not aware of those parts of the past that have left no trace in the present. That is, according to the structure Derrida traces in his discussion of the Socrates/plato postcard, if the past were "truly totally other," nothing could happen between it and the present, between it and Hanold.

[13] A version of this paper, originally presented at the conference "Classical Subjects and Modern Subjectivities," was written during the course of, and is closely related to, my doctoral research, undertaken thanks to a grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB), which I thank.

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